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From the Editor

O

ur Summer issue opens with a Special Commentary by our
contributing editor, Jacqueline Deal, “Prospects for Peace: The
View from Beijing.” Deal urges policymakers to engage in more
“emulative analysis”—thinking more like our rivals and competitors—
when developing foreign policies. Appreciating just how much China’s
views of peace and international order differ from ours, she argues, will
be instrumental in the months and years ahead.
Our first forum, Russian Military Power, presents two articles
addressing Moscow’s military forces. Tor Bukkvoll’s “Russian Special
Operations Forces in Crimea and Donbas” discusses Moscow’s muchimproved special operations forces, how they have been used, and what
impact they might have on Western defense policies. In “Why Russia
is Reviving its Conventional Military Power,” Bettina Renz suggests
Moscow’s recent revitalization of its conventional military forces has
broader utility than merely preparing for offensive action. We must not
forget, Renz contends, strong conventional forces are the stock-in-trade
of great powers, and those aspiring to be great.
The second forum, Challeges in Asia, features two contributions
regarding foreign policy issues in the Asia-Pacific Region. Michael
Spangler’s “Preparing for North Korea’s Collapse: Key Stabilization
Tasks” argues one way to increase the chances of China’s acquiescence to
Korean unification in a post “Kim Family Regime” scenario is to offer
Beijing a nuclear weapons ban on the peninsula. Jin H. Pak’s “China,
India, and War over Water” describes the increasing importance of the
shared waterways that flow between China and India, and their implications for security in the region.
Our third forum, War: Theory and Practice, offers two essays concerning recent and future conflict. Christopher Tuck’s “The ‘Practice’
Problem: Peacebuilding and Doctrine” revisits the question of state- or
nation-building. Tuck maintains the problems of peacebuilding are not
just matters of technique; they are also the product of an inadequate
“theory of victory.” In “Capturing the Character of Future War,” Paul
Norwood, Benjamin Jensen, and Justin Barnes introduce a theoretical
framework for identifying, analyzing, and conceptually preparing for
changes in war’s character. ~ AJE

Special Commentary

Prospects for Peace: The View from Beijing
Jacqueline N. Deal
© 2016 Jacqueline N. Deal

O

ne hundred years ago, on the eve of our entry into World War
I, Americans faced a troubling set of developments at home
and abroad that bear an eerie resemblance to today’s challenges.
While 21st-century “home-grown” terrorists are associated with the
Muslim faith, at the dawn of the 20th century anarchists and leftists
of European and, particularly, Jewish descent were committing acts of
violence against innocent civilians on US soil. This period was the last
time immigrants made up such a large proportion of the US population,
and the country was riven not only by domestic unrest, but also by disagreement over whether to intervene in conflict on the other side of the
ocean. Woodrow Wilson prevailed in the 1916 election on the platform,
“He kept us out of war,” but ultimately, even the most cosmopolitan
occupant of the Oval Office before President Obama could not avoid
sending American troops to defend US allies and interests overseas.
Then, as today, it was tempting to view the use of force through the
prism of what it would mean for progressive American ideals. Opponents
of intervening in World War I argued it would unleash nationalist, industrialist, profiteering tendencies at home, and thus the wise course was to
refrain. Humanity would eventually converge on peace. Confronted with
imperial Germany’s ambition to conquer Europe, President Wilson had
to disabuse his own supporters of the notion that international comity
was on the march. And though Wilson propounded “peace without
victory,” Americans would have to give their lives to oppose German
expansionism, not once, but twice over the next two-and-a-half decades.
At a time when domestic terrorism and tensions with immigrants
appear to be returning to the fore, Americans would do well to remember this history. When we have turned inward in the face of domestic
tensions and hoped international developments would go our way, we
have been bitterly disappointed. While it is tempting to think we can
retreat back within our borders and await the end of history, the other
Jacqueline N. Deal is
guys get a vote, and as it turns out they frequently have other plans.
President and CEO of
For this reason, it is important for national security planners to the Long Term Strategy
(LTSG). Her
perform emulative analysis—to try to think like the decision-makers Group
work has appeared in The
of our rivals or adversaries, who may not share our cosmopolitan, pro- New York Times, Foreign
and The National
gressive ideals. The recent record suggests today, as in the World War Policy,
Interest, along with
I period, we may be so caught up in domestic deliberations—or what academic journals. She
the president calls “nation-building at home”—we have neglected the earned her BA summa
laude from Harvard
emulative analysis mission. The shock of 9/11 can, in part, be traced to cum
and her MPhil and DPhil
the paucity of national security professionals who had read and internal- from Oxford. She was a
ized the writings of terrorist groups like al-Qaeda. The missing nuclear postdoctoral fellow and
lecturer at
arsenal of Saddam Hussein after the Second Gulf War seems to have award-winning
Harvard. Deal is a Senior
reflected a perspective few, if any, American national security experts Fellow of the Foreign
Research Institute
considered—Saddam was bluffing because he wanted his near enemies, Policy
and a term member of
the Shia, to believe he was nuclear-armed and assumed the United States the Council on Foreign
Relations.
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had sufficient intelligence to understand this. And while the sinister
creativity of Putin’s Crimea incursion may have stymied even the most
sincere effort at emulative analysis, it would be more reassuring today
if we could look back and cite indicators we had been tracking, but had
discounted.
None of these episodes rises to the level of World War I, of course.
We currently consider ourselves to be the beneficiaries of a “long peace,”
one that has kept the world free of global conflict since the Korean
War. But from 9/11 to Russia’s forays into Ukraine and Syria, we have at
least learned important lessons about taking seriously the perspectives of
decision-makers from Raqqa and Baghdad to Moscow. We may not be so
lucky with Beijing. Of all our global interlocutors, the People’s Republic
of China (PRC) seems most adept at employing a “salami slicing” or
“silkworm” strategy; it is confronting our allies and partners in a way
that does not breach the threshold of alarming us, even as the balance
of power in contested areas, such as the South China Sea, now tilts in
its favor.
It is thus especially important for us to understand how Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) elites see the world. If the lesson of the 20th
century is the other guys get a vote about the prospects for peace, we
should focus on how Chinese decision-makers understand that set of
questions. Fortunately, we can avail ourselves of a thriving Chineselanguage publishing scene. Authoritative outlets in Beijing put out stacks
of important works on historical and contemporary national security
topics each year.1 A review of these official and quasi-official sources,
along with secondary works citing them, indicates the PRC’s national
security elites have a very different perspective from ours on the current
long peace. They do not take it for granted and, unfortunately, I fear,
they do not expect it to last.
For us, the long peace starts at home with a political system that is
basically legitimate. The American people elect their leaders, who lead
with the consent of the governed, or we throw the bums out, and they go
back to their private lives, often making a lot of money. But one only has
to observe the CCP’s ongoing anti-corruption campaign to understand
the stakes associated with losing power in the PRC. Since 2013, roughly
200,000 party members and officials have been investigated, with a 99
percent conviction rate. That means once the Party’s Central Discipline
Inspection Commission turns its eyes on you, you are finished. You
go to jail or disappear; your assets are seized; and your family lives in
penury and fear.
Xi Jinping, the current Chinese leader, has shown no hesitation to
go after very senior people in the Party, from Bo Xilai, the famous
princeling who may have been Xi’s key rival to succeed Hu Jintao, to
Zhou Yongkang, the former internal security czar and oil baron, to Xu
Caihou and Guo Boxiong, Chinese generals and former vice chairmen
1      Both the Academy of Military Science and the National Defense University in Beijing have
publishing houses that put out journals and textbooks on security issues, the contents of which are
vetted by senior officers within those institutions. The Chinese Ministry of Defense has also published Defense White Papers bi-annually since 1998. The Chinese military, the People’s Liberation
Army (PLA), boasts its own daily newspaper, and the individual service branches within the PLA
also publish periodicals, as did the PLA’s old military regions, which were abolished at the end of
2015 in favor of new theater commands.
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of the Central Military Commission (the 11-member body composed of
officers and Xi himself that runs China’s military).
The current campaign Xi is leading has aroused fears he is recreating the climate that existed during Mao’s Cultural Revolution in the
1960s. Xi is what is called a CCP “princeling,” because his father was the
Party’s head of propaganda when Xi was born (and later a vice-premier)
who fell from favor and was sent to prison in this period, and Xi himself
was rusticated during the Cultural Revolution, forced to do hard labor
in the countryside.2 So he knows firsthand the rough and tumble of allor-nothing, violent Chinese political campaigns. Xi is a survivor. And,
he eventually turned the hardship he experienced because of his elite
Communist pedigree into an opportunity to take over all of China. The
person running the anti-corruption campaign was another “princeling”
who was rusticated in the same area as Xi in the mid-1960s.
Think about this personal history. If Americans tend to take peace
for granted, as the natural state of affairs in a civilized, cosmopolitan
world, for Chinese elites like Xi Jinping, the world is both full of danger
and freighted with opportunity. In fact, right after the 9/11 attacks,
Chinese defense strategists designated the first two decades of the 21st
century the “period of strategic opportunity” (重要 战略 机遇期,
zhong yao zhanlüe jiyuqi), signifying that it was a rare chance for them to
restore China to its natural position as a world-leading power because
the United States would be diverted and distracted by the War on Terror
in the Middle East.3
They do not believe we defend the current international order simply
because we think respect for international law and free trade will boost
prosperity and promote peace globally. Rather, they think we set up the
system to benefit us and to keep everyone else down, because that is
how hegemons (霸, ba) behave. By contrast with our cosmopolitanism,
today’s CCP elites are the heirs of a kind of Darwinian nationalism
imported from Japan in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.4 In other
words, they see competition and conflict as endemic. Chinese defense
strategists describe an ongoing global competition for resources and for
control over key geographic points. This competition is zero-sum and
cutthroat. It is very much a dog-eat-dog world, and Chinese culture even
tends to describe this competition in racial terms. The CCP still oversees
a “Patriotic Education” (爱国教育, aiguo jiaoyu) curriculum for all Chinese
students, emphasizing this period as the “Century of Humiliation” (百
年国耻, bainian guochi) when European colonial powers and the United
States, Russia, and Japan conspired to prey on China at a moment of
weakness, as the last dynasty, the Qing, decayed and declined.5 These
outside powers stole Chinese money by taking over the revenues from
trade through Chinese ports, and they also stole Chinese land—not only
the ports, but also the 1.5 million square kilometers of Manchuria or
Eastern Siberia Russia acquired through “unequal treaties.”
2      Evan Osnos, “Born Red,” The New Yorker, April 6, 2015, 42-55.
3      “Full Text of Jiang Zemin’s Report at the 16th National Party Congress of the Communist
Party of China, 2002,” Xinhua, November 18, 2002.
4      Jacqueline Newmyer Deal, “China’s Nationalist Heritage,” The National Interest, Jan.-Feb. 2013,
44-53.
5      Zheng Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics (New York,
NY: Columbia University Press, 2012).
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The “Patriotic Education” curriculum was promoted by the man
we think of as the father of modern China, Deng Xiaoping. Deng
launched Patriotic Education after the Tiananmen Square crackdown
in 1989, when he wanted to fight an influx of dangerous Western, or
American, democratic ideas into the country.6 To some extent, he knew,
the Tiananmen Square protests were the logical culmination of the
reforms he had pioneered. When Deng—who, like Xi was purged but
came back from the political wilderness—took power after Mao’s death
in 1979, he saw how weak the PRC was, even compared to Southeast
Asian countries, and he knew something had to be done. The Soviet
model of economics clearly was not delivering, so he launched a revolutionary policy of “Reform and Opening” to the West.
We now know Deng was no liberal; he viewed this policy purely
instrumentally, as a means to ensure the CCP’s survival.7 The idea was
to allow foreign (American, European, and Japanese) money and knowhow into China, so the PRC would grow economically and, eventually,
be able to modernize militarily. This would ensure China would finally
be in the driver's seat vis-à-vis outside rivals—such as the West and
Russia and Japan—which had preyed on it when it was weak. It could
coerce, deter, and, if necessary, defeat any potential opponent. Wealth
and military strength were keys to staying in power and succeeding in a
dangerous world.
It should be striking to us that one of Deng’s first moves upon
taking power was to launch an invasion of Vietnam in 1979 that seems
to have been the product of a very particular set of calculations about
the balance of power. The Russians had signed a defense treaty with
the Vietnamese in 1978, so Deng feared the PRC was going to be surrounded. Deng also appears to have believed he needed to fight the
Vietnamese to ensure the United States would see China as a friend
and back it against the Russians. And, Vietnam gave him the pretext by
mistreating ethnic Chinese in Vietnam and invading Cambodia. What
Deng was after by this time was American economic and technological
support.8 By taking on our old foe, he wanted to prove the Chinese could
be trusted allies against the Russians in order to get US investment,
technology, and defense support.
The Chinese also worked with us in the period to defeat the Soviets
in Afghanistan, gaining valuable defense support and establishing an
important intelligence relationship with Washington. And, in 1986 Deng
propounded the “State High Technology Research and Development
Plan,” better known as the “863 Program” (standing for 1986, March),
which entailed spending billions of dollars to improve the PRC’s
technological position—gaining access to cutting-edge information
technology, automation or computing power, space capabilities, lasers,
energy technologies, and new materials.9 This initiative has been called
6      Christopher R. Hughes, Chinese Nationalism in the Global Era (London, UK: Routledge, 2006).
7      Jacqueline Newmyer Deal, “Tracing China’s Long Game Plan,” The National Interest, Sept.-Oct.
2013, 77-88; and Orville Schell and John Delury, Wealth and Power: China’s Long March to the TwentyFirst Century (New York: Random House, 2013).
8      Xiaoming Zhang, Deng Xiaoping’s Long War: The Military Conflict Between China and Vietnam,
1979-1991 (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 2015).
9      Mark A. Stokes, China’s Strategic Modernization: Implications for the United States (Carlisle, PA: US
Army Strategic Studies Institute, September 1999).
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the PRC’s “Sputnik” moment, and it worked, yielding the space weapons
and high-powered lasers the PLA has acquired over the past decade.
Even after the turbulence of Tiananmen Square in 1989, Deng advocated a strategy of patience; he told the Party elites the PRC should “bide
its time and hide its capabilities” while they built up wealth and power.
Successive CCP leaders followed this advice closely, at least until the
last few years. They were able to take advantage of massive investment
from the outside world, and they benefited militarily from the fact we
are in an era of dual-use information technology.10 The modernization of
their civilian economy helped them upgrade their military for high-tech
war. Any impulses to flex their growing strength were checked, at least
in the 1990s, by evidence of how far ahead the United States still was,
given the relatively easy American victory over Iraq in 1990-91 and the
US campaigns in Bosnia and Kosovo, culminating in the accidental US
bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999. These experiences
demonstrated the potency of the American military’s penetrating, highly
accurate weapons. So even after the accidental bombing, China’s leaders,
now under Deng’s successor Jiang Zemin, elected to stay the course with
hiding and biding.
In pursuit of wealth and power, Jiang encouraged Chinese firms to
“go out” internationally through the decade, acquiring overseas technology, investments, and interests. China became a net energy importer
back in 1993, and its appetite for energy from the Middle East, Central
Asia, and Africa steadily grew as it industrialized to become the world’s
leading manufacturer, ushering in a remarkable period of export-led
growth. By 2000, China’s GDP was already the fifth largest in the world.
And then, in 2001 the United States was hit with the 9/11 attacks, creating the aforementioned “period of strategic opportunity.”
However, several ominous developments have surfaced over the last
few years. At home, the PRC’s economic growth has begun to slow
down, potentially dramatically. The scale of corruption has become
undeniable; environmental pollution is taking its toll on mortality rates
and the health of new babies born in China; the crackdown on civil
society and religious organizations suggests a major fear of civil unrest;
and there have been a number of terrorist incidents involving Chinese
Muslim Uighurs that suggest the situation in Xinjiang (Western China)
is not stable.
So Xi has tightened his grip over the domestic situation, with human
rights conditions deteriorating beyond anyone’s memory in recent years.
Meanwhile, he is not only head of the CCP, head of the government,
and head of the military, but he has also made himself the leader of the
Party’s most powerful committees on foreign policy, Taiwan, and the
economy, and he has created new bodies he runs to oversee the Internet,
government restructuring, national security, and military reform. Xi has
effectively taken over not only the country’s military and foreign policy,
but also the PRC’s economy, courts, police, and secret police.
Abroad, Xi’s control is less clear. The United States and its allies
have begun to realize there is trouble in East Asia. That Beijing doesn’t
really accept the current map or boundaries. That, as the then-Foreign
10      Jacqueline Newmyer, “The Revolution in Military Affairs with Chinese Characteristics,”
Journal of Strategic Studies 33 no. 4 (2010) 483-504.
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Minister Yang Jiechi told Hillary Clinton in Hanoi in 2010, their view
is “there are big countries, and there are small countries, and that’s just
a fact”—the smaller countries in Southeast Asia should come into line
and respect the PRC’s claims to most of the South China Sea.
As Yang Jiechi implied, Beijing hopes to achieve its aims peacefully, through deterrence or coercion. The smaller or more distant
countries should defer to the PRC’s wishes. Chinese political-military
leaders do not count on this. It is no accident Xi Jinping announced a
major restructuring of the Chinese armed forces on December 31, 2015.
Consistent with a decade of the People's Liberation Army planning to
take on a greater role in the world, the restructuring was designed to
facilitate expeditionary joint operations along the PRC’s periphery and
outside its borders.11 Other indicators of this new external thrust include
the acquisition of increasingly long-range missiles, the deployment of
the PRC’s first aircraft carrier and construction of follow-on carriers,
the announcement of the PLA Navy’s first overseas base in Djibouti last
year, and the PLA’s ongoing nuclear modernization.
Perhaps the most benign interpretation is Chinese decision-makers
believe the best way to keep the peace is to prepare for war. Unlike us,
Chinese elites seem to believe the global environment is naturally conflictual. The “period of strategic opportunity” was only projected to last
for a couple decades at best. Our long peace has been an aberration, and
successive CCP leaders have exploited it to amass the wealth and power
they think the PRC will need to survive in a dangerous world. Western
concepts of an international balance of power or convergence around
cosmopolitan norms are not reassuring or even intelligible. In a highly
competitive security environment, the PRC must strive to be recognized
as dominant. For this reason, Chinese pessimism about the prospects
for peace may be more realistic than American hopes for international
stability and tranquility.
The US Department of Defense should therefore develop strategies
for deterring Chinese aggression and out-competing the PRC over the
long term. Since we cannot rule out the possibility the competition will
devolve into another major-power war, American defense planners must
also prepare to win such a conflict. Unfortunately, in this connection as
well, the conditions of 1916 should serve as a warning: the dynamics of
the conflagration in Europe defied the expectations of planners from
each of the principal belligerents. Still, they were much closer to being
prepared than they would have been had they simply hoped for peace.

11      “China Releases Guideline on Military Reform,” China Military News, January 1, 2016, accessible at: http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/2016-01/01/content_6840071.htm.

Russian Military Power

Russian Special Operations Forces in Crimea
and Donbas
Tor Bukkvoll
© 2016 Tor Bukkvoll

Abstract: Special operations forces have played an important role in
Russian warfare against Ukraine. In Crimea, they engaged in mostly
covert action tasks, whereas in Donbas they engaged in more regular
special operations functions such as special reconnaissance, military
assistance, and direct action. The annexation of Crimea was the first
time in which the new Special Operations Command took on a leading role. Based on the Ukrainian experience, there is little reason to
doubt Russian capacity in special operations has increased. This may
have consequences for the contingency planning of other countries,
including the United States.

T

his article investigates the roles special operations forces (SOF)
have fulfilled in Russian warfare against Ukraine—both in Crimea
and in Donbas. It starts with a brief survey of the different types
of Russian SOF and how these forces fit into the “hybrid” warfare
paradigm.1 Russian special operations in both Crimea and Donbas are
then analyzed in relation to standard categories of SOF tasks. Finally, the
question of what lessons other countries, including the United States,
may draw from the Crimea and Donbas examples is discussed.
First, a brief note on sources is necessary. Given the particularly
secret nature of special operations, reliable data are difficult. This is
even more so in this case due to the recent nature of the events and the
current timidity of the Russian press. Barring a few media outlets and
Internet sites, much investigative journalism is “scared into silence” in
Russia today. Except for the officially admitted use of SOF in Crimea,
and the arrest of two Spetsnaz GRU officers in Donbas in May 2015,
there is little available in Russian open sources.
Hence, this study, relies to a large extent on Ukrainian sources. Since
Ukraine is party to the conflict, these sources are obviously biased. The
Ukrainian sources used are relatively independent from the Ukrainian
government. Still, they are not objective. Most of them, understandably,
display varying degrees of patriotism in the face of Russian military
aggression.
Dr. Tor Bukkvoll is a
Senior Research Fellow
at the Norwegian
Defence Research
A version of this article appeared in the Aleksanteri Papers 1/2016 published by Kikimoro Publications Establishment. He is a
at the Aleksanteri Institute, University of Helsinki, Finland.
specialist on Russia and
Ukraine, particularly in
1     Research for this article took place as part of the project Russian Hybrid Warfare: Definitions, the areas of defense and
Capabilities, Scope and Possible Responses financed by the Finish Prime Minister’s Office.
security policy.
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On the other hand, since the presence of in-service Russian military
personnel on Ukrainian soil has been demonstrated beyond doubt, there
is little reason to assume Russian SOF are not there. No modern army
would engage in a foreign mission of this scale without having designated roles for its SOF in operations. Thus, it would be in the details of
how they operate, rather than in the fact of their presence, that the bias
in Ukrainian sources could skew the analysis.

Russian SOF in the Serdiukov Reforms2

Russia has many military and paramilitary formations that are
called special operation forces or Spetsnaz (short for spetsialnoe naznachenie
or special assignment). For this study, the special forces of the armed
forces’ Main Intelligence Directorate, Spetsnaz GRU, the special forces
of the Federal Security Service (FSB), Spetsnaz FSB, the special forces
of the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), Spetsnaz SVR, the Special
Operations Command (SOC) and the 45th Special Forces Regiment
of the Airborne troops are the most relevant. One should note special
forces only make up parts of each of these organizations. GRU, FSB, and
SVR have a number of agencies beyond special forces, such as spying
bureaus (Agentura), SIGINT (signal intelligence) units and others. These
latter agencies are also included in this study, since they often work in
close cooperation with “their” special forces. However, belonging to the
same super-structure is no guarantee of close cooperation. The rivalry
between Spetsnaz and Agentura within the GRU is well known.
Spetsnaz GRU is probably the most famous of the Russian SOF.
This organization was established in the early 1950s, and it played an
important role in the Russian warfare in Afghanistan and Chechnya.
Consequently, most of the operational experience of the organization is
as elite light infantry rather than as special forces in the current Western
understanding of the term. Thus, Spetsnaz-GRU may today better be
compared to the US Rangers than to the US Delta Force. This supportive role for Spetsnaz-GRU was to some extent formalized as part
of the Serdiukov reforms. Here, the responsibility of Spetsnaz GRU as a
provider of services to the other branches of the military was enhanced
at the expense of its former more independent position.
In parallel, a new Special Operations Command (SOC) was established to be the military instrument most directly at the hands of the
political leadership. Spetsnaz GRU consists of seven brigades spread
around the country, with approximately 1,500 servicemen in each—
battle and support units combined. In addition, there are four naval
Spetsnaz-GRU detachments, one connected to each of the fleets. These
latter detachments most likely have up to 500 servicemen each, again
battle units and support personnel combined.3 Thus, the total number of
troops is probably plus/minus 12,000.4 All Spetsnaz-GRU were supposed
to be contract soldiers by the end of 2014. So far, however, it has been
2      Minister of Defense Anatolii Serdiukov in 2008 initiated a fundamental reform of all the
Russian armed forces. The main element of this reform was the transition from mass mobilization
to high-readiness troops, but the reform also changed many other aspects of organization.
3      “Spetsnaz BMF Rossii,” http://modernarmy.ru/article/254/spetcnaz-vmf-rossii (accessed
November 5, 2013); and Sergei Kozlov, 2010, Spetsnaz GRU – Noveishaia istoria, Russkaia
Panorama, Moscow, 363.
4      Aleksandr Chuikov, “Spetsnaz soliut voiedino,” Argumenty i Fakty, January 28, 2010; and Sergei
Kozlov, Spetsnaz GRU – Noveishaia istoria, 2010, 310.
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difficult to find verification as to whether this aim was achieved or not.
Conscripts have traditionally played a significant role in Spetsnaz-GRU.
The establishment of SOC was announced by Chief of the General
Staff, General Valery Gerasimov, in March 2013, but it had been under
development since 2009. It is modelled directly on the US Delta Force
and the UK Special Air Service. The organization is divided into five
special operations divisions with about 50 service personnel in each,
and the total number of troops, including support personnel, is probably
no more than 1,500.5 The establishment of SOC was, and probably still
is, resented within the GRU. SOC was seen as both a reason for, and
a symbol of, GRU’s institutional loss of status. The new special force
was initially part of GRU, then removed from GRU, and is now again
officially part of GRU, but with a very significant degree of autonomy.
Also, recruitment often comes from outside GRU. The main strategic
idea behind SOC is for the political leadership to have a small and very
competent military tool at its disposal for national and international
contingencies where the use of force is needed, but where one does not
expect larger scale military action to follow.
The FSB has two Spetsnaz units—Alfa and Vympel. Alfa consists of
five sub-units at different locations in Russia, and the main responsibility of the organization is anti-terror operations. Vympel consists of four
sub-units, and has protection of strategic objects, such as nuclear plants,
as the main responsibility. These special responsibilities, however, do
not in any sense mean these forces cannot also be used for other purposes. The size of Alfa and Vympel together is probably between 300
and 500 troops.6
The 45th SOF Regiment of the Airborne forces basically fulfills the
same type of SOF support for these forces as the army Spetsnaz-GRU
does for the land forces and the navy Spetsnaz-GRU does for the naval
infantry. Their number is probably around 700 troops.7
Finally, the SVR has its own Spetsnaz with around 300 troops called
Zaslon (covering force).8 Their primary mission is the protection of
Russian official personnel around the world, but they will also be available for other assignments.

SOF and “Hybrid” Warfare

There have been numerous attempts to define the concept of hybrid
warfare, and many also dismiss the concept. In terms of the Russian
aggression against Ukraine, much of the focus has been on the use
of non-military means for the achievement of strategic goals. It is, as
pointed out by some scholars, important to keep in mind that “hybrid”
5      Alexey Nikolsky, “Russian Special Operations Forces: Further Development or Stagnation?”
Moscow Defense Brief, No. 4, 2014, 25; and Alexey Nikolsky, “Little, Green and Polite – The
Creation of Russian Special Operations Forces,” in Brothers Armed – Military Aspects of the Crisis in
Ukraine - Second Edition, ed. Colby Howard and Ruslan Pukhov, (Minneapolis, MN: East View Press,
2015),128.
6      The exact figures are secret, but estimates such as these are available in open sources. See
interview with former FSB colonel Sergeii Shavrin at http://www.agentura.ru/press/about/
jointprojects/mn/shavrin.
7      “Spetsnaz GRU i spetsnaz VDV: naidi desiat otlichii,” http://1071g.ru/node/356 (accessed
October 15, 2013).
8      “Razvedka budet igrat muskulami i vnutri strany,” Moskovskii Komsomolets, March 4, 1998.

15

16

Parameters 46(2) Summer 2016

refers to the means, not the principles or the goals of warfare.9 SOF is
by definition a military means. The use of SOF in regular battle would
therefore fall outside most definitions of hybrid warfare. However, one
could argue the use of SOF to attain political goals in non-combat settings would be an example of the use of these types of forces for hybrid
warfare.
By NATO’s classification, special operations can be divided into
three main types: direct action, special reconnaissance, and military
assistance.10 This categorization, however, does not really accommodate
some of the more covert “political” tasks that special forces sometimes
execute. Since these latter missions are important in the present context,
I use the concept of covert action in addition to the three NATO types
to structure the analysis.11 It is primarily in this covert action role that
Russian SOF become a hybrid warfare tool. In the two cases below, we
will see that Russian SOF were parts of larger regular operations in both
Crimea and Donbas, but also that they played the hybrid warfare covert
action role of influencing local political events in non-combat settings.

Crimea

The Crimean operation, although most probably conducted according to existing contingency plans, was sudden and executed mostly
without direct fighting. This means there was no direct action, and little
time or need for military assistance from the Russian SOF. The operation was largely covert action, most likely based on intelligence gathered
previously by units connected to the Russian Black Sea fleet and possibly
local agents recruited by the FSB and GRU. Pre-deployment special reconaissance by Spetsnaz-GRU may have taken place, but so far it has been
difficult to find evidence of it in open sources. The Ukrainian military
observer Dmytro Tymchuk claims both FSB and GRU became very
active in Ukraine after Viktor Yanukovych became president in 2010.
The latter made the Ukrainian security service, SBU, change its focus
from counterespionage against Russia to counterespionage against the
United States.12 It would probably also be wrong to claim any significant military assistance role for the Russian SOF in Crimea, since the
so-called “Crimea self-defense units” seem largely to have been décor,
providing the Russian forces with a local image. The self-defense units
did not play a very significant military role.13
9      Nadia Schadlow, “The Problem with Hybrid Warfare,” War on the Rocks, April 2, 2015, http://
warontherocks.com/2015/04/the-problem-with-hybrid-warfare/ (accessed April 26, 2016).
10      US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Special Operations, Joint Publication 3-015 (Washington,
DC: US Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 16, 2014), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_05.pdf.
11      The United States defines covert action as “an activity or activities of the United States
Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that
the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly.” See Aki
J. Peritz and Eric Rosenbach, “Covert Action,” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
Memorandum, July 2009, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/19149/covert_action.
html.
12      Dmytro Tymchuk, “Po deiatelnosti rossiiskikh spetssluzb ha vostoke Ukrainy,”
Informatsionnoe Soprotivlenie, April 14, 2014, http://sprotyv.info/ru/news/50-po-deyatelnostirossiyskih-specsluzhb-na-vostoke-ukrainy.
13      This is the general impression from reading one of the most detailed accounts of the operation in Crimea, Anton Lavrov, “Russian Again: The Military Operation for Crimea,” in Brothers
Armed: Military Aspects of the Crisis in Ukraine - Second Edition, ed. Colby Howard and Ruslan Pukhov
(Minneapolis, MN: East View Press, October 2014), 157-184.
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Since the operation in terms of SOF was largely a covert action,
it was only to be expected that the newly created SOC would play the
crucial role. According to Russian military observers Anton Lavrov
and Alexey Nikolsky, the take-over of Crimea was the first operation
of a significant scale undertaken by the SOC.14 In particular, SOC was
behind the seizing of the local parliament on September 27. This act
made it possible to elect the Russian “marionette” Sergei Aksenov as
new Crimean prime minister. Furthermore, SOC also led the takeover of the Ukrainian military’s headquarters and a number of other
hard-target military compounds. These were, however, operations that
demanded more troops than SOC could provide. The organization was
therefore aided by units from Spetsnaz-GRU and naval infantry. The
SOC, however, was always in the lead.15
The Crimean operation used speed and surprise to establish fait
accompli on the ground, thus making a military response from the
Ukrainian side difficult. True, the Russian victory was secured by the
transfer of additional troops to the peninsula, but the initial action
by SOC and other special and elite forces elements was the decisive
element.16 From the take-over of the Crimean parliament to the signing
of the treaty making Crimea a part of Russia it took only 19 days. Seven
days later all Ukrainian military units had laid down their arms. Such
a time schedule makes the Crimean operation very different from the
follow-on operation in Donbas.

Donbas

Based mostly on “selfies” posted by Russian soldiers on the Internet,
the volunteer Ukrainian group “InformNapalm” has identified by name
a large number of individuals from different Russian SOF units on
Ukrainian soil. These include all seven Spetsnaz GRU brigades, the VDV
45th Brigade, and the FSB.17 No open source, however, seems to claim
the SOC has taken part in these operations. According to the Russian
military observer Alexey Nikolsky, “based on what we know about how
SOF forces are utilized and for what purposes, it appears that there is
no need for their [meaning SOC] presence in eastern Ukraine.”18 So
far this author has found no evidence to the contrary. Their absence in
Donbas fits the image of SOC as an exclusive force used only where the
chances of further fighting were small. It also underscores that SOC is a
capability of such value and cost that it will be used mostly when others
cannot do the job.
The first GRU operative was arrested on Ukrainian soil by the
Ukrainian security service SBU in March 2014. He was arrested together
with three others while gathering intelligence on Ukrainian military
positions on the Chongar Peninsula just north of Crimea. His name was
Roman Filatov, and he admitted to being an officer of GRU. As a result
14      Ibid., p. 160; and Nikolsky, “Little, Green and Polite,” 124.
15      Lavrov, “Russian Again,” 173-178.
16      “Special forces” are here understood as the ones listed under the subtitle Russian SOF and
the Serdiukov reforms in this study. “Elite forces” are the airborne forces and the naval infantry.
These are elite in the sense they have a much-higher degree of professional soldiers than regular
army units, and the selection of personnel is much stricter.
17      InformNapalm, https://informnapalm.org/12174-russianpresence.
18      Nikolsky, “Little, Green and Polite,” 130.

18

Parameters 46(2) Summer 2016

of a personal deal between Russian Minister of Defense Shoigu and head
of the Ukrainian presidential administration Serhiy Pashynsky, Filatov
was sent back to Russia in exchange for Ukrainian Kontr-Admiral
Serhii Haiduk and eight others then held hostage by the new Crimean
authorities.19
Besides Spetsnaz-GRU, the Russian Internet site Zabytii Polk
(Forgotten Regiment) claimed the 45th Spetsnaz Regiment had been
present with a base in the Ukrainian city of Novoazovsk. Furthermore,
the Ukrainian general staff claimed to have evidence the SVR had been
active doing political work in the area, and both FSB special units, Alfa
and Vympel, had taken part in the fighting. This latter claim, however,
has so far been difficult to corroborate from other sources.20
Exactly when Spetsnaz-GRU first started to send operators into
Donbas is still unknown. One of the first eyewitness accounts was provided by the Ukrainian war correspondent Inna Zolotukhina. In her
book Voina s pervykh dnei (The War From Its First Days), she claims
the forces occupying the SBU headquarters in the Eastern Ukrainian
city of Sloviansk in late April 2014 “were dressed and equipped exactly
as the fighters from Ramzan Kadyrov’s Vostok Battalion I had seen
in Crimea two months earlier.”21 She also contended “a highly placed
representative of the local power structures [in Sloviansk] told me that
about 150 instructors from GRU had been in place in the city for almost
a month.”22 If this information is correct, Spetsnaz-GRU may have been
on the ground in Eastern Ukraine as early as mid-March 2014. That is a
month before the Donbas anti-Kiev rebellion became full blown.
Ukrainian oligarch Serhiy Taruta has also confirmed Russian special
operations forces most likely had a role in the initiation of the rebellion.
Taruta took part in the Ukrainian government’s negotiations with the
rebels in Donetsk. According to him, on April 8 the Ukrainian authorities were able to bribe the rebels, who had taken over the town hall
in Donetsk, to leave the building. However, as soon as that agreement
was clear, “green men” came to Donetsk from Sloviansk and changed
the mind of the Donetsk rebels. After that visit, a compromise was no
longer possible.23 This evidence suggests Russia was involved in initiating parts of the anti-Kiev rebellion in Donbas, and Russian SOF was
one of the main tools. This is a prime example of the use of SOF in a
covert operation hybrid warfare role. At the same time, the evidence in

19      Iurii Butusov, “Kak ukrainskaia kontrrazvedka rovno god nazad zakhvatila pervogo shpiona v
rossiisko-ukrainskoi voine,” Tsensor. net, March 12, 2015, http://censor.net.ua/resonance/328206/
kak_ukrainskaya_kontrrazvedka_rovno_god_nazad_zahvatila_pervogo_shpiona_v_rossiyiskoukrainskoyi_voyine.
20     See http://joinfo.ua/politic/1057527_Rossiyskie-aktivisti-opublikovali-polniy-spisok.html;
and “Rossiiskaia armiya i spetssluzhby RF v voine protiv Ukrainy,” Tsensor.net, November
25, 2014, http://censor.net.ua/resonance/313320/rossiyiskaya_armiya_i_spetsslujby_rf_v_voyine_protiv_ukrainy.
21      The Vostok Battalion, consisting largely of Chechen fighters, was directly subordinated to
GRU in the years 1999-2008. In 2008, it was officially disbanded, but according to Ivan Sukhov, a
Russian journalist and Caucasus expert, it was “never really broken up, just re-profiled and incorporated into a Defense Ministry unit based in Chechnya.” See Claire Bigg, “Vostok Battalion: A
Powerful New Player in Eastern Ukraine,” RadioFree Europe/Radio Liberty, May 30, 2014, http://
www.rferl.org/content/vostok-battalion-a-powerful-new-player-in-eastern-ukraine/25404785.html.
22      Inna Zolotukhina, Voina s pervykh dnei (Kiev: Folio, 2015), 70.
23      Sonia Koshkina, Maidan – Nerasskazannaia Istoria (Kiev: Brait Books, 2015), 400.
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no way excludes that there also was significant local initiative for rebellion against Kiev.24
While Crimea for Russian SOF was mostly about covert action,
their involvement in the Donbas war also saw them engaged in the full
spectrum of regular SOF tasks from July-August 2014 onwards. The
Ukrainian military observer Konstantin Mashovets claims SpetsnazGRU at any time have had from three to four combined units/battalions
in Donbas. These units have contained roughly 250 to 300 fighters each,
and have been provided to the theater of operations on a rotational basis
among the seven Russian Spetsnaz GRU brigades. They have operated
in groups of 10-12 individuals, and worked closely with GRU SIGINT
units.25
In terms of Russian SOF relations with the local rebels, the former
trained and provided intelligence for the latter. At the same time, there
has been a reluctance to operate together, especially in the cases where
Russian not-in-service volunteers have been able to do the same job.
Mashovets further claims each Spetsnaz-GRU group has been set up
with “curators” from Agentura-GRU. Thus, the Russian tactic seems
to have been to keep political and military assignments somewhat
separate. Spetsnaz-GRU do special reconaissance and military assistance,
whereas the political work is taken care of by embedded “curators” from
Agentura-GRU.26
In terms of direct action, Russian SOF in general have tried to
avoid direct combat in Donbas. This, however, has not always been possible. For example, one of the GRU officers identified in Donbas is an
individual known as Krivko. He was wounded in battle at Sanzjarovka
at the end of January 2015. Simultaneously, in May 2015, two soldiers
from the 16th brigade in Tambov were wounded in battle by Stsjastye
near Luhansk.27 These examples suggest Spetsnaz-GRU has been only
partially successful in avoiding participation in regular battle.
Another area of direct action has been sabotage in Ukrainian rear
areas. One example, of a sabotage mission gone wrong, was the killing of
an alleged Russian GRU-agent in Kharkov in September 2014. He was
suspected of blowing up train wagons with air fuel at Osnova railway
station, probably in order to create problems for Ukrainian military
aviation.
Ukrainian sources additionally claim combined groups of rebels
and Spetsnaz-GRU increased their activities in Ukrainian rear areas in
24      This point is currently contested among specialists. For emphasis on the local initiative, see Serhiy
Kudelia, “Domestic Sources of the Donbas Insurgency,” PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No. 351.
For a stronger emphasis on Russia’s role, see Andreas Umland, “In Defence of Conspirology,” http://
www.ponarseurasia.org/article/defense-conspirology-rejoinder-serhiy-kudelias-anti-politicalanalysis-hybrid-war-eastern, and Yuriy Matsiyevsky, “The Limits of Kudelia’s Argument: On the
Sources of the Donbas ‘Insurgency’,” PONARS Eurasia, October 31, 2014, http://www.ponarseurasia.org/article/limits-kudelias-argument-sources-donbas-insurgency.
25      Konstantin Mashovets, “O turistakh Putina ili voina malykh grupp,” Informatsionnoe soprotivlenie, July 30, 2015, http://sprotyv.info/ru/news/kiev/o-turistah-putina-ili-voyna-malyh-grupp.
26      Ibid.
27      Falcon Bjorn, “‘Royal Flush:’ Russian Special Forces Soldier Fighting in Ukraine Showed
Us All!” InformNapalm, May 28, 2015 https://informnapalm.org/en/royal-flush-russian-specialforces-soldier-fighting-in-ukraine-showed-us-all/; and Falcon Bjorn, “Ukrainian Army Destroys
Russian Spetsnaz GRU Recon Group Near Shchastya and Captures Two Russian Servicemen,”
InformNapalm, May 17, 2015, https://informnapalm.org/en/ukrainian-military-destroys-arussian-spetsnaz-incursion-into-shchastya-and-captures-two-wounded-spetsnaz-troops/.
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the summer of 2015. This activity included mine-laying and attacks at
poorly guarded Ukrainian transport convoys.28
A somewhat different direct-action activity has been the responsibility of the FSB special forces. The Ukrainian military observer Dmytro
Tymchuk states that the FSB special forces have had supervision and
disciplining of the different separatist groups as a special responsibility.
This has included both diplomacy and more “physical measures” against
recalcitrant individuals.29
Finally, as in most countries, there are problems with the coordination of policies among different agencies. Russian observer Konstantin
Gaaze claims there are at least three different agencies of the Russian
state that implement policy in Donbas. Those are often neither willing
nor able to coordinate their efforts. For example, presidential adviser
Vladislav Surkov has supervised the DNR/LNR political leaderships,
whereas the Russian military have been directing the DNR/LNR militaries. In addition, the FSB has done things on its own that very few
have heard about. None of the three, according to Gaaze, have informed
each other very much about their doings.30 In October 2015, however,
according to Ukrainian sources, a joint coordination center was established between the GRU and FSB in Donetsk to deal with the problem.31
In summary, the Russian use of SOF in Crimea and Donbas may be
illustrated by the following table:
Crimea
Direct action
Special reconnaissance
Military assistance
Covert action

X
X

Donbas
X
X
X
X

Implications for the United States

As always will be the case, characteristics particular to these two
operations will limit what other countries can learn from them. Both
the presence of significant, largely ethnic Russian, pro-Russia elements
in the populations, and the historical ties of these areas to Russia, set
Crimea and Donbas apart from many other areas where Russia may get
into conflict in the future. Despite this fact, at least three broad lessons
can be learned.
First, the increased Russian ability to deploy SOF at high speed to a
conflict zone is worth attention. It is especially the establishment of the
28     See “Spetsnaz GRU nachal okhotitsia na ukrainskykh voennykh v tylu,” Novoe Vremia, July
17, 2015.
29     Interview with Tymchuk in Viktor Stepanenko, “Rossiiskikh grushnikov na okkupirovannykh
territoriakh smeniaiet FSB,” Novoe Vremia, October 20, 2015.
30     Konstantin Gaaze, “Vybor Surkova: zachem Kreml opiat meniaiet donetskoe
nachalstvo,” Forbes Russia, September 7, 2015, http://www.forbes.ru/mneniya-column/
vertikal/298849-vybor-surkova-zachem-kreml-opyat-menyaet-donetskoe-nachalstvo.
31     http://nv.ua/ukraine/events/vtorgshiesja-v-ukrainu-fsb-i-gru-obedinilis-dlja-teraktov-idiversij---is-78415.html.
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SOC that has strengthened Russia’s capability in this area. In Crimea
they were very rapidly able to create a fait accompli on the ground that
Ukrainian authorities found it hard to respond to. It is possible to imagine
something similar also in Russia’s relations with other countries. If, in a
conflict of interest between Russia and another state, Russia uses SOF to
quickly establish a fait accompli, the host government may face a serious
dilemma. Accepting what Russia has done will not be easy, but risking
escalation to a full-scale conflict by striking back is not easy either. That
is especially the case if the actual material and/or political damage of
accepting the new status quo is limited. NATO countries, furthermore,
must take into account how other members of the alliance are likely to
judge the new situation. Just because the host government may think a
military response is justified, this does not mean the other members of
the alliance think likewise. There will be serious worries about escalation. The host government should probably secure clarity on the issue of
assistance before deciding on its own type of response.
Second, Russian use of SOF in particular, and hybrid warfare in
general, will probably look very different from case to case. Thus, training according to Ukraine-like scenarios may be of limited value. Instead,
each country needs to identify what their particular vulnerabilities may
be in the case of a potential conflict with Russia. Efforts to deal with
these vulnerabilities should be the main focus.
Third, the effect of the use of SOF may be enhanced by the simultaneous use of other, non-military, tools. In the cases of Crimea and
Donbas, this was propaganda by state-controlled Russian television and
disruption of the normal information infrastructure. In other cases, it
may be something totally different. The main lesson is to be ready for
the fact that several threats are likely to manifest themselves at the same
time.
Also for the United States, the increased Russian ability to conduct
high-speed limited scope military operations with SOF against US allies
should be of concern. Reaction will be easier if the right mix of military
and/or political response has been given some thought in advance. In
terms of NATO solidarity, the threshold for Article 5 assistance may
become more blurred.
Another potential development with possible consequences for the
United States could be that Russia exports its new model for SOF to
other countries. Russia already has some experience in this field, helping
establish SOF in Ethiopia in the late 1990s. Russia often cooperates in
the military sphere with countries that have strained relations with the
United States. Stronger SOF capabilities among potential US adversaries
may have consequences for US contingency planning.
Unless there is a change of regime, Russia’s relations with many
countries look set to be challenging for years to come. This means that
even if Russia is not actively seeking confrontation, diverging interests
and interpretations of political realities are likely to make conflict a real
possibility. For many countries, until a broader understanding and more
stable relations with Russia have been achieved, the danger of violent
conflict remains a possibility. In this setting, growing Russian SOF
capabilities are a particular concern.
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Abstract: The revival of Russian military power poses certain challenges to NATO and to the West. However, the exact nature of
these challenges is not straightforward. This article discusses why
Russia is reviving its conventional military power and argues these
developments are not limited to the intention of preparing for offensive action. NATO’s and the West’s policy responses to recent
changes in Russian defense policy need to be based on a realistic and
nuanced understanding of Russian motivations because ill-considered responses could have serious unintended consequences.

A

fter almost 20 years of allowing Russia’s conventional armed
forces to fall into disrepair, an extensive program of modernization announced in 2008 has yielded impressive results and
started a process of Russian military revival.1 Following the military
intervention in Ukraine, the annexation of Crimea, and Russia’s first
expeditionary operation outside of the former Soviet region in Syria,
recent developments in Russian defense policy have led to increasing
concerns about a militarily resurgent Russia and the potential implications of this for its neighbors, NATO, and the West. In the words of the
new NATO SACEUR, US General Curtis Scaparotti, who was sworn in
in May 2016, “a resurgent Russia [is] striving to project itself as a world
power…To address these challenges, we must continue to maintain and
enhance our levels of readiness and our agility in the spirit of being able
to fight tonight if deterrence fails.”2
According to Gustav Gressel, writing for the European Council
of Foreign Relations, “Europe’s military advantage over Russia” is
now “undermined.” To counter “Russia’s new military boldness and
adventurism” and its military vision that is “centered on the Eurasian
landmass,” Europe is now in need of finding an urgent response to
Acknowledgements: The research for this article was conducted as part of a project funded by the
Finnish Prime Minister’s Office, government’s analysis, assessments, and research activities fund.
The opinions expressed in the article are those of the author. For the duration of the project the
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would like to thank everybody at the institute for their support.
1      Dmitri Trenin, “The Revival of the Russian Military: How Moscow Reloaded,” Foreign Affairs
(95) no. 3 (May/June 2016), 23-29.
2      Matthew Bodner, “Changing of the Guard: NATO Brings in Army General to Deter Russia,”
The Moscow Times, May 12, 2016, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/article/569142.html (accessed
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“Russian expansionism.” Although “a major military escalation on the
European continent is not imminent,” according to Gressel, “Russia is
clearly preparing itself for offensive operations.”3
Russia’s conventional military capabilities are more impressive
today than during the first two decades of the post-Soviet period, and
these capabilities are likely to continue growing. It is also beyond doubt
Russian foreign policy rhetoric and conduct today, particularly towards
NATO and the West, is more forceful and aggressive than it was at any
time during the post-Cold war era. However, the convergence of these
factors does not necessarily mean Russia is rebuilding its conventional
military exclusively to prepare for more offensive action or to pursue
expansionist policies in direct confrontation with NATO.
This article argues this conjecture overlooks the fact that most states
continue to see the maintenance of a powerful conventional military
as essential. Conventional military power has remained highly relevant
throughout the post-Cold war era not only as an instrument of policy,
but also as an essential attribute of a strong state and global actor. From
this point of view, Russia’s restoration of conventional military power
was only a matter of time and money and is in many ways less surprising
than the long neglect of these capabilities. Moreover, the assumption
that preparation for offensive action and the pursuit of expansionist
policies is the only motivation behind the revival of Russia’s conventional military power disregards the fact that the utility of military force
is not limited to the fighting of wars and defeating of opponents.
Instead, conventional military power is routinely wielded to deter,
compel, swagger, dissuade, or reassure. The idea that improvements in
Russia’s conventional military capabilities have significantly increased
the likelihood of offensive action, including against the West, also
underestimates the limitations of Russia’s conventional military capabilities and overstates its likely willingness to take such a step in the
first place. Theoretically, the scenario of a Russian offensive against a
NATO member state is not impossible now or in the future, but it would
be highly irrational given Russia’s persistent disparity in conventional
military power and the risk of escalation into nuclear conflict. The
revival of Russian conventional military power will increasingly affect
the defensive balance in Europe and pose certain challenges. However,
the implications of this development and how NATO and the West
should respond are not straightforward. A more nuanced consideration
of Russia’s possible motivations for rebuilding its conventional military
power is essential. Basing policy responses on a skewed understanding
of Russian intentions could have serious unintended consequences.

The Enduring Relevance of Conventional Military Power

A strong military is central to a state’s ability to project power on
an international level. As Hans Morgenthau noted, as long as anarchy
obtains in the international system, “armed strength as a threat or a
potentiality is the most important material factor making for the political
3      Gustav Gressel, “Russia’s Quiet Military Revolution and What It Means for Europe,”
European Council on Foreign Relations Policy Brief 143 (October 12, 2015): 1 and 13, http://www.ecfr.eu/
publications/summary/russias_quiet_military_revolution_and_what_it_means_for_europe4045
(accessed February8, 2016).
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power of nations.”4 Arguably, this is as true today as it was at the time
this line was written. During the Cold War, strong conventional military
power, in addition to nuclear deterrence, singled out the United States
and the Soviet Union as the world’s two superpowers. Although some
advocates of nuclear weapons believed nuclear deterrence would make
conventional military power obsolete in the long run, such a view never
took hold in the superpowers’ defense decision-making establishments.
In fact, both countries continued spending the bulk of their military
budgets on conventional forces because it was understood the politicalmilitary utility of nuclear deterrence was limited for dealing with threats
to their interests below the threshold of a direct nuclear attack on their
own territories.5
When the Cold War ended, many believed the centrality of military
power in international relations would diminish. The dissolution of the
Soviet Union and the threat of a global conflict had waned and, with the
spread of democracy and economic interdependence, state competition
in the future would revolve around economic, not military matters.6
However, such beliefs were short-lived. Military power continued to be
seen as an essential instrument of statecraft, especially for great powers,
even though economic competition had become more important and
there was no longer an immediate threat of a global war.7 In the absence
of an immediate adversary against whom to assess its conventional military capabilities, the United States defined the “two-war” standard as a
measure to size its conventional forces in 1991. As there was no clear and
present danger emanating from a specific state actor, conventional forces
strong enough to deal with the eventuality of two simultaneous major
regional contingencies were considered essential to ensure the country’s
“ongoing demands for forward presence, crisis response, regional deterrence, humanitarian assistance, building partnership capacity, homeland
defense, and support to civil authorities.”8
Contemporary China is another important example demonstrating
the enduring relevance of conventional military power in the eyes of
states aspiring to great power status. Although China has established
itself as one of the world’s economic great powers, growing economic
strength has been accompanied by a massive drive to establish a competitive conventional military arsenal. As the world’s second largest
military spender behind the United States, and with its budget continuing to grow, China’s development has evoked discussions similar
to the Russian case about the country’s intentions and its potential
transformation into a “revisionist state.”9 As Hew Strachan has noted,
4      Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th Edition (New York,
NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), 29.
5      Robert J. Art, “To What Ends Military Power?” International Security 4, no. 4 (Spring 1980):
21; and Gary L. Guertner, Deterrence and Conventional Military Forces (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies
Institute, US Army War College, 1992), 1-2.
6      Robert J. Art, “American Foreign Policy and the Fungibility of Force,” Security Studies 5, no.
4 (1996): 7.
7      Ibid., 8-9.
8      Daniel Goure, PhD, “The Measure of a Superpower: A Two Major Regional Contingency
Military for the 21st Century," The Heritage Foundation Special Report #128, January 25, 2013, 1, http://
www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/01/the-measure-of-superpower-a-two-major-regionalcontingency-military-for-21-century (accessed May 19, 2016).
9      Wei-chin Lee, “Long Shot and Short Hit: China as a Military Power and Its Implications for
the USA and Taiwan,” Journal of Asian and African Studies 43, no. 5 (October 2008): 524.
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rather than causing a decline of the role of conventional military power
in international politics, the end of the Cold War made permissible a
situation where states, especially in the West, have displayed a growing
readiness to use military force as an instrument of policy.10 The utility
of conventional military power endures.

Russia and Conventional Military Power

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia always maintained a strong nuclear deterrent, and in this area remained equal to the
United States. However, its conventional forces were left to decay for
almost two decades. This drawn-out neglect of its armed forces should
not be confused with a statement of pacifism in the sense that the projection of military power was no longer seen as important.
Russia’s quest for great power status dates back centuries, and its
self-perception as such did not cease with the end of the Cold War in
1991.11 Military power was central to the making of the tsarist empire. It
was also a strong military, above all else, which elevated the Soviet Union
to superpower status during the Cold War years. Relinquishing armed
strength and accepting the resulting loss of great power status was never
a serious option for Russia. The first military doctrine of the Russian
Federation issued in 1993 envisaged significant cuts to Soviet legacy
force levels and prioritized the development of conventional forces able
to deal with local conflicts, which were seen as the most immediate
concern at the time. The idea that a global conventional deterrent was no
longer needed was never a consensus view in Russia. Traditional military
thinkers from the outset argued in favor of more open-ended defense
requirements that would keep the country prepared for a larger variety
of eventualities.12
In fact, the 1993 doctrine already reflected ambitions to maintain a
competitive conventional deterrent. It envisioned investments in research
and development for the creation of high-tech equipment, including
electronic warfare capabilities, stealth technology, and advanced naval
weaponry. This was a direct response to the lessons Russian strategists
had learned from the accomplishments of the “revolution in military
affairs” demonstrated by superior US conventional forces in the 1991
Gulf War.13 Such ambitions were confirmed in the 2000 military doctrine, which explicitly reoriented priorities away from the focus on small
wars-type scenarios and towards the need for the creation of conventional forces with global reach. This doctrine was published in the wake
of NATO’s high-tech operation “Allied Force” over Serbia which, in the
words of Alexei Arbatov, “marked a watershed in Russia’s assessment of
its own military requirements and defense priorities.”14
10      Hew Strachan, The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective (Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 22.
11      Iver B. Neumann, “Russia as a Great Power, 1815-2007,” Journal of International Relations and
Development 11, no. 2 (June 2008).
12      Alexei G. Arbatov, “The Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine: Lessons Learned
from Kosovo and Chechnya,” The Marshall Center Papers, no. 2, (June 2000): 7, http://www.marshallcenter.org/mcpublicweb/MCDocs/files/College/F_Publications/mcPapers/mc-paper_2-en.pdf
(accessed October 12 2015).
13      Richard Pipes, “Is Russia Still an Enemy?” Foreign Affairs 76 no. 5 (September/October
1997): 75-76.
14      Arbatov, “The Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine,” 8-9.
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Although the central components of the successful 2008 modernization program, such as the need to professionalize, create rapid
reaction forces, and procure advanced technology, were considered in
all reform attempts from the early 1990s, no program up until 2008 led
to fundamental transformation. Unlike the 2008 reforms, which were
backed up by realistic financial means and unprecedented political will,
Yeltsin-era plans for military transformation faltered owing to the country’s dire economic situation and the lack of political clout required for
pushing through changes unpopular with some elements in the military
leadership.15 The inability to turn ambitions for its conventional military
into reality did not mean the Russian leadership no longer saw strong
conventional military power as desirable or important. Clearly, there was
an understanding that a strong nuclear deterrent alone was insufficient
to uphold Russia’s great power status in the long term, especially when
other countries’ conventional armed forces continued to modernize
at a rapid pace. Conventional military power persists as an important
attribute of state power. It is deemed to have utility as an instrument of
policy, even more so now than it was during the Cold War. As long as
this is the case, it would be unrealistic to expect Russia not to want to
remain a player in the game.

The Utility of Conventional Military Power

The idea that the modernization of Russia’s conventional military
capabilities can only be motivated by its intention to engage in ever more
aggressive, expansionist, and offensive military action is based on a simplistic understanding of the utility of conventional military power. As
Robert Art argued, “military power should not be equated simply with
its physical use…To focus only on the physical use of military power is
to miss most of what most states do most of the time with the military
power at their disposal.”16 In other words, states maintain conventional
military forces not only to fight offensive wars, but also to wield these
forces in a variety of physical and non-physical ways to deter, coerce,
compel, swagger, reassure, or dissuade other actors, depending on the
situation and on the objectives to be achieved.17
The prerequisite for a state’s ability to use its military power in
any physical or non-physical way is the availability of a robust military
organization in the first place. Following the serious neglect of the
Russian armed forces throughout the 1990s, this availability was increasingly in doubt. The degree of decay of the Russian military and the
possible domestic and international repercussions if this situation had
been allowed to continue need to be taken into account when Russia’s
reasons for rebuilding its conventional military power are considered.
As Eugene Rumer and Celeste Wallander wrote in 2003, “Russia entered
the millennium with its capacity to project military power beyond its
borders vastly reduced and its ability to defend its territorial integrity

15      Alexei G. Arbatov, “Military Reform in Russia: Dilemmas, Obstacles, and Prospects,”
International Security 22, no. 4 (Spring 1998): 112-113.
16      Art, “American Foreign Policy,” 10.
17      Art, “To What Ends Military Power?” and John F. Troxell, “Military Power and the Use of
Force” in US Army War College Guide to National Security Issues: Volume 1: Theory of War and Strategy,
5th Edition, ed. J. Boones Bartholomees Jr. (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2012): 217-241.
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and sovereignty severely tested by the war in Chechnya.”18 Clearly, the
fact that the once powerful Russian military struggled to defeat “a band
of irregulars fighting with little more than the weapons on their backs,”
as Jeffrey Tayler had put it, created a feeling of insecurity in Russia that
cast serious doubts on its ability to defend against and deter potential
external threats.19
Although a stronger Russian conventional military poses certain
challenges to NATO and the West, it is clear further decay would have
been a poor alternative. When the Russian National Security Concept
issued in 2000 permitted nuclear first use to “repulse armed aggression,
if all other means of resolving the crisis have been exhausted,” it was
widely assumed the nuclear threshold was lowered because there was
no longer any faith in Russia that conventional options would be successful in the case of an armed attack.20 As Charles Glaser cautioned,
there is the danger that insecurity can pressure an adversary to adopt
competitive and threatening policies.21 This is particularly dangerous if
the only tools available for pursuing such policies are nuclear weapons.
It is also clear the modernization of Russia’s conventional military was a
necessity not only to ensure defense requirements. Although a military
coup was never on the cards, concerns over growing military opposition
and mutiny became increasingly common by the end of the 1990s.22 The
potentially catastrophic consequences of this for Russia, as well as for
international security, are not hard to imagine.
Russian views on the utility of conventional military power are not
limited to territorial defense and the peaceful deterrence of potential
external threats. After all, Russia has used armed force to pursue a
variety of policy objectives throughout the post-Cold War years, including various “peace enforcement” operations across the former Soviet
region at the beginning of the 1990s, the Chechen wars, the war with
Georgia in 2008, in Ukraine starting in 2014, and most recently in
Syria. A reason why there is concern in the West about improvements in
Russia’s conventional military capabilities is the conviction that better
capabilities will inevitably lead to more offensive action in the future.
As British expert on the Russian military Keir Giles has put it, “the
more Russia develops its conventional capability, the more confident and
aggressive it will become.”23 The influence of capabilities on the decision
to use force is not as straightforward, however. As Benjamin Fordham
argued, the “claim that capabilities influence not just opportunity, but
also willingness…is implicit or explicit in a substantial amount of work
in international relations, but has rarely been tested.”24
18      Eugene B. Rumer and Celeste A. Wallander, “Russia: Power in Weakness?” The Washington
Quarterly 27, no. 1 (2003): 61.
19      Jeffrey Tayler, “Russia is Finished,” The Atlantic, May 2001, http://www.theatlantic.com/
magazine/archive/2001/05/russia-is-finished/302220/ (accessed May 21, 2016).
20      Celeste A. Wallander, “Wary of the West: Russian Security Policy at the Millennium,” Arms
Control Today 30, no. 2 (March 2000): 11.
21      Charles Glaser, “Will China’s Rise Lead to War? Why Realism Does Not Mean Pessimism,”
Foreign Affairs 90, no. 2 (March/April 2011): 82-83.
22      Arbatov, “Military Reform,” 103 and 129.
23      Keir Giles, Russia’s New ‘Tools’ for Confronting the West: Continuity and Innovation in Moscow’s
Exercise of Power (London, UK: Chatham House, March 2016), 2, https://www.chathamhouse.org/
sites/files/chathamhouse/publications/research/2016-03-21-russias-new-tools-giles.pdf (accessed
April 2, 2016).
24      Benjamin O. Fordham, “A Very Sharp Sword: The Influence of Military Capabilities on
American Decisions to Use Force,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 48, no. 5 (October 2004): 633.

Russian Military Power

Renz

29

Better military capabilities are likely to influence Russian foreign
policy by providing more opportunity for the use of force. After all,
as Fordham also noted, “decision makers cannot use force unless they
have the means to do so.”25 Russia’s air campaign in Syria, for example,
was certainly enabled by the opportunities created from improvements
in its conventional capabilities. In Syria, Russia demonstrated it now had
the capability to deploy and sustain a limited out-of-area operation for
the first time in post-Soviet history. This came as a surprise to many
observers, who did not believe Russia had the sea and airlift capabilities
required for such an undertaking.26 This operation would not have been
possible ten years ago, even if there had been the willingness in theory
to launch a similar offensive.
The most likely area for future Russian military action continues to
be the former Soviet region in cases deemed by Russia to pose significant
threats to its interests, for example, the intrusion of IS terrorism into
Central Asian states. It is unlikely better capabilities will result in the
indiscriminate future use of military force by Russia or a proliferation of
expansionist policies as improvements in Russia’s conventional military
capabilities have not substantially changed the relative military power
balance in this region. Even at its lowest point, Russian conventional
military power far outrivalled any of the other former Soviet states, at
any point of the post-Cold War period, due to the sheer disparity in
size and the fact that their militaries were besieged by similar levels of
neglect.
Although the operational performance of Russian forces in conflicts
fought up until the Georgia war in 2008 was far from stellar, especially
when the Chechen wars stretched their capabilities in every possible
way, the country never risked a situation that could lead to comprehensive defeat. In spite of its consistent military superiority over the other
former Soviet states, Russia opted for the use of force in some cases, but
not in others even when this was expected, such as the Kyrgyz-Uzbek
clashes in 2010. Although long-term occupation and territorial expansion following the five-day war with Georgia in 2008 was within the
realm of possibility, Russia decided to withdraw.
Better conventional capabilities have created more options for the
Russian leadership to resort to the use of force. However, better capabilities per se are unlikely to cause Russia to lose sight of the fact that the
utility of military force is limited and not suited for the achievement of
every policy objective. Rationality in Russian decision-making, when
it comes to the use of force as an instrument of policy, is an important
context for the fear that improved capabilities are pursued ultimately to
prepare for offensive action against the West. This is not a new insight:
in spite of the success of the 2008 modernization program, Russian conventional military power continues to lag far behind the United States
and NATO in terms of size, spending, and technological sophistication.
This fact has been conceded even by analysts who have warned about
the dangers of a military resurgent Russia, as Gressel cited above. This
issue tends to be brushed aside, however, as disparity is merely expected
25      Ibid.
26      Dmitry Gorenburg, “What Russia’s Military Operation in Syria Can Tell Us About Advances
in its Capabilities,” PONARS Policy Memo 424, March 2016, http://www.ponarseurasia.org/memo/
advances-russian-military-operations (accessed May 20, 2016).
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to delay the threat of Russian offensive action. It should not be. Given
the relative weakness of Russia’s conventional military vis-à-vis NATO
and the likelihood of serious escalation and defeat, a military offensive
on a NATO member state would be highly irrational. It is also far from
clear what strategic objective such a move would serve.
There is no doubt that in absolute terms Russian conventional
military capabilities in 2016 are considerably bigger and better than they
were at any point during the post-Soviet period. The achievements of
the 2008 modernization program, which emphasized the efficiency of
command structures, the move from mobilization to rapid reaction, and
the modernization of technology, have been well documented and were
demonstrated during the conflicts in Ukraine and Syria.27 Relative to the
conventional military power of other great powers, the United States
and NATO in particular, Russia’s position remains far from impressive.
Although defense spending alone is insufficient as a measure of relative
military power, the sheer discrepancy in this respect is worth reiterating.
Although Russian defense spending has seen a steady increase since
Vladimir Putin’s election as president in 2000, the country’s military
budget today is still little more than 10 percent of United States mlitary
budget—and a fraction of the NATO alliance as a whole. Even when
the Russian defense budget approached five percent of the gross domestic product in 2015 at the peak of military spending, its entire budget,
inclusive of spending on nuclear capabilities, amounted to less than the
combined budgets of Germany and Italy.28
In terms of the number and quality of high-tech weaponry, Russia
continues to lag far behind Western competitors, especially the United
States. Although strides have been made in reforming the Russian
defense industry, persistent organizational problems need to be resolved
before Russia can start rivaling the West with advanced military technology. Regarding troop numbers, it is generally assumed Russian military
strength in 2015 comprised up to 800,000 personnel. This is sizeable
(even compared to the United States’ 1,400,000 active soldiers), but
the bulk of the Russian armed forces are poorly trained conscripts.29
When it comes to the combat readiness and operational experience of
Russian conventional forces relative to those of the United States, there
is little reason to fear Russia is catching up. Although Russian troops
have trained in the fighting of large-scale joint inter-service operations
in numerous military exercises in the past few years, Russia’s reformed
ground forces have never been tested in an actual conflict situation, as
both Crimea and Syria were limited in scope and scale.30
Fears over the possibility of Russian offensive action against a
NATO member state have not arisen out of the blue. Although longrange Russian bomber flights close to other countries’ airspaces resumed
in 2006 and have caused concern for a while, such instances of military
provocation continue and have risen in number. Aggressive maneuvers
27      Giles, “Russia’s New ‘Tools’,” 13-25.
28      “Chapter Ten: Country Comparisons – Commitments, Force Levels and Economics,” The
Military Balance 116, no. 1 (2016): 484-485.
29      Ibid.
30      Johan Norberg, “Training to Fight: Russia’s Major Military Exercises, 2011-2014,” Swedish
Defense Research Agency (FOI) Report, December 2015, 5, http://foi.se/rapport?rNo=FOI-R--4128-SE (accessed January 2016).
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by Russian fighter aircraft, like the buzzing of a US naval vessel in the
Baltic Sea in April 2016, have exacerbated concerns Russia was willing
to risk a military confrontation with the West. Moreover, the number
and size of Russian military exercises and surprise inspections in its
Western military district have mushroomed since the start of the 2008
modernization program. According to figures of the Russian Ministry of
Defense, some exercises have involved up to 150,000 military personnel
and have honed the country’s ability to fight a large-scale interstate war.31
It remains highly questionable whether preparation for offensive
action is the most likely motivation behind these developments. Given
the variety of possible ways in which states can wield conventional
military power to achieve different objectives, there are more plausible
explanations for Russia’s actions vis-à-vis NATO. One explanation, for
example, is that Russia is using its military power for swaggering. This
has been defined by Art as the conspicuous display by a state or statesman
of one’s military might “to look and feel more powerful or important,
to be taken seriously by others in the councils of international decisionmaking, to enhance the nation’s image in the eyes of others.”32 Clearly,
after years of decay during which the West had written off Russia as a
global military actor, such swaggering, coupled with the interventions
in Ukraine and Syria, has been an effective way to enhance the international image of Russia’s shiny, new military power in a comprehensive
manner. Given the importance for Russia of being granted great power
status on a global level, this explanation makes a great deal of sense,
as swaggering can bring prestige “on the cheap,” especially when the
country is not in the position to project the image of being a great power
by other means.33
The idea that the revival of Russian conventional military power
is motivated entirely by the wish to pursue expansionist policies and to
build the offensive potential required to defeat the West is reminiscent
of the Western school of thought that during the Cold War sought to
explain the Soviet defense effort as the result of historical Russian paranoia, aggressiveness, and “mindless lust for territory,” thus depriving
Soviet decision-making of any rationality.34 Such an interpretation of
Russian motivations and intentions is even more remarkable because the
decision to risk offensive action against a NATO state would be even
more irrational today than it was at any point during the Cold War given
the disparity of the conventional military power balance. Some observers have expressed the fear Russia, even in the face of military inferiority,
might test NATO’s resolve with an attack on one of the Baltic states
because a lack of commitment to Article V collective defense might
mean the United States and other NATO members would not fulfill
their treaty obligations.35

31      Ibid., 62.
32      Art, “To What Ends Military Power?” 10.
33      Ibid.
34      William C. Fuller Jr., Strategy and Power in Russia, 1600-1914 (New York, NY: The Free Press,
1992): xv.
35      Alexander Woolfson, “Why the World Still Needs the West,” Standpoint, June 2015, http://
www.standpointmag.co.uk/features-june-2015-alexander-woolfson-the-world-still-needs-the-west
(accessed May 20, 2016).
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In fact, similar concerns were prominent during the Cold War when
analysts expressed doubts about the United States’ willingness to escalate
in the case of a Soviet attack on Europe. As Glaser noted, “the stronger
argument in this debate held that US strategy did provide an adequate
deterrent…because even a small probability of US nuclear escalation
presented the Soviets with overwhelming risks.”36 The fact that a Soviet
attack did not materialize in spite of a much more favorable military
balance indicates this argument had a lot of truth in it.
The assumption of irrationality as the basis for Russian decisionmaking in the area of defense and foreign policy can only hamper the
identification of appropriate policy responses. Certainly, measures such
as sanctions imposed on the Russian regime would be useless as their
success depends on the targets’ rational response. A more complex
assessment of Russia’s reasons for rebuilding its conventional military
force, not based implicitly or explicitly on questionable assumptions
about Russian strategic culture, is required.

Implications

As long as conventional military power retains utility as an instrument of policy, and it is seen as an important attribute of a global power,
Russia is unlikely to stop improving its capabilities. The neglect of
Russia’s armed forces throughout the 1990s resulted from the leadership’s
inability—not its principled lack of desire—to maintain a competitive
conventional military. Given the persistent importance of great power
status for Russia and the historical significance of military strength in
its self-perception as such a power, the revival of Russia’s conventional
military was just a matter of time.
This revival has implications for the global power balance and
confronts the United States and NATO with an uncomfortable reality.
Forcing Russia into reversing, or putting a stop to, this process per se
is not an option. Western sanctions banning the export of defense
technology and dual-use equipment into Russia are already in place
and should be continued. The Russian defense industry is reliant on
Western imports, especially for microelectronics and advanced production equipment, so the sanctions have the potential to slow down the
modernization process. Although Russia has implemented measures to
counter the impact of the sanctions with import substitution, according
to the British expert on the Russian defense industry Julian Cooper,
the completion of some weapons systems have already been halted or
delayed.37
The pace of further Russian military modernization will largely
depend on economic developments within the country. When the ambitious rearmament program to the year 2020 was created in 2010, the pace
of the program was based on the expectation of significant economic
growth which would allow Russia to keep defense spending below three
percent of the gross domestic product for the lifetime of the program.
Economic stagnation, however, meant military expenditures ballooned
36      Glaser, “Will China’s Rise Lead to War?” 85.
37      Julian Cooper, “Russia’s State Armament Program to 2020: A Quantitative Assessment of
Implementation, 2011-2015,” Swedish Defense Research Agency (FOI) Report, March 2016, 41, http://
www.foi.se/report?rNo=FOI-R--4239--SE (accessed June 5, 2016).
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to 5.4 percent of the gross domestic product in the amended budget for
2015, and the new armaments program was delayed until 2025.38 From
this viewpoint, much will depend on the Russian leadership’s willingness and ability to prioritize defense over other crucial areas of state
spending.
Russia is likely to continue using military force as an instrument of
policy. Better capabilities have given it a wider range of options, including outside of the former Soviet region. It is another uncomfortable
reality for the United States and for NATO—as long as the right of
states to use force persists in international politics, there is no easy way
of stopping Russia from resorting to force in certain situations.
This is the case even if Russia does so in ways deemed to go against
internationally accepted norms on when intervention is justified, as it did
in Ukraine in 2014. In this sense, the United States and NATO can only
lead by example in using military force strictly as a last resort and within
the parameters of international law and to condemn Russia when it does
not do the same. It is clear Russian military actions in Ukraine have
already had serious consequences for the country’s international image.
Negative views of Russia in Europe have risen from 54 to 74 percent and
no region of the world has improved its perspective of the country.39 As
complete isolation is not in Russia’s interest, there is hope international
repercussions and likely condemnation when international law is clearly
violated will be a factor in its future decisions to use military force.
On a more encouraging note, there are limitations to Russia resorting to the use of military force in an offensive capacity and to the
effectiveness of relying on this instrument as a means to regaining the
status of a world power. It is unlikely improved conventional capabilities
will blind the Russian leadership to the fact that military force is not a
panacea for the achievement of all policy objectives and that in certain
cases, especially if it could lead to direct confrontation with a militarily
superior actor such as NATO, this could have devastating consequences
that would not serve its interests. Although Crimea demonstrated Russia
does not in principle shy away from using military force in support of
territorial expansion, it is unlikely a “mindless lust for territory” has
become the driver for Russian defense and foreign policy. If the experience of the post-Soviet era is anything to go by, Russia has not used
military force for territorial expansion in the past, even in cases when
the opportunity presented itself—and its military power would have
allowed it to do so.
When it comes to Russia’s use of conventional military power to
re-establish itself as a serious actor in global politics, it is clear “swaggering” has already yielded considerable results. Although Russia’s relative
conventional military power is nowhere near the strength of the United
States and NATO, international reactions to the display of its revived
armed forces have arguably enhanced its global image to an extent
that far exceeds its actual material capabilities. This should be kept in
mind when decisions on US and NATO force deployments on Russia’s
38      Ibid., 51-52.
39      Mark Galeotti, “The West is Too Paranoid About Russia’s ‘Infowar’,” The Moscow Times,
June 30, 2015, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/the-west-is-too-paranoid-aboutrussias-infowar-op-ed/524756.html (accessed May 3, 2016).
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western borders are made. Reassurance measures, especially for NATO’s
most eastern member states, are inevitable. If the motivations for these
measures are not clearly communicated, they could potentially lead to a
situation whereby increasingly aggressive posturing by Russia could be
encouraged rather than discouraged by indirectly inflating the image of
its military power internationally and amongst the Russian population.
Reliance on conventional military power will only get Russia so far
in its quest to regain international recognition as a great power. In an
article published in 1996, Richard Pipes noted financially unattainable
ambitions for conventional military power in the 1993 Russian military
doctrine. In his view, Russia was at a crossroads between the lengthy
path of turning the country into a genuine world power that projected
strength in all areas of statecraft and the alluring shortcut towards recognition as a great power based entirely on military might.40
If Russia did indeed choose the second path, as seems probable given
recent developments, this is unlikely to serve its interests well in the long
term. The collapse of the Soviet Union demonstrated the hollowness
of international status based entirely on military might. The loss of the
latter inevitably signified the loss of great power status for Russia which,
unlike the United States, had not maintained strength in other important
areas of statecraft and foreign policy.41 Although recent Russian defense
reforms cannot be compared to the defense efforts of the Soviet Union
in terms of scope and size, even comparatively modest military spending
has significantly strengthened Russia’s ability to project the image of
power on an international level. This is a double-edged sword, however.
If Russia continues to use military force in ways condemned by large
portions of the international community and neglects the development
of other instruments of statecraft for both domestic and international
use, it will isolate itself further, rather than gain the respect it craves.

NATO’s Options

NATO’s and the West’s options for stopping the ongoing revival
of Russia’s conventional military power, or to prevent potential future
Russian military interventions, are limited. There are choices to be made
in deciding how to respond to these developments, especially when it
comes to Russian military posturing vis-à-vis NATO, and potential
consequences of any responses made need to be weighed up carefully.
As indicated in NATO SACEUR Scaparotti’s May 2016 statement
and also by NATO’s actions since the start of the Ukraine conflict in
spring 2014, the alliance has decided to take an uncompromisingly tough
stance towards Russia, strengthening its presence and posture alongside
its eastern borders in order to demonstrate strength, unity, and resolve
to deter any potential Russian military aggression or expansionist move
against NATO members and allies. While these measures are likely to
reassure NATO member states in eastern and central Europe that have
been historically fearful of Russian intentions, their potential long-term
consequences for NATO and the West should not be ignored. It is already
obvious Russia is not interpreting NATO’s actions in the spirit intended
40      Pipes, “Is Russia Still an Enemy?” 78.
41      Ibid.; and Art, “American Foreign Policy,” 41.
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by the alliance, that is, as defensive measures aimed predominantly at
reassuring NATO member states close to its borders.
Continuing to perceive NATO troops stationed and exercising close
to its borders as a threat to its security and national interests, Russia has
reacted by stepping up its military posture and presence, as well as its
aggressive rhetoric vis-à-vis NATO. The experience of the Cold War
has taught us what an ever-more intense security dilemma can lead to.
If the current trend of uncompromising rhetoric and military posturing
on both sides continues, a renewed arms race is a likely outcome. Given
Russia’s economic situation and comparative conventional military
weakness, the West would probably emerge victorious yet again in such
a race. From this point of view, the scenario of a new arms race would be
less disastrous for the West than it would be for Russia, but nonetheless
it would be costly for all states and societies involved. Moreover, the
danger of intended or unintended escalation in the face of spiralling
tensions is worth bearing in mind.
Doing nothing is clearly not an alternative to NATO’s current
policies towards Russia. Even if a convincing case can be made that
Russian intentions are probably not driven by expansionist policies and
that an attack on a NATO member state is highly unlikely, chance and
uncertainty make the fears felt by Russia’s closest neighbors understandable and justified. The question is whether a middle ground between a
policy (that will inevitably lead to another arms race with all the costs
this involves), and “doing nothing” or a weak response (that could be
interpreted as “appeasement”) can be found.
The intensity of current East-West tensions cannot yet be likened
to those of the Cold War and rhetoric about a “New Cold War” is not
helpful as it “makes it harder for the West to craft realistic policies with
respect to both the Ukraine crisis and Russia generally,” as Andrew
Monaghan has argued.42 However, certain lessons from the Cold War
might be instructive, especially when it comes to NATO’s and the West’s
handling of aggressive Russian military posturing.
George F. Kennan’s Cold War doctrine of containment, with its
emphasis on strength, unity, and readiness to defend against and deter
potential Russian expansion, has already experienced a revival and is
being discussed amongst some Western leaders and within NATO as
a relevant framework for creating responses to Russia.43 As Matthew
Rojansky cautioned, there is a tendency to interpret this doctrine falsely
as an exclusively military approach. In fact, Kennan’s understanding of
containment was a complex and long-term political strategy. Focusing
on recognition of the opponent’s vulnerabilities at the same time as
strengthening the West’s capacities to find long-term solutions to pressing problems, Kennan explicitly warned against the use of “threats
or blustering or superfluous gestures of outward toughness” as this
could back the Kremlin into a corner and inadvertently exacerbate the
situation.44
42      Andrew Monaghan, A ‘New Cold War’? Abusing History, Misunderstanding Russia (London, UK:
Chatham House, May 2015), 1.
43      Matthew Rojansky, “George F. Kennan, Containment, and the West’s Current Russia
Problem,” NATO Defense College Research Division, Research Paper #127, January 2016, 6.
44      Ibid., 2 and 7.
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The intensity of current East-West tensions will make a renewed
attempt at resetting relations with Russia a much more difficult undertaking for the soon-to-be elected new US administration. The new
administration will have the opportunity to consider whether a policy of
increasingly tough military containment of Russia will serve the future
interests of the United States and NATO better than a more balanced
approach as advocated by Kennan. The latter will be the more difficult
choice because it requires a complex understanding of developments in
Russia, as well as the willingness of both sides to communicate. This
effort appears worthwhile because as Rojansky argued, it will allow the
United States and the West to strike a balance “between demonstrating
the collective political will necessary to maintain a credible deterrent,
and charting a way forward for negotiated settlement of differences,
selective cooperation, and eventual reconciliation in Russia-West relations overall.”45

45      Ibid.
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Abstract: North Korea’s hereditary rulers have been under a “death
watch” for decades, with many pundits regularly predicting the demise of the “Kim Family Regime.” Recent collapse scenarios are
predicated on the sudden death of Kim Jong-un, the 32-year-old
Supreme Leader, and an ensuing succession struggle ranging from
an internal-faction “winner-takes-all” fight to a more chaotic transition where factions clash with assistance from outside powers. Offering China a ballistic missile defense ban on the peninsula might
persuade the Chinese to acquiesce to eventual Korean unification
and denuclearization.

N

orth Korea’s hereditary rulers have been under a “death watch”
for almost 30 years, with pundits regularly predicting the demise
of the Kim Family Regime. At present, Kim Jong-un, the
32-year-old Supreme Leader (so far without an heir apparent) appears to
be effectively consolidating his power through a combination of brutal
acts, tentative economic reforms, and beneficent giveaways. He executed
his uncle, National Defense Commission Vice Chairman Jang Sungtaek, and 70 other senior officials and generals since assuming power
in December 2011.1 Concomitantly, Kim opened glitzy amusement
parks (including a water park, a dolphinarium, and a ski resort) for use
by the rising, increasingly affluent entrepreneurial class mainly located
in “Pyonghattan” and other privileged enclaves of Pyongyang. These
emerging Donju (masters of money) are relatively well-off, a result of
leveraging government ties, Chinese connections, and tacit market-based
reforms introduced over the last 15 years that permit them to earn private
incomes primarily in trade and agriculture.2

Internal Collapse

Despite Kim’s carefully calibrated moves to cement his rule, the
internal collapse of his regime remains possible, plausible, and predictable due to its reliance on a single point of potential failure, namely,
the Kim bloodline. Without another male Kim in the wings, Kim’s
1      Zachary Keck, “Revealed: Why Kim Jong-un Executes So Many North Korean
Officials,” The National Interest, July 14, 2015. http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/
revealed-why-kim-jong-un-executes-so-many-north-korean-13332.
2      Anna Fifield, “North Korea’s One-Percenters Savor Life in ‘Pyonghattan’,” Chicago Tribune,
May 15, 2016, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-pyonghattan-gentrificationnorth-korea-20160515-story.html.
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sudden assassination or death is likely to precipitate a succession struggle
ranging from an internal-faction “winner-takes-all” fight to a more
chaotic, uncertain transition where factions clash over time with help
from major outside powers.
North Korea’s collapse remains a question of “if, not when,” chiefly
because Kim seems to be in good health despite a persistent weight
problem. In addition, roughly one-third of North Koreans appear to be
bolstering his regime, mainly in return for food security and other privileges. One-tenth of North Koreans have officially registered cell phones,
and another tenth may have unregistered ones.3 The rest of society constitutes a silent, hard-to-assess majority, increasingly exposed to foreign
criticism of its leader, but voicing no opposition as a result of their isolation, deprivation, powerlessness, or imprisonment. The imprisonment
of dissidents applies not only to offenders, but often to their extended
families—with up to 120,000 currently interned in hard-labor camps.4
On balance, the Kim Family Regime appears to be ruthless in protecting
its survival as the most prominent authoritarian dynasty in the world,
except for Cuba’s single-generation Castro leadership.
Recent collapse scenarios conjure two potentially interrelated events:
first, the sudden death or assassination of Kim Jong-un, and second, the
emergence of alternative power centers within the secretive Kim Family
clan itself and among key security organizations. These power elites,
failing to accommodate each other in North Korea’s highly authoritarian
system, could clash and break up the brittle, centralized regime. Given
this worst-case scenario, the “internal collapse” school anticipates a
new territorial partition if internal groups align strongly along diverging
Chinese and South Korean/Western interests.5 The formal demarcation
between North and South Korea might then be redrawn north of the
Demilitarized Zone, where it has existed since 1953.6

Korean Unification

Reunification of, by, and for the long-divided Korean people has
been a basic assumption of Korean studies for the last 60 years. It
was reaffirmed by North and South Korean leaders at a summit held
in Pyongyang in June 2000. At that time, North Korean Leader Kim
Jong-il and South Korean President Kim Dae-jung declared:
1. The South and the North agreed to resolve the question of
reunification independently and through the joint efforts of the
3      Ju-hee Park, “Unofficial Cell Phones in North Korea,” New Focus, June 29, 2015, http://
newfocusintl.com/unofficial-cell-phones-in-north-korea/.
4      Human Rights Watch, World Report 2015: North Korea, https://www.hrw.org/worldreport/2015/country-chapters/north-korea. On July 6, 2016, the Obama administration froze property or interest in property within US jurisdictions that belongs to Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un
and 10 other regime officials. This is the first time the US government has designated specific North
Korean officials for their alleged complicity in human-rights abuses.
5      Bruce W. Bennett argues China “could take political control” of much of the North in the
event of a regime collapse. See Bruce W. Bennett, “Preparing for the Possibility of a North Korean
Collapse,” Rand Corporation, 2013, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_
reports/RR300/RR331/RAND_RR331.pdf.
6      Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy formalized the 38th parallel on the Korean peninsula in August 1945 in order to demarcate the areas of US- and Soviet-supervised disarmament
of Japanese troops. The United States had previously invited the Soviet Union into Korea to
continue the fight against imperial Japan. The 38th parallel roughly determined the 2.5-mile-wide
Demilitarized Zone established in 1953.
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Korean people, who are the masters of the country.
2. For the achievement of reunification, they agreed there was
a common element in the South’s concept of a confederation
and the North’s formula for a loose form of federation. The
South and the North agreed to promote reunification in that
direction.7
Unfortunately, these goals remain vague and aspirational, flying in
the face of the long history of foreign influences on the Korean peninsula.8 To date, few concrete achievements have been recorded that
would block the emergence of a new major power rivalry on the Korean
peninsula, one that carves out spheres of influence for China and the
South Korean/Western alliance. A renewed major power rivalry could
lead to a repartition of North Korea, as many of the country’s elite seek
help from China to carve out a new authoritarian state underpinned by
Communist and Worker Party of Korea ideology.

China after a North Korean Collapse

China has many reasons to feel conflicted about Korean unification.
Removing North Korean nuclear weapons from the Korean peninsula
as a result of unification would eliminate a major threat underpinning
the US-South Korea-Japan military alliance. Weakening the alliance
would, in turn, allay Chinese fears of encirclement by the United States
and its allies. In addition, unification would relieve China from supplying the bulk of foreign aid to North Korea since the breakdown in
Six-Party Talks in 2009.9 China might also be tempted to reinvigorate
those talks, pursuing both denuclearization and unification, to burnish
its status as a senior statesman above regional power-brokering and to
draw attention away from its actions in the South and East China Seas.
On the other hand, China has long relied on North Korea as a
buffer state to protect its northeastern flank. If the United States were
to rebalance its military forces elsewhere in East Asia while enabling
a unified Korea to deploy the latest ballistic missile defense system
(Terminal High Altitude Area Defense – THAAD), China would be
left with fewer offensive options and only Russia as a potential defense
partner. On balance, China may have concluded it is better to leave the
North Korean card on the table in some form following the possible
collapse of the Kim Family franchise. As the Chinese proverb goes,
“Kill the chicken to scare the monkeys.” In other words, Beijing may
have calculated its national security risks are more manageable if Korean
unification is sacrificed in order to prevent a resurgent, stronger Korea
from joining the United States and other potential adversaries. In light

7      US Institute of Peace, “South-North Joint Declaration,” June 15, 2000, http://www.usip.org/
publications/peace-agreements-north-korea-south-korea.
8      US-South Korean presidential summits in 2009, 2013, and 2015 reaffirmed the importance
of peaceful Korean unification, but produced no new initiatives on how to achieve it. See SungYoon Lee, “Optical Illusion: The US-South Korea Summit,” Asia and the Pacific Policy Society,
November 11, 2015, http://www.policyforum.net/optical-illusion-the-us-south-korea-summit/ for
an overview of the 2015 summit.
9      Six-party talks were initiated in 2003 to pursue dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear
weapons program in the wake of its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The
talks included the United States, China, Russia, Japan, and North and South Korea.
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of its “containment” anxiety, China seems likely to frustrate Korean
unification efforts if the Kim Family’s third generation collapses.10
Over the past decade, Chinese analysts of North Korea have
emphasized the inability of Beijing to influence or restrain its neighbor, primarily because of Chinese concerns about “destabilizing” the
regime and precipitating larger migrant flows into China.11 The “Middle
Kingdom” already has 2.3 million ethnic Koreans, the largest Korean
population outside of the two Koreas, according to official South
Korean estimates.12 As argued below in assessing North Korean trade
inspections, Beijing’s passive line of thinking allows it to go only so far
in levying economic sanctions against North Korea, thus helping prop
up its nuclear-armed neighbor. Chinese analysts also seem to believe
China can do “little to influence” any newly emerging North Korean
authoritarian leaders because those leaders would fear for their personal
safety, much less their privileged status, in the event of unification.
China, therefore, appears to be in denial about the leverage it can, and
does, exert on North Korea.

The Tumen River Valley and Below

In a post-Kim North Korea, China seems best able to influence and
shape the emerging government of the four North Korean provinces
along its border, notably the Tumen River Valley, as well as two midlocated provinces and Pyongyang.13 China has four major reasons to
do so. First, as noted earlier, it has a long-standing national security
interest in maintaining a security buffer there. Second, it enjoys widespread economic dominance in the area and remains keen to continue
exploiting the region’s rich mineral resources. Third, China is likely to
seek a controlling economic interest in North Korea’s eastern seaports
close to Russia; and finally, China may be able to draw on a large number
of supportive North Korean officials, military officers, and refugees to
help set up a pro-Chinese governmental system in the region. Indeed,
Robert Kaplan argues China has already made the political contacts
and the infrastructure investments needed to establish a “Tibet-like
buffer state in much of North Korea.” He opines that any new post-Kim
10      Andrew Scobell and Mark Cozad, “China’s North Korea Policy: Rethink or Recharge?”
Parameters 44 no. 1, (Spring 2014): 51-63. The authors indicate China will stay the course in bolstering the Kim and any follow-on authoritarian regime and call for the United States to persevere in a
dialogue with China to avoid “misunderstandings.” Exploring their call for “US perseverance,” this
paper contends South Korea and the United States could offer China a denuclearization-missile
defense trade-off that enhances China’s security in return for its acquiescence on Korean unification.
11      Eleanor Albert and Beina Xu, Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder: The China-North Korea
Relationship, February 8, 2016, http://www.cfr.org/china/china-north-korea-relationship/p11097).
12      South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Current Status of Overseas
Compatriots, 2009.
13      The Chinese may indeed be interested in establishing a new enclave as far south as, and
including, Pyongyang. In the trial of South Korean spy Pak Chae-seo in 2010, Pak claimed a Chinese
intelligence officer told him about a Chinese contingency plan named “the Chick Plan,” referring to
North Korea as China’s chick. See Nick Miller, “Chinas’s War Plans for Pyongyang,” SinoNK, March
12, 2012, http://sinonk.com/2012/03/10/pla-plans-for-pyongyang/. This alleged plan is based on
a new line of demarcation between the towns of Nampo and Wonson, including Pyongyang. Above
this line, the Chinese would establish a new security buffer against South Korean and US troops and
prevent refugees from entering China. Pak also claimed Chinese investment is not permitted south
of this line and People’s Liberation Army divisions stationed in Shenyang are trained to execute
the Chinese plan across the Yalu River and Tumen River bridges. Bennett, op.cit., adds that China’s
Northeast Project study, completed in 2007, claims Manchuria and North Korea were “originally
Chinese,” enhancing the case for Chinese intervention.
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authoritarian state will be “less oppressive than the morbid, crushing
tyranny it will replace.”14
South Korea, after soliciting substantial international aid, would be
poised to set up a rival system in the southern part of North Korea that
could attract most of North Korea’s populace. Indeed, North Korea’s
“voiceless majority”—mainly the relatively malnourished, poor, and
deprived—is very likely to migrate closer to South Korea in search
of food and medical care. While South Korea may end up controlling
a large swath of territory, the costs of pushing further north against
regrouping North Korea Army units could prove too high, especially in
light of possible Chinese support for an emerging North Korean polity.
If this scenario were to play out, the South Korean Assembly Hall would
still have seats vacant that have long been reserved for all of North
Korea’s district representatives.

Talking to China

To help avoid a new major power rivalry unfolding on the Korean
peninsula, it is essential for South Korea and its key allies to work out
a division of labor with China (and possibly Russia) on key stabilization
challenges. Such talks would be difficult to foster, but should be pursued
in light of North Korea’s fourth nuclear test in January 2016. North
Korea remains a dangerous repository of weapons of mass destruction
that could be smuggled out to third-world countries and terrorist groups
in the chaotic aftermath of a collapse.
After this fourth nuclear test, The Wall Street Journal reported the
United States had agreed secretly, just prior to the test, to peace-treaty
talks with North Korea. In the wake of the test, the United States
reportedly walked away from its commitment.15 The State Department
corrected this press report, noting North Korea had reached out to the
United States on peace-treaty talks before the test. At that time, the
United States rejected talks because North Korea would not agree to the
peace talks taking place in tandem with denuclearization talks.16
This State Department response is striking as it indicates the United
States had relinquished its long-held position that denuclearization talks
should precede peace-treaty talks. China had long urged the United
States to do this, and apparently, the United States has shown the flexibility the Chinese sought. The United States seems ready to engage in
peace talks with North Korea, if those negotiations include a denuclearization component.
The United States may have shown this flexibility in return for
China’s support for United Nations economic sanctions levied against
North Korea’s weapons programs. In addition, South Korea might also
have temporarily backpedaled on the proposed US introduction of a
14      Robert D. Kaplan, “When North Korea Falls,” Atlantic Monthly, October 2006.
15      Alastair Gale. and Carol E. Lee, “US Agreed to North Korea Peace Talks Before Latest
Nuclear Test,” The Wall Street Journal, February 21, 2016, http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-agreedto-north-korea-peace-talks-1456076019 and http://www.marketwatch.com/story/us-north-koreahad-agreed-to-secret-peace-talks-before-nuke-test-2016-02-21.
16      Elizabeth Philipp, “China Backs Peace Talks for North Korea,” Arms Control
Association, March 29, 2016, https://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/2016_04/News/China-BacksPeace-Talks-for-North-Korea.
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new missile defense system into South Korea.17 If the United States and
South Korea were to renounce their current plans to introduce THAAD
on the peninsula, this proposal might entice China to support a leading
South Korean role in Korean reunification.
The THAAD trade-off may prove unworkable for South Korea over
time, however, if it increasingly believes Chinese ballistic missiles seriously threaten its national security. Moreover, Beijing might conclude a
Korean commitment to forego major defensive missile investments will
not stand for long. Could the prohibition of defensive missile systems be
negotiable in the context of a truly denuclearized Korean peninsula? The
United States may also need to renounce its military role above the 38th
parallel in return for China not crossing the Yalu River.18 On balance,
this proposal, coupled with the THAAD trade-off, might provide the
Chinese with enough security assurance to risk the resurgence of a
unified Korea. Beijing’s role, either positive or negative, appears to be
crucial for a more secure northeast Asia.
US and South Korean talks with China can be pursued through
a series of consultations held within existing bilateral diplomatic
exchanges or via multi-national deliberations under a Six-Party-Talkslike framework.19 These talks should be held before any collapse, but
remain a long shot with the Kim Family Regime still going strong, and
are more likely to unfold with emerging North Korean leaders after a
collapse. The Korean focus group will need to stand up a sub-group
immediately tasked with sharing critically needed information on the
evolving attitudes and dispositions of North Korea’s security apparatus
and the country’s formidable standing army and related organizations.20

Key Stabilization Tasks

A leadership succession crisis, engendering widespread social instability, will almost certainly lead to a single Korean federation or another
two-state solution. The execution of key stabilization tasks will set the
stage for the eventual outcome. What should an international focus group
pursue with the North Korean authorities who will quickly emerge after
a collapse? What are the key stabilization challenges that could arise in

17      On July 8, 2016, the South Korean Defense Ministry announced it would deploy THAAD
by the end of 2017 and complete site selection soon. While the South Korean side stressed THAAD
would be focused solely on the North Korean missile threat, China immediately urged South Korea
and the United States to halt deployment, arguing it would destabilize the regional security balance
without achieving “anything to end North Korea’s nuclear program.” See Reuters, “South Korea, the
US to Deploy THAAD Missile Defense, Drawing China Rebuke,” July 8, 2016, http://www.reuters.
com/article/us-southkorea-usa-thaad-idUSKCN0ZO084.
18      Even if the United States and China were to renounce any major military intervention,
they may still agree to joint operations to secure North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction, as
discussed below in this article.
19      Bennett, op. cit., argues China would have a strong preference for talks within the United
Nations Security Council, seeking UN authorization for any foreign troops dispatched to North
Korea in the event of instability. He acknowledges, however, that a UN Security Council Resolution
would “take time” and China would probably intervene first if North Korean instability unfolds
rapidly and the international community did not react.
20      China is already preparing for this, according to a reported Chinese People’s Liberation
Army contingency plan published by the Kyodo News in May 2014. See Shannon Tiezzi, “Does
China Have A Contingency Plan for North Korea,” The Diplomat, May 7, 2014, http://thediplomat.
com/2014/05/does-china-have-a-contingency-plan-for-north-korea/.
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security, humanitarian assistance, justice, economic infrastructure, and
governance?21 Key tasks in order of priority are discussed below.

Near-Term Priorities (Undertaken Immediately)

Weapons of Mass Destruction Control – Identifying the highest
priority task, analysts are unanimous in calling for securing North
Korea’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as soon as possible. Some
analysts assume US Special Forces should play a “significant” role in
searching for North Korea’s nuclear and biological-chemical weapons.22
A Special Forces mission would entail “teaming up” with South Korean
experts as well as friendly North Korean Army units possessing the
weapons who could be under siege by other North Korean Army units.23
When confronting WMD issues, it is not safe to assume the United
States and South Korea would be first on the scene or best situated
to gain control of North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction. China
is likely to be in first contact for two reasons. Most of North Korea’s
weapons fabrication and storage facilities appear to be closer to China,
and the responsible North Korean military units would be more disposed to Chinese influence than that of South Korea, the United States,
Russia, and, most certainly, Japan. China’s natural lead on this task, if
correct, clearly puts it in the driver’s seat in terms of whether denuclearization can be achieved.24
Beijing’s role in demobilizing and disposing of weapons of mass
destruction, even if agreed upon, could still be carried out ambiguously
in order to preserve China’s options to promote a North Korean polity.
Chinese hesitation or refusal to help disarm North Korean Army units
may be easily obscured by the fog of instability rolling in after the collapse of the North Korean regime. Will China persuade North Korean
units to account for their weapons caches, much less surrender them?
China’s response to this task will, in turn, shape the conditions for either
setting up a new buffer state or reunifying Korea.
Since both geography and political links appear to put China at
point on this stabilization task, multi-party talks with Beijing should
seek agreement on the rules of engagement with North Korean Army
units in the event of a Kim collapse, the procedures for reporting and
securing the weapons, and the verification of their final disposition. In
this regard, China may actually prefer to work with the United States
rather than risk South Korea “inheriting” North Korea’s weapons.25
Ultimately, all parties should commit to implementing a denuclearized
21      Bennett, op. cit., leads the way in thinking about stabilization tasks. Please refer to his monograph for an alternative assessment of these tasks.
22      South Korean officials and journalists have periodically expressed sensitivity that US Special
Forces planning not restrict South Korean sovereignty, that is, the United States not “take command” of securing weapons of mass destruction and other installations in North Korea. See
GlobalSecurity.org, “OPLAN 5027 Major Theater War - West,” http://www.globalsecurity.org/
military/ops/oplan-5027.htm.
23      WMD units may be the most ideologically aligned with the Kim regime, but many analysts
view their loyalty as variable. See Michael O’Hanlon, “North Korea Collapse Scenarios,” Brookings
East Asia Commentary, No. 30, June 2009, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2009/06/
north-korea-ohanlon.
24      Bennett, op. cit., adds that any US effort to reach WMD facilities north of Pyongyang would
force China to secure these sites “before the United States. can reach them.”
25      Bilateral disarmament talks with the United States might hold more allure for China, but,
once public, would alienate South Korea.
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Korean peninsula, a long-standing goal of the international community.
However, other parties simply do not know whether China would help
to carry out this key task or support other parties in doing so.
Humanitarian Aid – North Korea’s collapse will confront the
international community with the world’s greatest humanitarian disaster,
due to the populace’s malnutrition and lack of medical care. South Korea
has the responsibility here as the putative leader and well-off sibling
of its poorer northern neighbor. Further increasing the stakes, South
Korea’s initial effectiveness in providing relief will likely be decisive in
shaping North Korean perceptions of a transitional government.
North Korea cannot adequately feed its estimated total population
of 25 million people. In 2013, more than 84 percent of the households
across North Korea were described as borderline or poor in terms of
food consumption. A third of North Korean children under five evince
substandard growth, particularly in rural areas. Chronic diarrhea is the
leading cause of infant death due to inadequate sanitation. Shipments
of food, medicine, and potable water will demand a large-scale logistics plan and significant contributions.26 The size of the North Korean
demand for aid indicates South Korea will need considerable help from
the international community.
Displaced Population Camps – In the midst of a post-collapse
environment that frees up travel, North Korea’s most vulnerable
populations are likely to migrate south where they will expect to find
badly needed food and medical aid, housing, and education services.
Most North Koreans would literally vote with their feet on for a new
transitional government if they migrated closer to South Korea, whose
ability to provide temporary housing will set the stage for the future of
a unified Korea. The rapid installation of displaced population camps
would become an urgent priority, calling for hard structures in the event
migrations begin in the fall or winter.
South Korea and the international community may wish to tap
humanitarian aid organizations (as well as divided families) to put a
human face on first-contact groups with the North Korean side, as the
community proceeds into North Korea and approaches Pyongyang.
Regardless of the basic unmet needs of the North Korean people, some
North Korean Army units may resist South Korean or Western soldiers
providing security to humanitarian workers, while other units may opt
to cooperate (hence the need for withdrawal or integration procedures
discussed below).
Peacekeeping and Demobilization – To ensure freedom of movement for international-relief operations, multi-party talks must reach
quick agreement on the disarmament, integration, and/or relocation
of artillery, missile, and armored units close to the border with South
Korea. This task represents a complex challenge in demobilization and
transformation, possibly entailing the initial withdrawal of many North
Korean units rather than their disarmament. Withdrawal agreements
may be the only way to avoid possible conflict between South and North
Korean forces, which would then open the way for swifter cross-border
26      Agence France Presse, “Widespread Malnutrition Still the Norm in North Korea Despite
Increase in Food Production,” Business Insider, November 28, 2013, http://www.businessinsider.
com/north-korea-malnutrition-food-production-2013-11.
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access to vulnerable segments of North Korean society. As important,
North Korean units that choose to support demining operations along
the border would make a significant contribution to good will and
unification.
Over time, a number of North Korean conflict groups could emerge
to seize financial assets, armories, supply depots, and ports. Multi-party
talks will need to carve out areas of responsibility for the international
security actors involved to isolate and disarm malign North Korean
Army units or relocate them to other areas. The multi-party group will
also need to develop coordination procedures for separating conflict
groups and conducting peacekeeping and related policing actions undertaken by multinational forces.
Export/Import Inspections and Human Trafficking – In the
immediate aftermath of a collapse, international actors will need to
maintain and tighten vigilance on North Korean export shipments and
channels for human trafficking. Export shipments may contain nuclear
materials or financial assets that rogue elements are seeking to remove
from the country, while human trafficking is likely to step up. Imports
will need to be inspected to interdict weapons shipments slated for conflict groups and criminal gangs.
United Nations Security Council economic sanctions levied against
North Korean weapons programs in March 2016 are not a substitute
for a more robust inspection regime at North Korea’s border points
and ports. Until a reliable Korean border authority is in place, however,
any cargo to and from North Korea will need to be inspected by UN
members outside of the country.27 Beijing helped draft the UN sanctions
guidelines and is publicly committed to their vigorous enforcement.
China accounts for more than 70 percent of North Korea’s total trade
volume. Unfortunately, China’s border area abutting North Korea is
home to burgeoning communities of smugglers who believe their business is now better than ever as North Koreans are compelled to move
more goods through their illicit networks.28 A post-collapse environment will only aggravate this situation.
As a result, official Chinese support for inspections remains crucial.
China’s current support of UN Security Council economic sanctions
against North Korea do not portend a widening break in Sino-North
Korean trade relations. The sanctions permit Beijing considerable discretion in how much pressure to apply against its neighbor. China could
quickly take its foot off the sanctions brake if it, inter alia, assesses the
United States will go ahead with the installation of a new missile-defense
technology in South Korea and elsewhere over the near term. Beijing
can explain its volte-face by reasserting its prior claim that sanctions are
ineffective in deterring North Korean weapons programs while deepening the tribulations of the long-suffering North Korean people.
Rule of Law and Police – Long before any formal ratification
of an inter-Korean justice system (preferably under a unified constitutional arrangement), new North Korean leaders will need to consider a
27      Under the current sanctions regime, UN members are also banned from purchasing North
Korean coal and minerals if any profit might go to weapons programs.
28      Matt Rivers, “North Korea Sanctions: Is China Enforcing Them?” CNN, March 31, 2016,
http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/31/asia/china-north-korea-border-dandong/.
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partnership with international policing units to enforce order. As these
talks unfold with emerging North Korean leaders, South Korea and the
United States will have a strong interest in promoting a law-enforcement
partnership that is consistent with the principle of a unified Korea.
Ideally, North Korean and South Korean police officers should assume
the lion’s share of enforcement work, with more specialized international teams brought in to advise border posts and ports in interdicting
the shipment of weapons and other contraband. At the outset of these
policing operations, the Chinese intent to either support or oppose an
inter-Korean policing operation is likely to be determinative, at least
in the northern half of North Korea. If Beijing does not recognize or
permit South Korean police officers to strengthen North Korean lawenforcement bodies near the Chinese border, other international parties
will be put on notice that China intends to promote a separate North
Korean polity.
North Korean officials and troops involved in running the Kim
Family Regime’s notorious internment camps—jailing up to one percent
of North Korea’s population—are likely to abandon these camps in the
wake of a collapse. These internal security groups may seek sanctuary or
anonymity to avoid possible public retaliation against them or Koreanstyle Nuremberg trials. Unsurprisingly, many of these camp overseers
and enforcers could be reabsorbed into other North Korean security
or military units and reconstituted as hard-core resistance elements
opposing Korean unification. The effective demobilization and reintegration of these and other North Korean security organizations into a
transitional system may partly depend upon foregoing trials for “crimes
against humanity” in favor of “truth and reconciliation” hearings.29
These hearings would require only public attestation of internment
practices, rather than entail any judicial punishments, as long as camp
prisoners were not killed.

Medium-Term Priorities (Undertaken in First Three Years)

Governance – Reunification, pursued in the wake of the decapitation of the Kim Family leader, has daunting odds stacked against it.
Diverse segments of North Korean society, not to mention China, may
reject the mutual benefits of what they perceive to be a South Koreandominated political system. In this light, South Korea and the United
States should consider advocating the establishment of dual NorthSouth parliaments with a suggested timetable for gradual federation
under a single chief executive within three to five years. The United
States and South Korea should avoid advocating the rapid introduction
of a powerful chief executive-led system as it resembles the Kim Family
past, disregards North Korean sensitivities about domination, and
could retard reconciliation efforts.30 A powerful chief-executive system
29      David Smith et al., “Special Report: Truth, Justice and Reconciliation,” The Guardian, June
24, 2014 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/24/truth-justice-reconciliation-civil-warconflict.
30      John Feffer, “Korean Reunification: The View from the North,” The Huffington Post, June
17, 2015, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-feffer/korean-reunification-the_b_7597430.html.
Feffer reports 34 out of 100 North Korean respondents—working or visiting in China—favored
the South Korean system, 26 a hybrid system, and 24 did not care which system the unified country
adopted. Incidentally, only seven percent thought reunification would follow a North Korean regime
collapse, although 95 percent believed it was necessary for economic reasons.
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might also impede bottom-up efforts to instill greater transparency and
accountability in North Korean political and economic life.
Once convened with emerging North Korean leaders (likely to
include North Korean Army senior officers), the transitional governmental system’s first order of business calls for decisions on how to
certify elections, recognize North Korean representatives, and ratify a
“unified” Korean constitutional arrangement under which criminal and
civil law can be enforced. It is ironic to propose launching this process
with North Korean representatives that will not be elected and may
indeed be guilty of crimes against their own people. However, failing to
include such leaders (or to extend provisional amnesty to them) is likely
to set back the governance task, since these leaders would then be free
to work against the system rather than be co-opted within it.
Immigration Policies – Unlike the Berlin Wall, the Demilitarized
Zone will not come down overnight because of the difficulty in extricating North Korean Army units stationed nearby and the number
of migrants that could flood over the border to an unprepared South
Korea. Over the medium term, South Korea will need to resolve the
thorny issue of how to offer interested North Koreans the opportunity
to relocate and reside permanently in South Korea. (China is likely to
remain relatively closed to Korean immigration.) Many divided families
may be quickly reunited in South Korea based on previous governmentsponsored contacts. However, the great majority of North Koreans will
require considerable long-term investments in housing, medical care,
and job retraining.
At present, many South Koreans remain wary of North Koreans,
widely seen as deprived and isolated, and uncertain about South Korea’s
financial ability to fund “Korean reunification.” Indeed, South Korea’s
younger generation—especially those born after North Korean leader
Kim il-Sung’s death in 1994—believe reunification, while necessary
in the long term, cannot be accomplished in the near future. “The
South Korean economy would be unable to support the North Korean
economy.”31 This view has become even more entrenched in the past
three years due to rising unemployment among young South Koreans.32
Security Sector Reform – Security sector reform in North Korea
means downsizing its bloated army—more than double the size of
South Korea’s army. A new transitional governmental system will need
to transform the world’s fourth-largest standing army, numbering about
one million (and 7.7 million reservists).33 Over the first one to three
years, this army could be employed in a new National Service Corps,
helping to improve basic infrastructure, housing, and health services for
the North Korean populace. In this way, soldiers could be constructively
engaged while continuing to support themselves and their families.
31      Tom Phillips, “Costly and Complicated – Why Many Koreans Can’t Face Reunification,”
The Guardian, October 9, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/09/why-manykoreans-cant-face-reunification.
32      Avaneesh Pandey, “South Korea’s Unemployment Rate Jumps to 6-Year High of 4.1%”
International Business Times, March 16, 2016, http://www.ibtimes.com/south-koreas-unemploymentrate-jumps-6-year-high-41-2337301. The data revealed youth unemployment (for those between 15
and 29 years of age) stood at 12.5 percent in February 2016, the highest on record; and the number
of unemployed college graduates surged 19.2 percent over the year.
33      See Global Security.Org’s website for the latest military statistics, http://www.globalsecurity.
org/military/world/armies.htm.
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Without a livelihood or income, these soldiers are likely to present a
serious security or crime issue.
Over the longer term, converting North Korea’s warriors into
productive citizens will require greater economic development. With
the North Korean security apparatus no longer soaking up to one
third of the country’s gross domestic product, those finances could be
diverted to more productive uses. Former military personnel may also
band together to form private companies, as in similar countries with
relatively large standing armies. Since this task is linked to uncertain
trends in economic growth and reorganization over the medium term,
it appears to be one of the most interdependent stabilization tasks facing
a unified Korea. Bridges to a more prosperous future must first be built,
as discussed next.

Long-Term Priority (Persisting Beyond Three Years)

Economic Development – North Korea’s population suffers from
chronic food shortages, but the country is rich in mineral resources.
In a post-collapse environment, many countries, likely led by South
Korea, would rush to compete with Chinese firms in developing these
resources, which include zinc, gold, copper, iron, coal, graphite, tungsten, and magnesium.34 In late 2013, an Australian geologist claimed
North Korea possesses the largest rare-earth oxide deposits in the
world.35 Rare-earth elements are used in key technologies ranging from
cell phones to guided-missile systems.
These deposits, if they exist, are extremely attractive. Beijing currently controls about 90 percent of the world supply of strategic metals
and has demonstrated its willingness to ban exports for political reasons.36 Foreign investment in North Korea could break China’s hold on
this market. North Korea might have more than six times the amount
of rare-earth elements as does China, and could be brought online relatively quickly after improving basic infrastructure.
Despite the overwhelming need to diversify rare-earth sources,
international investors should not press quickly for foreign leases to
exploit these and other resources. Foreign investment in infrastructure
coupled with stronger environmental protection regulations are first
needed to guard against the potential for environmental pollution and
degradation. Regulatory efforts should be spearheaded by transitional
governmental bodies, with the support of the World Bank and other
international financial institutions. These cooperative efforts are essential to sustain long-term mining operations and to dampen local fears
of North Korea’s foreign exploitation. If these efforts are not shortchanged, the resulting regulatory and infrastructure improvements
34      Dexter Roberts, “North Korea, New Land of Opportunity,” Bloomberg Business
News, January 19, 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-01-19/north-koreanew-land-of-opportunity.
35      Frik Els, “Largest Known Rare-Earth Deposit Discovered in North Korea,” Mining.Com,
December 5, 2013, http://www.mining.com/largest-known-rare-earth-deposit-discovered-innorth-korea-86139/. South Korean analysts subsequently pointed out this claim is not supported
by any meaningful data.
36      China banned rare-earth shipments as a result of a Japanese seizure of a Chinese fishing
vessel in disputed East China Sea waters in September 2010. See Keith Bradsher, “Amid Tension,
China Blocks Vital Exports to Japan,” The New York Times, September 22, 2010, http://www.nytimes.
com/2010/09/23/business/global/23rare.html?_r=0.
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should garner more North Korean buy-in for expanded mining operations and help generate stronger foreign exchange revenues.
Cultural Assimilation – Even if China is supportive of a “reunified
Korea” and international donors assist South Korea in funding the huge
welfare, educational, and medical needs of the North Korean people, that
population will still require one or two generations to assimilate fully
into a unified Korean culture that accepts them with greater trust, inclusiveness, and acceptance.37 A large majority of South Koreans currently
believe significant socio-economic and cultural chasms separate the two
Koreas. These gaps are found in election practices, legal systems, dialect,
standard of living, way of life, and sense of values. North Koreans may
be just as aware of these cultural differences.
A Seoul National University scholar concludes increased exchanges
and visits between North and South Korea “do not guarantee mitigation
of political, economic, and cultural differences. In fact, more exchanges
could possibly cause more troubles.”38 Problems could include North
Korean unrest over its perceived unmet needs and much-lower income
levels. On the South Korean side, labor union and youth protests could
spring from the perception South Korea’s economic development and
social safety net are being compromised by the relatively high costs of
North Korean assistance.
In light of these cultural differences and risks, North-South
assimilation will require gradual inter-generational changes over time.
Perhaps, the growing recognition that a unified Korea will exhibit greater
economic strength as a result of wedding the North and South’s comparative advantages (in mineral resources and technological advancement,
respectively) will help to facilitate cultural assimilation. In other words,
North-South cultural convergence should increasingly be underpinned
by the peninsula’s stronger, self-sustaining economic growth.39

Conclusion

Harking back to his grandfather’s party-centric doctrine and marking
a milestone in his own consolidation of power, Kim Jong-un presided
over the seventh congress of the Worker’s Party of Korea in Pyongyang
in May 2016. This congress was last held in 1980 under his grandfather. At that time, 118 countries attended the congress; this time, none
were invited. Foreign press were welcomed, but only allowed in the hall
when the North Korean leadership convened to confirm Kim as Party
Chairman. One analyst speculated foreign journalists were permitted
into the hall only to serve as a human shield in the event of an improbable South Korean or US missile attack.40 Kim made a point of denying

37      Phillips, op. cit.
38      Kim Philo and Choi Kyong-hui, “Comparative Analysis of the Views of North and South
Koreans on Unification,” Korea Focus, October 2012, http://connection.ebscohost.com/c/
articles/96058773/comparative-analysis-views-north-south-koreans-unification.
39      Some scholars prefer to compare Korean to Vietnamese unification since both cases involve
large income differences between North and South. See William H. Thornton, Fire on the Rim: The
Cultural Dynamics of East/West Power Politics (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), 161.
40      UK Ambassador John Everard, “Parsing Kim Jong-un’s Party,” Korea JoongAng Daily, June 2,
2016, koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspz?aid=3019447.
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the first use of nuclear weapons unless North Korea’s sovereignty was
threatened “by invasive hostile forces with nuclear weapons.”41
Contrasting jarringly with the 1980 congress, the Chinese
Communist Party’s message of congratulations to the 2016 congress—
released by the (North) Korean Central News Agency—was very short,
did not mention Kim Jong-un by name, and carried no Chinese party
official’s signature.42 Presumably, China was signaling its concern with
Kim’s fourth nuclear test and trying to distance itself, if not discourage Kim from conducting a fifth test. It is looking ahead to the risk of
an East Asian nuclear-arms race provoked by North Korea’s weapons
development. Beijing apparently fears South Korea, Japan, and other
neighbors might pursue nuclear weapons programs, possibly first developing shorter-range missiles under both the US strategic umbrella and
enhanced missile-defense systems.
More revealing, China—keeping pace with US and South Korean
planning processes43 —has reportedly drawn up a new contingency plan
in the event of possible North Korean upheaval.44 In May 2014, the
Japanese Kyodo News published “leaked People’s Liberation Army Plans”
to deal with upheaval caused by, inter alia, “an attack by foreign forces”
on the “country next door with the hereditary system.” The plan highlights the need for greater surveillance along the Chinese border, calling
for “reconnaissance groups” to observe the situation, “investigation
groups” to question those entering China, “blockage” groups to prevent
the entry of malign actors, and armed groups to “defend against hostile
powers.” The plan anticipates key North Korean figures may attempt
to regroup inside China. These figures must be protected from “assassination attempts” while ensuring they cannot command any military
activity or join “other forces within China.”45
In light of Beijing’s concerns about North Korean upheaval and
a regional arms race, it may now be a good time for South Korea and
the United States to propose a new multi-party dialogue with China
on post-crisis stabilization measures that all parties can recognize as
mutually beneficial.46 In particular, US- and South Korean-led initiatives
to pursue denuclearization with China risk little—and may make major
headway in spurring greater information sharing and cooperation if a
ballistic missile defense trade-off is offered to the Chinese. China likely
calculates that multi-party talks, once grasped by the North Korean side,
risk provoking hostile acts against South Korea that would require pro41      Euan McKirdy, “Kim Jong-un: We’ll Only Use Nuclear Weapons if Sovereignty Threatened,”
CNN, May 8, 2016, http://www.cnn.com/2016/05/07/asia/north-korea-nuclear-use-sovereignty/.
42      Everard, op. cit.
43      In August 1999, the United States acknowledged its military planning for North Korea.
Then US Forces Korea Commander, General John H. Tilelli Jr., noted “it would be unusual if we
didn’t have (a plan).” See GlobalSecurity.org, “OPLAN 5027 Major Theater War - West,” http://
www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/oplan-5027.htm.
44      China has reportedly drawn up earlier versions. In the trial of South Korean spy Pak Chaeseo in 2010, Pak claimed a Chinese intelligence officer told him about a Chinese contingency plan
named “the Chick Plan” (referring to North Korea as China’s chick). See Miller, “Chinas’s War Plans
for Pyongyang,” http://sinonk.com/2012/03/10/pla-plans-for-pyongyang/.
45      Justin McCurry and Tania Branigan, “China Denies Making Preparations for Collapse of
North Korea Regime,” The Guardian, May 6, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/
may/06/china-denies-preparations-collapse-north-korea.
46      Indeed, most Korean studies experts have consistently called for South Korea and the United
States to seize every opportunity to share perspectives with China on a potential North Korean
collapse.
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portionate responses. Over time, however, the talks might nudge North
Korea’s Supreme Leader into taking positive steps on denuclearization
that could break his country’s increasing isolation.
Whether brought on by a sudden regime decapitation, a serious
pandemic, or a nuclear accident, North Korea’s collapse demands
multi-party attention in light of the WMD stakes involved, the array
of daunting tasks requiring urgent attention, and the overriding need
to foster greater international cooperation. North Korea’s hereditary
ruler will see such talks as undermining his stature. But, heading the
only 21st-century authoritarian dynasty, the North Korean leader should
realize he sets up far more serious challenges for the world in the event
of his demise. Addressing these challenges will hinge on constructive
engagement with Chinese and emerging North Korean leaders.
Addressing the Chinese side, South Korea and the United States
will need to offer hard transactional trade-offs that provide adequate
security assurances to China in return for its acquiescence on unification. For emerging North Korean leaders, the socio-economic weight of
South Korean and international aid, coupled with co-equal integration,
may be enough to bring in most, if not all of North Korea.
Let us try to persuade these power-holders to turn away from North
Korea’s unproductive WMD stockpile, stark deprivation, and worsening
isolation—and begin to unify Korea and build a more peaceful northeast Asia.

Challgenges in Asia

China, India, and War over Water
Jin H. Pak

Abstract: This article examines the likelihood of water insecurity
causing war between China and India. Water insecurity itself will not
likely lead to armed conflict. But when coupled with other international and domestic factors, it could increase the likelihood of war.
China’s water scarcity and its widening north-south water gap have
increased pressure to execute controversial water diversion plans.
These plans will threaten India, especially since the Brahmaputra
River flows through a disputed area. These factors, plus changing
domestic conditions in China, may increase the likelihood of war.

O

ver the past decade, numerous analysts and scholars have speculated about the likelihood of India and China going to war over
water. Some maintain a future “water war” will occur—and
others call such fears overblown.1 These arguments focus on how water
is unevenly distributed and how China’s upstream behaviors, such as its
damming activities, could instigate conflict with its downstream neighbor.
To determine if water scarcity could cause military conflict between
these two states, an extensive analysis of factors affecting relations
between India and China, as well as domestic conditions within China,
are needed. Such analyses suggest water scarcity itself will not likely lead
to war. However, coupled with other factors such as increasing water
scarcity in China, linkages between water scarcity and national sovereignty, and decreasing political stability in the upstream state, war may
become more likely.
The glaciers in China’s Tibet are melting at a faster rate, and coupled
with growing water scarcity and a widening north-south regional water
gap, China will face increasing pressure to implement a controversial
upstream water diversion plan in its western provinces. This plan will
threaten India since the downstream portion of the Brahmaputra River
flows through a disputed area with strong implications for national
sovereignty. Both states will then increase their security postures in an
already heavily militarized border region. As China’s economic growth
continues its downward trajectory, popular nationalism will threaten
the Chinese Communist Party’s ability to pursue a foreign policy
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uninfluenced by populism and public opinion. The likely net result: a
likely water war between the two states.

Water Scarcity and Conflict

The idea of water security has gained traction over the years, and
is defined as “the availability of an acceptable quantity and quality of
water for health, livelihoods, ecosystems, and production, coupled with
an acceptable amount of water-related risks to people, environment, and
economies.” This idea includes the negative effects of having too little
water, or “water scarcity,” and damage from having too much water such
as floods, contamination, erosion, and epidemics.2 This article focuses
on the scarcity component of water insecurity and assesses six driving
factors that make it more likely China and India will fight over water
in the future. But, first, let us discuss how water scarcity is related to
conflict.
People can survive plague, war, and natural catastrophes, but they
cannot survive without water. Unfortunately, fresh water is an increasingly scarce and precious resource. Less than 2.5 percent of all water on
earth is fresh water, and more than half of it is trapped in polar ice and
high-altitude glaciers around the world. This precious-little amount is
declining due to increasing consumption, pollution, and climate change.
“Global per capita freshwater availability has unstoppably declined for
more than a century, plummeting more than 60 percent since 1950
alone.”3
At the turn of the millennium in 2000, more than one billion people
could not access clean drinking water.4 According to a recent article
co-authored by the chair of the Department of Water Engineering at
the University of Twente in the Netherlands and a water scarcity expert
from the Johns Hopkins Water Institute, approximately 66 percent of
the world’s population, or more than four billion people, live in areas
under severe water scarcity. Of these four billion people, one billion live
in India, and 900 million live in China; the majority of their populations thus live in areas of severe water scarcity.5 In 2006, a World Bank
Working Paper on water scarcity claimed “China will soon become the
most water-stressed country in East and Southeast Asia.”6
Water scarcity is also linked to food availability. Agriculture accounts
for 70 percent of all global water consumption, compared to 19 percent
for industry and about 11 percent for drinking.7 The Strategic Foresight
2     David Grey and Claudia W. Sadoff, “Sink or Swim? Water Security for Growth and
Development,” Water Policy 9, No. 6 (Washington, DC: The International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development/The World Bank, 2007): 545-546.
3     Brahma Chellaney, Water, Peace, and War: Confronting the Global Water Crisis (Lanham, MD:
Rowman & Littlefield, 2013), 60, 62.
4     Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, “Scarcity and Conflict,” Forum for Applied Research and Public Policy
15, no. 1 (Spring 2000): 28.
5     Mesfin M. Mekonnen and Arjen Y. Hoekstra, “Four Billion People Facing Severe Water
Scarcity,” Science Advances 2, no. 2 (February 12, 2016): 3. The two authors assessed water scarcity on a
monthly basis using a ratio between water consumption and water availability. A water scarcity (WS)
ratio of greater than 2.0 meant consumption far exceeded water availability and severe water scarcity.
By their calculations, more than four billion people live in areas with a WS score greater than 2.0.
6     Zmarak Shalizi, “Addressing China’s Growing Water Shortages and Associated Social and
Environmental Consequences,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper - Vol. 3895 (Washington,
DC: The World Bank, April 2006): 5.
7     Chellaney, Water, Peace, and War, 64.
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Group, a prominent India-based think tank that publishes extensively
on climate change and environmental issues, projects both India and
China will face a 30 to 50 percent decline in rice and wheat yields by
2050 due to “the cumulative effect[s] of water scarcity, glacial melting,
disruptive precipitation patterns, flooding, desertification, pollution,
and soil erosion.”8
Brahma Chellaney, Professor for Strategic Studies at the New
Delhi-based Center for Policy Research and a noted scholar on water
security, asserts water is now the world’s most extracted resource.9 In
fact, water is already more expensive than oil. According to the US
Energy Information Agency, the average retail price for gasoline for all
grades in the United States on February 1, 2016 was $1.93 per gallon, or
$0.51 per liter, well below the retail price US consumers pay for a liter
of water.10
In the scholarly literature regarding water security, one common
refrain is, “no nations have ever gone to war strictly over access to water,
nor are any likely to do so in the future.”11 Juha Uitto, at the United
Nations Human Development Program, and Aaron Wolf, professor of
geography at Oregon State University, find only one war was fought over
water, and only seven cases exist of acute water-related violence between
states.12 Moreover, there have been more than 3,600 water-related treaties over the years, reflecting a strong record of cooperation.13
Yet, there is a growing body of work suggesting water security will
cause war. Peter Gleick theorizes environmental security issues will
become a more dominant part of international discourse in the postCold War era. He claims rapid population growth, increased migration,
greater demands on environmental resources, and future climactic
changes will increase international tensions over shared fresh-water
resources.
In 1978, when Ethiopia publicized its intention to construct dams in
the upstream section of the Nile River, Egypt’s President Anwar Sadat
said, “We depend upon the Nile 100 percent in our life, so if anyone,
at any moment, thinks to deprive us of our life, we shall never hesitate
[to go to war] because it is a matter of life or death.”14 Furthermore,
8     Stratetic Foresight Group, The Himalayan Challenge: Water Security in Emerging Asia (Mumbai:
Strategic Foresight Group, 2010): iv.
9     Chellaney, Water, Peace, and War, 5.
10     “Weekly Retail US Gasoline and Diesel Prices,” US Energy Information Agency Independent
Statistics and Analysis, February 1, 2016, https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/PET_PRI_GND_DCUS_
NUS_W.htm (accessed February 7, 2016).
11     Jack A. Goldstone, “Population and Security: How Demographic Change Can Lead to
Violent Conflict,” Journal of International Affairs 56, no. 1 (Fall 2002): 8.
12     Juha I. Uitto and Aaron T. Wolf, “Water Wars? Geographical Perspectives: Introduction,”
The Geographical Journal 168, no. 4 (December 2002): 289. The seven cases are: between India and
Pakistan in 1948 over access to the Indus basin; between Syria and Israel in 1951 over Israeli water
projects in the Huleh Basin; between Egypt and Sudan in 1958 over the Nile River; between Somalia
and Ethiopia in 1963-1964 over water in the Ogaden Desert; between Israel and Syria in 1965-1966
over Arab plans to divert the Jordan River; between Iraq and Syria in 1975 over the Euphrates River;
and between Mauritania and Senegal in 1989-1991 over grazing rights along the Senegal River; and
Aaron T. Wolf, “Conflict and Cooperation along International Waterways,” Water Policy 1, no. 2
(January 1998): 256.
13     Uitto and Wolf, “Water Wars? 289; and Todd Hofstedt, “China’s Water Scarcity and Its
Implications for Domestic and International Stability,” Asian Affairs: An American Review 37, no. 2
(April-June 2010): 77.
14     Peter H. Gleick, “Environment and Security: The Clear Connections,” Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists 47, no. 3 (April 1991): 17, 20.
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water has contributed to fighting in the Middle East between Israel and
its Arab neighbors for decades. Located in one of the driest areas on
Earth, Israel relies on the Jordan River for much of its water, a resource
it shares with the four other riparian states: Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and
the Palestinian Authority.15
In the late 1950s, Israel began a project to divert water away from the
Jordan River for distribution elsewhere in Israel. Arab states responded
with their own project to divert water into Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan.
In 1964, the year the Arab project was supposed to commence, the first
of a series of border clashes between Israel and Syria occurred that
targeted water facilities. These clashes contributed to the state of heightened tensions between Israel and the Arab states during which time
Egypt mobilized its military along the Sinai Peninsula. Israel responded
with a preemptive attack, and the 1967 Six-Day War.16
Rebecca Lowe and Emily Silvester’s report on water shortages
threatening global security argues water can spark conflict when other
destabilizing factors already exist: “combine water scarcity with political instability, increasing resource demands and climate change, and
the ‘perfect storm’ for conflict can be created.”17 While water can help
cause war, it is surely not the sole reason for a war: “when territorial
disputes overlap with water wrangles—as has been the case in a number
of prominent post-World War II feuds—water is usually an underlying
driver, rather than an overt instigator of conflicts.”18 Miriam Lowi, noted
scholar on water scarcity in the Middle East, argues the geographical
positions of states along a transboundary river system also affect the level
of cooperation over water distribution—with clear advantages going to
the upstream state which could use the water unilaterally without regard
to the needs of the downstream state.19
Despite considerable evidence of cooperation over water usage, a
number of arguments link water scarcity and armed conflict. While states
have not fought exclusively over access to water, increased water scarcity,
when combined with other factors such as upstream-downstream positioning, sovereignty linkages, and political instability, may lead to war.
These factors provide the foundation for examining the driving factors
linking water security to the possibility of war between China and India:

15     Meredith Giordano, Mark Giordano, and Aaron Wolf, “The Geography of Water Conflict
and Cooperation: Internal Pressures and International Manifestations,” The Geographical Journal 168,
no. 4 (December 2002): 295.
16     Miriam R. Lowi, “Water and Conflict in the Middle East and South Asia: Are Environmental
Issues and Security Issues Linked?” The Journal of Environment and Development 8, no. 4 (December
1999): 387.
17     Rebecca Lowe and Emily Silvester, “Water Shortages Threaten Global Security,” International
Bar Association Global Insight 68, no. 4 (August 2014): 48.
18     Chellaney, Water, Peace, and War, 54.
19     Miriam R. Lowi, Water and Power: The Politics of a Scarce Resource in the Jordan River Basin (New
York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 10.
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China’s growing water scarcity.
China’s future upstream activity.
Sino-Indian dispute over Arunachal Pradesh.
Increasing political instability in China.

Driving Factor #1: China’s Growing Water Scarcity

China’s Tibetan plateau, nestled in the Himalayas, is the source
of Asia’s 10 major river systems, including the Yellow, Yangtze, Indus,
Sutlej, Brahmaputra, Salween, and Mekong. It is no wonder many refer
to Tibet as the “Water Tower of Asia.” These rivers traverse 11 countries
and support 2 billion people stretching from Afghanistan to India in
South Asia, and to Vietnam in Southeast Asia. Due to its upstream position, China enjoys a potential monopoly over the supply of fresh water
for most of South and Southeast Asia. In the case of India, both the
Indus and Brahmaputra Rivers flow downstream from China into its
borders. In fact, China is the source of more transnational water flows
than any other upstream power in the world.20

Major Rivers Sourced in Tibet 21

Consequently, despite the wealth of water in Tibet, China faces an
emerging water crisis further aggravated by overuse and pollution. In
2004, China’s available water per capita was one of the lowest in the
world for a populous country, just one-third of the average for developing countries, one-fourth of the world average, and one-fifth of the US
average. This comparison reflects a 23 percent decline in China’s available water per capita over the past 20 years. Meanwhile, the demand for
20     Of all the major rivers originating in the Himalayas, only the Ganges River originates outside
of Tibet. See Hofstedt, “China’s Water Scarcity and its Implications for Domestic and International
Stability,” 78; Chellaney, Water, Peace, and War, 231; Uttam Kumar Sinha, “Examining China’s HydroBehavior: Peaceful or Assertive?” Strategic Analysis 36, no. 1 (January 2012): 42; Lowe and Silvester,
“Water Shortages Threaten Global Security,” 45; and Chellaney, Water, Peace, and War, 231.
21     Major Rivers Sourced in Tibet [Map]. Climate Change and Its Impact on our World’s Major
Rivers – Part 1: The Rivers of Asia, 21st Century Tech, September 4, 2013, http://www.21stcentech.
com/climate-change-impact-major-rivers-asia/ (accessed December 1, 2015).
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water is growing more than 10 percent annually in Chinese cities—and
more than five percent annually for its industries.22
This precipitous decline in available water has worsened an already
critical shortage in drinking water for China’s huge population. More
than 25 percent of all Chinese are without access to drinking water.
Almost half of China’s 668 largest cities are short of water with 108
identified as “serious” and 60 as “critical.” By 2030, the Chinese government predicts the country’s annual freshwater shortage will reach 200
billion cubic meters.23
China’s worsening water shortage is exacerbated by increased pollution on a historic scale. More than 90 percent of China’s underground
aquifers, which supply 70 percent of the country’s drinking water, are
polluted. More than half of China’s population drinks water contaminated with organic waste. More than 75 percent of surface water flowing
along China’s rivers is unsafe for drinking or fishing, and 30 percent is
unsuitable for agriculture and industry.24
China’s water problem has a stark regional dimension as well; the
south has the preponderance of water while the north has the higher
demand. This has created a significant regional disparity that is getting
worse with time. While 45 percent of China’s population and 60 percent
of its agriculture are in the north, the region has only 13.8 percent of
the fresh water. In per capita terms, the amount of available water in the
north is about 25 percent of that available in the south.25

Driving Factor #2: China’s Future Upstream Activity

To remedy the great north-south water divide, China started a
massive South-North Water Diversion Project to transfer a total of 38
to 48 billion cubic meters of water annually. Officially announced by
China’s State Council in 2002, the project called for diverting waters
along three different routes—an eastern route, a central route, and a
western route. The water diversion projects along the first two routes
are already completed and are transferring water from China’s Yangtze
and Han Rivers in the south to the Yellow River in the north. The
third route is still under development. It will divert tributaries to the
upstream portion of the Yangtze River in western China to the Yellow
River. However, in the last 30 years, Chinese scholars and officials have
proposed going above and beyond this project by diverting water from

22     Elizabeth C. Economy, “The Great Leap Backward? The Costs of China’s Environmental
Crisis,” Foreign Affairs Vol. 86, no. 5 (September 2007); Shalizi, “Addressing China’s Growing Water
Shortages and Associated Social and Environmental Consequences,” 4-5; and Kathleen Cannon,
“Water as a Source of Conflict and Instability in China,” Strategic Analysis 30, no. 2 (April-June 2006):
310.
23     Ibid., 312; Hofstedt, “China’s Water Scarcity and its Implications for Domestic and
International Stability,” 72-73.
24     Cannon, “Water as a Source of Conflict and Instability in China,” 313; and Economy, “The
Great Leap Backward?”
25     Sebastian Biba, “Desecuritization in China’s Behavior Towards Its Transboundary Rivers: The
Mekong River, the Brahmaputra River, and the Irtysh and Ili Rivers,” Journal of Contemporary China 23,
no. 85 (2014): 30; and Shalizi, “Addressing China’s Growing Water Shortages and Associated Social
and Environmental Consequences,” 7.
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the upstream portions of the Mekong, Salween, and Yarlung Tsangpo
Rivers that flow from China’s Tibet.26
India views this additional diversion plan with great trepidation because it would affect the downstream flow of water into the
Brahmaputra River; the Yarlung Tsangpo River becomes the Brahmaputra
River once it flows across the Indian border.27 The Brahmaputra River
holds special importance for India. First, it accounts for almost 29
percent of all surface water in India’s rivers. Second, it encompasses
roughly 44 percent of India’s total hydropower potential. Of course,
China’s upstream activities will reduce both the run off and hydropower
potential India could expect from the Brahmaputra River. Considering
India’s population is expected to grow by another 500 million by 2050,
it is no surprise water diversion is a serious issue.28
Thus far, the Chinese government has not officially approved plans
to divert the Yarlung Tsangpo River. However, India remains concerned about China’s future intentions. In 1999, China’s State Council
established a special task force of experts from the Ministry of Water
Resources, the Ministry of Land and Resources, the Science Academy,
and other agencies, to conduct a major field study of the Grand Western
Water Diversion Plan (GWWDP). After a 36-day field research trip, the
task force published a report in support of the water diversion plans
outlined in the GWWDP.29 After listening to the report in October
2012, General Zhao Nanqi, deputy chairman of the ninth Chinese
People’s Political Consultative Conference and a former president of the
Military Academy of Sciences, stated, “Even if we do not begin this
water diversion project, the next generation will. Sooner or later it will be
done.”30 In 2005, Li Lang, an officer from China’s second artillery corps,
published a widely read book which listed various reasons and options
for diverting the Yarlung Tsangpo River.31
Many Chinese experts have refuted the technical feasibility of the
Grand Western Water Diversion Plan. In 2000, the minister of water
resources told China’s state council the project was technically and economically impossible, and his successor echoed these concerns. In 2006,
China’s Engineering Academy, in consultation with numerous academics and experts, produced a report refuting the findings from the 1999
26     Hofstedt, “China’s Water Scarcity and its Implications for Domestic and International
Stability,” 74; Kiki Zhao, “Water From China’s South-North Transfer Project Flows to Beijing,”
The New York Times, December 25, 2014, http://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/12/25/waterfrom-chinas-south-north-transfer-project-flows-to-beijing/; and Hongzhou Zhang, “Sino-Indian
Water Disputes: The Coming Water Wars?” Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews Water 3 (October 2015): 4.
27     The Brahmaputra River, India’s longest river, originates in the Chemayungdung Glacier on
the slopes of the Himalayas. At its origin in Tibet, the Chinese call it the Yarlung Tsangpo. The river
enters India through Arunachal Pradesh at which point it is known as the Siang River. From there
it flows into the plains of Assam where it is known as the Dihang River. The river flows for about
35 kilometers before it is joined by the Dibang and the Lohit Rivers. From here on, it is known as
the Brahmaputra.
28     Biba, “Desecuritization in China’s Behavior Towards its Transboundary Rivers: The Mekong
River, the Brahmaputra River, and the Irtysh and Ili Rivers,” 37; and Upali A. Amarasinghe, Tushaar
Shah, Hugh Turral, and B. K. Anand, India’s Water Future to 2025-2050: Business-as-Usual Scenario
and Deviations, International Water Management Institute - Research Report 123, (Sri Lanka, 2007): 9.
29     Zhang, “Sino-Indian Water Disputes: The Coming Water Wars?” 4-5.
30     Jinshui Cai, “Da xixian’ yinggai shang” [Great Western Route Must Be Executed], Kexue
juece [Scientific Decision-making], December 16, 2016, cited in Holslag, “Assessing the Sino-Indian
Water Dispute,” 25.
31     The name of the book is Saving China Through the Water from Tibet [Xizang zhi shui jiu
Zhangguo], cited in Holslag, “Assessing the Sino-Indian Water Dispute,” 25.
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task force, and asserted the GWWDP is “not technically feasible in the
foreseeable future, and given the development trajectory of China, it is
neither practical nor necessary.”32
These conflicting indicators have led to an ongoing debate over the
true intentions of Chinese water diversion plans for its western route.
Meanwhile, China officially announced plans to build a network of up to
five massive dams on the Yarlung Tsangpo River for the purpose of generating hydroelectricity—not water diversion. In Fall 2014, it completed
construction of the Zangmu Dam, the first of these hydropower dams
along the Yarlung Tsangpo River. Many in India believe these hyropower dams are the first step in the process to construct the additional
infrastructure needed to divert water in accordance with the GWWDP.33
While it does not appear likely China will go through with its water
diversion plan due to cost and engineering difficulties, there is growing
concern Beijing will change course if its current water-diversion plans do
not resolve its growing water-scarcity problem. Should China proceed, it
would increase tensions with India. This dynamic is all the more worrisome when one examines the linkage between the Brahmaputra River
and national sovereignty.

Driving Factor #3: Sino-Indian Dispute over Arunachal Pradesh

The area in which China’s Yarlung Tsangpo River becomes India’s
Brahamaputra River is called the Arunachal Pradesh. Both China and
India claim this region. This territorial dispute is all the more sensitive because it is linked to the sovereignty of both countries. China
cannot give up its claim without simultaneously weakening its claim of
sovereignty over Tibet, which it took by force in 1950. For India, the
Arunachal Pradesh is the site of a humiliating defeat by the Chinese in
1962.
From China’s perspective, political control over Tibet is a matter of
sovereignty, territorial integrity, and security. The Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) claims China’s sovereignty over Tibet traces back 700 years
to the Yuan (Manchu) Dynasty.34 Furthermore, the CCP perceives its
sovereignty over Tibet as an essential part of restoring China’s national
pride and security. After the fall of the Qing Dynasty in 1911, Great
Britain exploited China’s weakened condition by recognizing Tibet as an
independent state and negotiating new borders. Shortly after the Qing
Dynasty fell, the government of India, which was still a colony of Great
Britain at the time, hosted a meeting between its representatives and

32     Holslag, “Assessing the Sino-Indian Water Dispute,” 26; and Zhang, “Sino-Indian Water
Disputes,” 5.
33     The argument that China may ultimately divert the Brahmaputra River headwaters is widely
reported in Indian news media. For a good review of the arguments both for and against China’s
commitment to diverting the headwaters, see Jonathan Holslag, “Assessing the Sino-Indan Water
Dispute;” Hongzhou Zhang, “Sino-Indian Water Disputes;” and “South Asia’s Water: Unquenchable
Thirst,” The Economist, November 19, 2011; Lowe and Silvester, “Water Shortages Threaten Global
Security,” 45; Ananth Krishnan, “China Puts First Brahmaputra Dam into Operation,” India Today,
November 23, 2014, http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/brahmaputra-dam-india-vs-china-zangmuyarlung-tsangpo-zangbo-hydropower-project/1/403379.html; and Ramachandran, “Water Wars.”
34     Sperling, Elliot. “Tibet and China: The Interpretation of History Since 1950,” China Perspectives
2009, no. 3 (September 2009): 26.
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those from Great Britain and Tibet in Simla, India. There, they drew up
the borders of a newly independent Tibet in the Simla Accord of 1914.35
This agreement created two sets of borders between India and Tibet,
one on either side of Nepal. The western border, known as the Johnson
Line, divided Kashmir from Tibet, and the eastern border, called the
McMahon Line, divided Arunachal Pradesh from Tibet. Both lines
were named after British diplomats.36 China refused to acknowledge the
agreement because it claimed Tibet was still part of China at the time and
did not have the authority to make international agreements.37 In fact,
the Chinese leadership determined recognition of the Simla Accord, and
its McMahon Line, would imply Tibet was an independent state with
treaty-making powers. This status would undermine the legitimacy of
China’s centuries-long claim of sovereignty over Tibet.38
In this manner, the Arunachal territorial dispute became linked
to a core issue—China’s claim of sovereignty over Tibet. Once China
invaded and occupied Tibet in 1950, both the Johnson Line and the
McMahon Line became contested borders between India and China.

China-India Border with Arunachal Pradesh Outlined39

The Arunachal Pradesh is also the scene of the 1962 Sino-Indian
War during which China wrested more than 20,000 square kilometers
of territory from India and inflicted heavy casualties.40 Since then, the
35     Ramachandra Guha, “The Dalai Lama’s War,” The National Interest 115 (September/October
2011): 47; and Sikri, “The Tibet Factor in India-China Relations,” 59; and Sikri, “The Tibet Factor
in India-China Relations,” 60.
36     Bruce Riedel, “JFK’s Overshadowed Crisis,” The National Interest 120 (July 2012): 55.
37     In fact, during the Chinese Civil War, both the Kuomintang Nationalists and the CCP claimed
all of Tibet as part of China. See Michael Clarke, “Ethnic Separatism in the People’s Republic of
China: History, Causes and Contemporary Challenges,” European Journal of East Asian Studies 12, no.
1 (2013): 112.
38     Sikri, “The Tibet Factor in India-China Relations,” 60.
39     “South Asia’s Water Unquenchable Thirst.”
40     The Indian government acknowledged the loss of more than 7,000 personnel—with 1,383
dead, 1,696 missing in action, and 3,968 captured. See Gyanesh Kudaisya, “Beyond the ‘Himalayan
Pearl Harbor’,” History Today 62, no. 11 (Nov 2012): 3.
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dispute over the Arunachal Pradesh remains a point of contention in
Sino-Indian relations and serves as a potential trigger for renewed military conflict despite a period of warming relations and increased trade
between the two countries.41
Even before President Hu’s historic visit to India in 2006, the
Chinese ambassador to India made a statement on an Indian news
channel asserting Beijing’s claim to the entire Arunachal Pradesh area,
casting a shadow over Hu’s visit.42 To further emphasize this point,
China refused to give a visa to a visiting Indian official from Arunachal
Pradesh on the grounds that, as the region was a part of China, the
official did not need a visa.43 In 2009, China refused to endorse an Asian
Development Bank project in Arunachal Pradesh on the grounds that
the area for the project was in China.44
Meanwhile, India continues a steady military build-up in and
around the Arunachal Pradesh. In 2008, when Indian Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh visited the province, he announced a major infrastructure development package, and appointed a retired army chief of staff
to the post of governor. In 2009, India deployed an additional 60,000
soldiers to Assam, near Arunachal Pradesh, bringing the total number
of troops in the area to 100,000. It also built three new airfields in the
Himalayan foothills. In 2014, India announced plans to build 54 border
posts in Arunachal Pradesh. Meanwhile, China has heavily invested in
improving its military infrastructure in Tibet, establishing “five fully
operational air bases, several helipads, an extensive rail network, and
36,000 miles of roads—giving them the ability to rapidly deploy 30 divisions (approximately 15,000 soldiers each) along the border, a 3-to-1
advantage over India.”45
In addition to the military build up on both sides of the border,
incursions into disputed areas are common. The Indian government
reported, from 2012-2015, Chinese soldiers conducted 600 incursions
into disputed areas along the India-China border.46 In recent years, the
Chinese-Indian border has become an increasingly dangerous hotspot,
41     From the 1980s to recently, India and China entered into a period of detente highlighted
with the signing of the “Declaration of Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation”
in 2003 and then the “India-China Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity”
in 2005. Despite this, the territorial dispute over the Arunachal Pradesh remained unresolved. See
Sikri, “The Tibet Factor in India-China Relations;” and Sujit Dutta, “Revisiting China’s Territorial
Claims on Arunachal,” Strategic Analysis 32, no. 4 (July 2008).
42     Jing-Dong Yuan, “The Dragon and the Elephant: Chinese-Indian Relations in the 21st
Century,” The Washington Quarterly 30, no. 3 (Summer 2007): 138. Also in 2007, the Chinese Foreign
Minister Yang Jieshi reiterated the PRC’s claim on Arunachal Pradesh during his talks with the Indian
External Affairs Minister Pranab at the sidelines of the G-8+5 meeting in Germany, see Dutta,
“Revisiting China’s Territorial Claims on Arunachal,” 556.
43     Sikri, “The Tibet Factor in India-China Relations,” 64; and Kerry Bolton, “Water Wars:
Rivalry Over Water Resources,” World Affairs 14, no. 1 (Spring 2010): 56.
44     Sanjeev Miglani, “India, China Take a Measure of Each Other at Border Row Talks,”
Reuters, August 5, 2009, http://blogs.reuters.com/india/2009/08/05/india-china-take-a-measureof-each-other-at-border-row-talks/.
45     Dutta, “Revisiting China’s Territorial Claims on Arunachal,” 572; Selina Ho, “River Politics:
China’s Policies in the Mekong and the Brahmaputra in Comparative Perspective,” Journal of
Contemporary China 23, no. 85 (2014): 14; Bolton, “Water Wars,” 61; Ben Blanchard, “China Expresses
Concern about Indian Plan to Build Border Posts,” Reuters, October 30, 2014, http://www.reuters.
com/article/2014/10/30/us-china-india-idUSKBN0IJ14G20141030; and Mohan Malik, “‘Victory
Without Bloodshed’: China’s India Strategy,” The Diplomat, August 20, 2013.
46     Ibid. The Indian government routinely tracks and reports incursions by Chinese military
patrols into various disputed areas India administers and which China claims. This number covers
all of these areas, not just Arunachal Pradesh.
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the net result of this military build up, aggressive patrolling, and border
incursions.

Driving Factor #4: Increasing Political Instability in China

China is facing growing domestic political instability due to an
economic slowdown and rising popular nationalism, making it increasingly difficult for the CCP to pursue national interests objectively in a
non-confrontational manner, especially with issues linked to national
sovereignty and quality of life. In the case of water scarcity, and especially with the case of the Brahmaputra River, both of these dimensions
are present. As water scarcity in China grows, the CCP will find it harder
to ignore the cries for more-drastic solutions, such as diverting the
Brahmaputra River and other transnational rivers, to alleviate the suffering of its people. And, because the Brahmaputra River flows through
a disputed area, the CCP’s ability to make decisions in a collaborative
manner with its neighbors will become even more important.

China’s Slowing Economy

Ever since the economic reforms ushered in by Deng Xiaoping in
the 1980s, the CCP has focused on promoting economic growth to build
its national power and to maintain its legitimacy as China’s ruling political party. This concentration resulted in tremendous economic growth
and rising living standards, but it also increased the income gap between
rich and poor, the expectations by the Chinese people for better services,
and environmental degradation.47
But now, China’s gross domestic product growth is slowing, and an
increasing number of analysts are worried China will enter a prolonged
period of slower growth—or an outright recession. This result would
severely test the CCP’s ability to deal with environmental issues, such
as water scarcity, increased social unrest, and rising popular nationalism. A major contributing factor to China’s declining economy is the
tremendous growth of non-government debt and overcapacity China
has accumulated since the 2008 Global Financial Crisis.
In response to the 2008 crisis, the Chinese government announced
a major fiscal stimulus package and adopted measures to relax monetary policy.48 A main component of this effort was to encourage local
governments to increase funding for infrastructure and public works
projects.49 In order to raise these funds, local governments looked to
the commercial sector to fund public projects by establishing Local
Government Financing Platforms, which are treated as municipal State
Owned Enterprises under Chinese law.50
Local Government Financing Platforms focus primarily on publicwelfare projects such as affordable- housing construction, infrastructure
47     Randall Peerenboom, “China and the Middle-Income Trap: Toward a Post Washington, Post
Beijing Consensus,” Pacific Review 27, no. 5 (2014): 663.
48     Yinqiu Lu and Tao Sun, “Local Government Financing Platforms in China: A Fortune or
Misfortune?” International Monetary Fund Working Paper, 13/243 (October 2013): 8.
49     Chaoying Qi, James Juniper, and James Xiaohe Zhang, “‘Minsky Moment’ and Financial
Fragility: The Case of China,” The Journal of Developing Areas 49, no. 6 (April 2015): 286; and Gang
Fan and Yan Lv, “Fiscal Prudence and Growth Sustainability: An Analysis of China’s Public Debts,”
Asian Economic Policy Review 7, no. 2 (December 2012): 207-208.
50     Fan and Lv, “Fiscal Prudence and Growth Sustainability,” 203.
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development, social services, and environmental protection. To finance
these projects, local governments provide Local Government Financing
Platforms with capital through the direct transfer of government
revenue, land-use rights, or other real-property assets such as roads and
bridges.51 Local Government Financing Platforms then use this capital
as collateral to obtain the financing they need from Chinese banks to
finance the projects the local governments want them to execute.
This relationship between local government, Local Government
Financing Platforms, and state- owned banks has produced far more
capacity than is demanded by foreign and domestic markets in housing,
steel, cement, construction, iron, and other goods. More than one in five
homes in China’s urban areas are vacant. At the macro level, China’s realestate activity is as much as 20 percent of the gross domestic product. To
put this in perspective, at the height of the US real-estate market prior
to the 2008 crisis, real estate was six percent of the US gross domestic
product. As an indicator of over-investment in construction projects,
China used more cement in 2011-2013 than the United States did in the
entire 20th century.52
Not surprisingly, this rising overcapacity has coincided with extraordinary growth in China’s commercial debt-to-GDP ratio which, in 2015,
exceeded 200 percent of the gross domestic product, almost double the
125 percent reported in 2008.53 When coupled with government debt,
China’s total debt-to-GDP ratio approached 300 percent, according to a
2015 report by McKinsey Consulting.54 Small wonder that on March 3,
2016, Moody’s downgraded its outlook on Chinese debt from “stable”
to “negative.”55
This over-capacity and debt has slowed China’s GDP growth rate.
Its nominal GDP growth rate declined from more than 15 percent in
2011 to around seven percent in 2014, but many analysts believe the
actual figure was closer to four percent.56 This slowdown is problematic
in terms of political stability due to the growing income gap in China, an
uncomfortable irony for a party whose originating ideology was based
on communism. Between 2008 and 2010, the Chinese government dealt
with more than 90,000 protests annually.57 As the economy continues
to slow and social unrest rises, the government will need to resort to
nationalism to maintain political stability. This action, however, will
entail its own risks, especially in the realm of foreign policy.

51     Lu and Son, “Local Government Financing Platforms in China,” 4.
52     Vague, “The Coming China Crisis,” 17; and Ibid., 21.
53     Ye Xie, “China’s Debt-to-GDP Ration Just Climbed to a Record High,” Bloomberg Business News,
July 15, 2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-07-15/china-s-debt-to-gdp-ratiojust-climbed-to-a-new-record-high.
54     Richard Dobbs, Susan Lund, Jonathan Woetzel, and Mina Mutafchieva, “Debt and (Not
Much) Deleveraging,” McKinsey Global Institute Report (February 2015): vi.
55     “Moody’s Cuts China Outlook on Eve of NPC, Cites Reform, Fiscal Risks,” Reuters, March
3, 2016, http://in.mobile.reuters.com/article/idINKCN0W408K?irpc=932.
56     Vague, “The Coming China Crisis,” 22; and Qi, Juniper, and Zhang, “‘Minsky Moment’,” 279.
57     Elizabeth C. Economy, “Roots of Protest and the Party Response in China,” Testimony before US-China Economic and Security Review Committee, First Session, 112th Congress, February
25, 2011.
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Rising Popular Nationalism in China

Ever since the capitalist reforms under Deng Xiaoping, the CCP
has based its legitimacy on economic growth and nationalist ideology.
In fact, up until the mid-1990s, the party was able to “decide the direction, content, and intensity of Chinese nationalism, and then to mobilize
the people…[it] could appeal to nationalism whenever it so wished, and
dismiss it whenever it needed to shift its policy.”58
A slowing economy and rising popular nationalism are impacting
a leadership that is more exposed to public opinion than ever before,
and constraining the ability of China’s political elites to coolly pursue
China’s national interests. The CCP originally supported this rising
wave of popular nationalism in the 1990s, when a series of incidents
contributed to the perception the West (with Japan included) harbored
ill intentions toward China: the selling of advanced fighter planes to
Taiwan; the search of a Chinese cargo ship; opposition to China’s bid to
host the 2000 Olympics; the accidental bombing of a Chinese embassy in
Kosovo; and Japanese claims on the Diaoyu Islands, denouncing China
in the name of human rights, and the deployment of aircraft carriers in
the vicinity of the Taiwan Strait.59
In the past, when rising popular nationalism threatened national
interests, Chinese leaders applied pragmatic controls, at times constraining or promoting depending on the national and political interests at
stake. For example, at the height of the 2005 anti-Japanese demonstrations, the Chinese government took measures to halt them because the
growing size and publicity of the protests influenced the government’s
foreign policy interest in maintaining productive relations with Japan.60
In the words of a prominent Chinese scholar, “Talking tough but acting
in a calculated manner helped Chinese leaders prevent the rise of popular
nationalism from damaging China’s relations with the United States and
Japan.” The CCP also took steps to halt anti-US demonstrations after
the 1999 accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Kosovo, as
well as the 2001 mid-air collision between a US EP-3 and a Chinese jet
fighter in the South China Sea.61
China’s ability to exert this pragmatic control of popular nationalism
has declined since the 2008 global financial crisis and the slowdown of
China’s economy. As Chinese elites lose the ability to leverage economic
growth to maintain legitimacy, they will become more unwilling, or even
unable, to control popular nationalism. China’s current president and
party leader, Xi Jinping, is particularly exposed to nationalist opinion
because of the way he has consolidated power. Prior to assuming office
as president in 2012, he witnessed the “collective presidency” which
distributed power across the CCP Standing Committee and constrained
58     Zemin Chen, “Nationalism, Internationalism, and Chinese Foreign Policy,” Journal of
Contemporary China 14, no. 42 (February 2005): 50.
59     Peter Hays Gries, “Chinese Nationalism: Challenging the State?” Current History (September
2005): 252; and Chen, “Nationalism, Internationalism, and Chinese Foreign Policy,” 50.
60     Shuisheng Zhao, “Foreign Policy Implications of Chinese Nationalism Revisited: The
Strident Turn,” Journal of Contemporary China 22, no. 82 (2013): 540.
61     Ibid., 542; and Ibid., 540. Actions by the CCP to tamp down Chinese protests concerning
Japanese claims over the Diaoyu Islands are another example of the central government’s ability to
constrain nationalism when needed. See also Phillip C. Saunders and Erica S. Downs, “Legitimacy
and the Limits of Nationalism: China and the Diaoyu Islands,” International Security 23, no. 3 (Winter,
1998-1999): 139.
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then-President Hu Jintao’s influence so completely he was nicknamed
the “woman with bound feet.” To reverse this, Xi surrounded himself
with “a shadow cabinet that was defined less by a single ideology than
by school ties and political reliability.”62
Xi has limited collective leadership and marginalized traditional
institutions of governance, and he relies on a small group of advisors who
are more loyal than experienced. The National Security Commission, for
example, is led by two figures loyal to Xi, but who have little foreign
policy experience. And with regard to foreign policy decision-making,
Xi has reduced the roles of the State Council, the Foreign Ministry, and
the military.63 He has consolidated so much power, he is personally at
the center of every major policy decision, and is arguably China’s most
authoritarian leader since Mao.64
Because Xi established such clear dominance in the national decisionmaking process, it has left him with near-total responsibility for the
government’s economic policies. As these policies continue to prove
ineffective in reversing China’s declining economic growth, Xi becomes
more exposed to popular nationalism as he will have to “address countless domestic challenges for which he is now explicitly accountable,” and
a major misstep on any of them could be costly to his political popularity
and position.65
As Xi and his small group of policymaking elites continue to grapple
with declining economic growth and rising social unrest, concerns
over political instability will become a driving factor for foreign policy.
“For this reason, Xi will most probably stimulate and intensify Chinese
nationalism—long a pillar of the state’s legitimacy—to compensate for
the political harm of a slower economy, to distract the public, to halt
rivals who might use nationalist criticisms against him, and to burnish
his own image.”66 This is evidenced by his development of an image as
an assertive strongman, not unlike that of President Putin to whom Xi
reportedly said in 2013, “We are similar in character.”67
As water scarcity continues to grow in China due to over-consumption,
climate change, and pollution, rising popular nationalism will pressure
the CCP to seek drastic solutions. Water diversion of rivers originating
in Tibet will become more attractive to the detriment of China’s relations with its downstream neighbors.

Conclusion

This article examined a diverse set of factors when assessing the
relationship between water insecurity and war. It is not enough to focus
purely on the dynamics of how water is shared, how water scarcity is
growing, or how the overall natural environment is deteriorating. War,
as a human and a political endeavor, is a more complex matter.
62     Evan Osnos, “Born Red,” The New Yorker (April 6, 2015).
63     Robert D. Blackwill and Kurt M. Campbell, “Xi Jinping on the Global Stage: Chinese Foreign
Policy Under a Powerful But Exposed Leader,” Council on Foreign Relations Special Report 74 (February
2016): 6.
64     Evan Osnos, “Born Red.”
65     Blackwill and Campbell, “Xi Jinping on the Global Stage,” 10.
66     Ibid., 4.
67     Evan Osnos, “Born Red.”
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Consequently, water scarcity, by itself, will most likely not lead to
war. However, water insecurity when coupled with other factors, such as
increasing water scarcity at the source of transnational rivers, threatening behavior by the upstream state, overlapping linkages between water
insecurity and national sovereignty, and decreasing political stability in
the upstream state, will increase the likelihood of war. In the case of
China and India, all these conditions exist.
So why should the Department of Defense care? It should care
because history has shown the United States could be drawn into a war
between these two powers. On November 19, 1962, when the SinoIndian War was at its worst point for India, Prime Minister Nehru wrote
two letters to President Kennedy describing India’s situation as desperate and requesting comprehensive military aid. He specifically asked for
a minimum of 12 squadrons of supersonic fighters, radar support, and
US Air Force personnel to man them.68 Although the United States did
not provide direct air support to India, probably having to do with the
timing of the request being on the heels of the Cuban Missile Crisis, it
did send C-130s, laden with military equipment and ammunition, and
dispatch the USS Enterprise to a nearby location.69
The Department of Defense should also recognize Tibet’s impact
to regional security as it becomes the strategic high ground of Asia for
fresh water due to increasing glacier melt; growing water consumption
in China, South Asia, and Southeast Asia; and increasing pressure for
China to divert water away from its downstream neighbors. While this
article covered these issues with regard to China and India, the same
lessons learned can apply to countries in Southeast Asia.
As water becomes increasingly sought after among states in that
region, and even around the globe, it is time for the United States and
the Department of Defense to elevate environmental security issues to
a level on par with national security interests such as countering WMD
proliferation and preventing attacks on the homeland. It is increasingly
important to promote confidence-building measures between certain
states to ensure military missteps do not aggravate territorial sovereignty
issues like the one over the Arunachal Pradesh. Finally, it is time for the
Department of Defense to invest in more water purification/treatment
capabilities so it is not focused only on sustaining the health of US and
coalition forces, but also on mitigating water shortage crises.

68     Kudaisya, “Beyond the ‘Himalayan Pearl Harbor’,” 4.
69     Riedel, “JFK’s Overshadowed Crisis,” 56.
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Abstract: Military doctrine on stability operations reflects a “planning-school” approach, which assumes rebuilding the capacity of
weak or failed states is a matter of preparation and technique. This
article argues the problems of stabilization are not just those of process; they reflect deep-rooted philosophical differences surrounding
the viability of these operations and the approaches used. When it
comes to state-building, military doctrine lacks a basis in an uncontested “theory of victory.”

S

tabilization is out of fashion. Burned by experiences in Iraq and
Afghanistan, Western states have little appetite for engagement
in complex nation-building tasks. But, if the international community is serious in its commitment to provide political solutions to such
crises as in Syria, it will be difficult to avoid confronting the problems
of stabilization experienced in the recent past. For example, the motion
passed by the British parliament giving agreement to air attacks in Syria
also identified explicitly military action as “only one component of a
broader strategy to bring peace and stability to Syria,” and this commitment “underlines the importance of planning for post-conflict
stabilization and reconstruction.”1
Western militaries have responded to the challenges of the last
decade and a half with a process of doctrinal revision. For example,
the United States produced a specific doctrine for stability operations
in 2008, revising it in 2014; the latest iteration of the United Kingdom’s
doctrine for stability operations was published in March 2016.2 In theory,
this process of learning lessons should ensure future operations go much
more smoothly than those of the past. This article contends this is likely
not to be the case. Colonel Charles Callwell noted in his 1906 treatise
on small wars, “Theory cannot be accepted as conclusive when practice
points the other way.”3 The difficulty for military doctrine is there is no
1     UK Parliament, “MPs Approve Motion on ISIL,” December 2, 2015, http://www.parliament.
uk/business/news/2015/december/mps-debate-motion-on-isil-in-syria/ (accessed May 18, 2016).
2     US Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-07, Stability (Washington, DC: Headquarters
Department of the Army, June 2014), http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/
fm3_07.pdf; and UK Ministry of Defense, Joint Doctrine Publication 05, Shaping a Stable World: The
Military Contribution (Development, Concepts and Doctrine Center, March 2016), https://www.
gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/516849/20160302-Stable_
world_JDP_05.pdf.
3     Colonel C. E. Callwell, Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice, Third Edition (Lincoln, NE:
University of Nebraska, 1996), 270.
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consensus on the practice of complex nation-building. This is evident in
the many debates outlined in the literature on peacebuilding, such as the
one featured in the previous issue of this journal.
Military doctrine on stability operations reflects predominantly
a “planning-school” approach.4 Consciously or unconsciously, this
approach assumes rebuilding the capacity of weak or failed states is a
matter of preparation and technique. It is about planning, inter-agency
cooperation, and a whole-of-government approach. It assumes success
is a matter of the right principles and the right techniques. It reflects a
rationalist, problem-solving approach. Military doctrine on stabilization
reflects Western liberal assumptions on how these operations should be
conducted. However, as the wider literature on peacebuilding illustrates,
there is a sustained argument surrounding the validity and viability of
Western liberal approaches to international intervention.5
For some commentators, stabilization operations require fundamentally different approaches if they are to be successful. For others, the
notion external interventions can create functioning democratic states
is not viable. In consequence, the whole enterprise rests on uncertain
foundations. Put another way, the challenges of stability operations and
stabilization are not the result of the wrong strategy or the wrong techniques, tactically or operationally. Instead, the difficulties derive from
fundamental uncertainties about whether such operations can be done
at all.
This article is divided into three parts. The first part looks at the
“planning-school” approach that underpins military doctrine on stability operations, highlighting some of the key strands associated with
this perspective. Next, the article examines the views of those who
reject fundamentally the viability of liberal approaches to intervention.
Finally, the article addresses the views of those who believe complex
nation-building interventions can be executed effectively, but with radically different philosophical approaches required. While the notion that
complex nation-building operations are difficult is hardly new, military
organizations continue to believe revised doctrines can provide a solution. Ultimately, this article concludes, despite the development of more
sophisticated doctrines for stability operations, there continues to be a
lack of an uncontested “theory of victory” for them: a clearly understood
consensus on how success can be achieved. On that basis, no matter how
rigorous military learning processes are, future military performance in
such operations is unlikely to improve radically, and policy-makers need
to expect less from such operations.

The “Planning-School” Approach

Military organizations need doctrine. Doctrine comprises “what is
believed officially to be contemporary best military practice.”6 Doctrine
reflects a distillation of the lessons of past operations. For this reason,
4     Rory Stewart and Gerald Knaus, Can Intervention Work? (New York, NY: W. W. Norton &
Company, Inc., 2011), xvii.
5     As an example, see Charles J. Sullivan, “State-Building: America’s Foreign Policy Challenge,”
Parameters 46, no. 1 (Spring 2016): 51-65; and M. Chris Mason, “Nation-Building is an Oxymoron,”
Parameters 46, no. 1 (Spring 2016): 67-79.
6     Paul Latawski, Sandhurst Occasional Papers No. 5 – The Inherent Tensions in Military Doctrine
(Camberley, UK: Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, 2011), 9.
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the Soviet strategist A.A. Svechin (1878-1938) referred to it as “the
daughter of history.”7 Doctrine plays a crucial role in interpreting history
for a military organization, providing intellectual guidance on how
to solve military problems and a common framework of thinking.8 It
ensures military problems do not have to be addressed each time from
first principles.
For some, the value of having a specific doctrine to conduct largescale state-building operations might be open to question. The strategist
Colin S. Gray has noted, “Stability operations, the demand for them and
the provision of new capabilities to perform them well, are the downstream product of larger decisions on foreign policy and strategy.”9 At
the moment, Western foreign policymakers seem keen to avoid generating the demand for such operations. Even if President Obama has
asserted “isolation is not an option,” he has also labelled interventions
to deal with terrorism as “naive and unsustainable.” His focus instead is
on building the capacity of local partners.10
Circumstances evolve over time, and it cannot be presumed these
kinds of operations will not be needed in the future. For example,
the United States has a long history of trying to resist involvement in
complex nation-building activities, but at some point it has been dragged
into them because contexts change and government policies have been
altered. The consequence of ignoring the potential need for such operations has been military organizations that have been left, as was the case
in Bosnia in the 1990s, conducting “roll-your-own” campaigns, trying
to adapt techniques and generate solutions “in contact.”11
Nor are there necessarily easy alternatives to nation-building. Lightfootprint interventions have advantages and, for some, interventions,
such as in Mali in 2012, are the way to go. As one commentator has
noted, “If you are looking at future military interventions, it will not
be like Iraq and Afghanistan.”12 Light-footprint interventions are no
silver bullet, and they may only mitigate the worst outcomes, rather than
achieve positive success.13 As the light-footprint operation in Libya has
demonstrated, even overwhelming short-term military success in no way
guarantees light-footprint operations will achieve longer-term stability.14
This reflects, in part, the paradox inherent in land power—putting
extensive “boots on the ground” gives the greatest opportunity to
7     Charles Grant, “The Use of History in the Development of Contemporary Doctrine,” in
The Occasional Papers No. 30 – The Origins of Contemporary Doctrine, ed. John Gooch (Camberley, UK:
Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, September 1997), 7.
8     Christopher Tuck, Understanding Land Warfare (New York, NY: Routledge, 2014), 35.
9     Colin S. Gray, “Stability Operations in Strategic Perspective: A Skeptical View,” Parameters 36,
no. 2 (Summer 2006): 4.
10     The White House, Remarks by the President at the United States Military Academy
Commencement Ceremony, May 28 2014, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/
05/28/remarks-president-united-states-military-academy-commencement-ceremony.
11     William Flavin, “US Doctrine for Peace Operations,” International Peacekeeping 15, no.1
(February 2008): 40.
12     Vivienne Walt, “What Mali’s Crisis Means for the Future of Western Military Intervention,”
Time, October 29, 2012, http://world.time.com/2012/10/29/what-malis-crisis-means-for-thefuture-of-western-military-intervention/ (accessed May 5, 2015).
13     Fernando M. Luján, Light Footprints: The Future of American Intervention (Washington, DC:
Center for a New American Security, March 2013), 13.
14     Adrian Johnson and Saqeb Mueen, eds., Short War, Long Shadow: The Political and Military
Legacies of the 2011 Libya Campaign, Whitehall Report 1-12 (London, UK: Royal United Services
Institute, 2012).
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influence local people. Precisely because of this, it also exposes troops to
the highest risks.15 Mitigating risk in intervention operations can therefore mitigate against achieving the most ambitious outcomes. It would
be dangerous to assume complex nation-building operations will never
reoccur. As analysts at RAND have noted, “If future wars will not look
exactly like Iraq, many of them are still likely to resemble Iraq more than
they will the great wars of the 20th century.”16
Whatever their initial objectives, international efforts in Iraq and
Afghanistan became exercises in liberal peacebuilding, the dominant
intellectual framework currently applied to post-Cold War policies and
practices of post-conflict intervention. They were large-scale interventions by external actors, with the objective of promoting long-term,
stable peace using multi-dimensional activities across political, economic, security, and social sectors. They became associated, particularly,
with the idea of state-building: the foundations of long-term stable
peace lay in giving war-torn societies effective national governance.
They assumed liberally constituted states were internally more peaceful, prosperous, and humane, and sustainably so, and therefore focused
on building states that featured liberal democracy, the rule of law, and
the promotion of human rights—and that were market-orientated, centralized, and secular. These operations proved to be problematic, and
militaries have attempted to learn from their failures, generating new
concepts and techniques for achieving their goals.
These responses assumed liberal peacebuilding could work. Based
on this assumption, the principal question for militaries became what
sorts of techniques and practices could best deliver liberal peacebuilding
goals. The answer reflected an assumption that complex nation-building
required a capacity to deliver on a hierarchy of themes: the provision
of security; humanitarian relief; governance; economic stabilization;
democratization; and development, covering the immediate needs of the
crisis (such as personal protection and access to food and clean water)
through to longer-term initiatives designed to deliver stable political and
economic development, including security sector reform, the building of
local political parties, and the promotion of economic growth.17
This approach has been reflected in the actual development of military doctrine in the US Army’s Field Manual 3-07, Stability Operations,
and the United Kingdom’s Joint Warfare Publication 3-40, The Military
Contribution to Stabilization. In performing complex state-building tasks
effectively, contemporary military doctrine highlights the importance
of host-nation ownership; legitimacy; a whole-of-government approach;
effective multi-national coordination; understanding of the human
terrain; and flexibility and adaptability in approach.18
15     Tuck, Understanding Land Warfare, Chapter 1.
16     Christopher S. Chivvis, Olga Oliker, Andrew M. Liepman, Ben Connable, George Willcoxon,
and William Young, Initial Thoughts on the Impact of the Iraq War on US National Security Structures (Santa
Monica, CA: RAND, 2014), 19.
17     James Dobbins, Seth G. Jones, Keith Crane, and Beth Cole DeGrasse, The Beginner’s Guide to
Nation-Building (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2007).
18     Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction (Washington, DC: United States Institute
of Peace, 2009); Andrew S. Natsios, “The Nine Principles of Reconstruction and Development,”
Parameters 35, no 2 (Autumn 2005): 4-20; and Angel Rabasa, John Gordon IV, Peter Chalk,
Christopher S. Chivvis, Audra K. Grant, K. Scott McMahon, Laurel E. Miller, Marco Overhaus, and
Stephanie Pezard, From Insurgency to Stability – Volume I: Key Capabilities and Practices (Santa Monica,
CA: RAND, 2011).
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Doctrine is supposed to be “what is taught, believed, and advocated
as what is right (i.e., what works best).”19 But, is success in peacebuilding activities simply a matter of getting the right principles and honing
tactical and operational methods?

Building Democratic States: Can It Be Done?

What if liberal peacebuilding cannot be done reasonably? For
one perspective, termed in some quarters the “critical approach,”
complex nation-building operations, such as those conducted in Iraq
and Afghanistan, are fool’s errands. They are too complex a task to be
executed effectively, irrespective of the methods one uses.20 For this
reason, attempts at peacebuilding are at best irrelevant and at worst
counter-productive.
For some peacebuilding literature, the proof for this perspective lies
in the empirical evidence. If one examines external interventions in the
past, one struggles to find concrete evidence of success. Some writers
have examined UN peacebuilding efforts. In general, and drawing on
the wider peace-support literature, there are three benchmarks used to
measure success in such operations: violence reduction, violence containment, and conflict settlement. The first measures the success with which
an operation reduces armed violence; the second, the success with which
violence is prevented from spreading to neighboring countries; and the
last measures an operation’s effectiveness in removing the underlying
causes of an armed conflict.21
Liberal peacebuilding has ambitious objectives that focus, especially, on the last of these three goals. But it is difficult to find examples
of unequivocal success in this regard. For example, operations in El
Salvador, Nicaragua, and Guatamala succeeded in ending the civil wars
there, but the imposition of economic liberalization and structural
adjustment programs produced many negative second- and third-order
effects. These included a growth in urban poverty; increases in the
wealth gap between rich and poor; higher levels of violent criminality;
and increasing political tensions. Similarly, operations in Cambodia and
Timor-Leste ended fighting, but the political settlements achieved did
not succeed in embedding liberal democracy in those countries.22 Where
successes have occurred, local actors, not external intervention, seem to
lie at the heart of the success.23
Other writers have examined the historic record of military occupations designed to promote nation-building or to embed significant
political change. Looking at 24 case studies beginning in 1815, the
political scientist David Edelstein found only seven major successes: the
occupation of France in 1815, and six other occupations clustered around
19     US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, Joint Publication 1
(March 25, 2013), ix.
20     The concepts of “problem-solving” and “critical approaches” are identified and explored in
Nicolas Lemay-Hebert, “Review Essay: Critical Debates on Liberal Peacebuilding,” Civil Wars, 15,
no. 2, (June 2013): 242-252.
21     Paul F. Diehl and Daniel Druckman, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010), 28-67.
22     Jacob Bercovitch and Richard Jackson, Conflict Resolution in the Twenty-First Century: Principles,
Methods, and Approaches (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2012), 178.
23     Pierre Englebert and Dennis M. Tull, “Postconflict Reconstruction in Africa: Flawed Ideas
about Failed States,” International Security 32, no. 4 (Spring 2008): 106-139.
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the end of World War II (Germany, Italy, Japan, West Austria, North
Korea, and the Ryukyu Islands). He concluded the key sources of success
were exogenous. They did not relate to the doctrine of the occupiers,
but instead to the strategic context. He also noted, in particular, the role
common external threats can play in helping the intervener and the host
population to define a community of interest (in the case of Germany,
for example, the threat posed by Communism).24 Or, as Ann Hironaka
discusses in her book Neverending Wars, the problem might be that since
the end of World War II the international community has become a
slave to the idea states cannot be allowed to fail. As a result, international efforts have been trying to sustain through intervention policies
that do not deserve to exist—“zombie states.” Historically, states have
risen and fallen; often the former has been tied to the processes of the
latter.25 Interventions fail because they provide life support for political
structures that are dead in their current form.
A second angle of attack on the viability of liberal peacebuilding
efforts derives from the argument that liberal political and economic
systems are culturally specific. Liberal peacebuilding is often presented
as a neutral, non-partisan and non-ideological intervention. It often
uses the language of “common sense” and humanitarianism, offering
to intervene in a dispassionate manner; it is presented as a value-free,
practical task.26 Critics of this view argue these assumptions lead to the
imposition of generic templates that do not fit the complex realities
extant in each particular context.
History demonstrates there is no single route to liberal democracy,
and recent Western attempts to create liberal democracies have tried to
impose a generic technical template onto a process that is slow, organic,
and the product of complex local conditions. For example, European
state formation has not conformed historically to top-down neo-liberal
approaches. European states were created through a lengthy process of
contestation, often violent in nature. They have not developed according
to a single template, but have instead followed different paths shaped
by differing contexts. Local elites, rather than external agents have
often been decisive, and the outcomes have often been contingent and
unexpected.27
Moreover, state reconstruction is “inherently political in nature
(rather than a neutral or technical process).”28 Focusing on the problem of
ethno-centrism, these commentators argue Western approaches ignore
local customs that might have the potential to mobilize more grass-roots
legitimacy than alien Western forms of government. Tradional conflictresolution methods include a focus on consensus decision-making and
compensation or gift exchanges to ensure reciprocal and harmonious

24     David M. Edelstein, “Occupational Hazards: Why Military Occupations Succeed or Fail,”
International Security 29, no. 1 (Summer 2004), 49-91.
25     Ann Hironaka, Neverending Wars: The International Community, Weak States, and the Perpetuation of
Civil War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005).
26     Roger Mac Ginty, No War, No Peace: The Rejuvenation of Stalled Peace Processes and Peace Accords
(Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 3-4.
27     Jonathan Goodhand and Mark Sedra, “Rethinking Liberal Peacebuilding: Statebuilding and
Transition in Afghanistan - An Introduction,” Central Asian Survey 32, no. 3 (October 29, 2013): 242.
28     Feargal Cochrane, Ending Wars (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2008), 170.
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relations between groups.29 However, critics argue liberal interventions
have tried to freeze in place political arrangements that do not reflect the
underlying social patterns of the host population and which are therefore
unsustainable. As one exasperated Afghan explained to a Westerner:
You are listing all the problems in Afghanistan—and heaping up buzzwords
like “tribalism” and “corruption.” But actually, these words have no connection to Afghan reality. You are trying to force Afghan reality into your
theory—cutting the suit to fit the cloth.30

Thus, a state is not just a formal apparatus of government. A state
is an assembly of forces, institutions, relations, actors, practices, and
boundaries. Like the roots of a plant, much of the state is not immediately visible; and in ignoring this, Western interventions, in effect, have
been trying to graft the stem of one plant onto the roots of another.31
A final perspective on the inherent implausibility of Western liberal
interventions argues it entails too many internal contradictions. The
principles of liberal peacebuilding cannot be reconciled and inevitably
produce contradictory and unwelcome outcomes. For example, can one
reconcile the need for persistence in such operations with the need to
maintain legitimacy? On the one hand, writing on liberal approaches to
statebuilding emphasizes the need for long-term external engagement
in order to build peace effectively in failing states: it cannot be done
quickly.32 But, inevitably, the long-term presence of foreigners tends to
alienate the local population, stoke a nationalist backlash, and undermine
the legitimacy of the operation. Rory Stewart notes the fundamental
problems caused by the peacebuilding intervention by foreigners, commenting, “The Afghans disliked the US-led intervention because it was
a US-led intervention, and no change in tactics would alter that fact.”33
Thus, the longer one stays, the less legitimate a given intervention is
likely to be.
Alternatively, can one reconcile the need in a weak or failed state
for a large-scale infusion of resources, with the need to encourage local
ownership of the state-building process? Building the capacity of failed
states requires huge resources, resources that are beyond the means of
the host-nation government to produce. For example, 80 percent of
the Afghan government’s official expenditures are from foreign aid.34
This scale of aid can undermine local ownership. It discourages local
government from generating its own fiscal resources. It encourages
the development of “rentier” states, in which the key form of wealth
creation is skimming off foreign transactions, and it distorts the local
economy, creating a “war-and-aid economy” marked by pervasive and
entrenched corruption.35
29     Kenneth Menkhaus, “Somalia: Governance vs. Statebuilding,” in Building States to Build Peace,
ed. Charles T. Call with Vanessa Wyeth (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008), 187-216.
30     Stewart and Knaus, Can Intervention Work?, 11.
31     Goodhand and Sedra, “Rethinking Liberal Peacebuilding,” 243.
32     US Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-07, x.
33     Stewart and Knaus, Can Intervention Work?, xxii.
34     Kevin Sieff for The Washington Post in Kabul, “Afghan Economy Faces Serious Revenue
Shortfall as State Undertakes Transition,” The Guardian, April 22, 2014, http://www.theguardian.
com/world/2014/apr/22/afghanistan-economy-revenue-budget-shortfall.
35     Astri Suhrke, “Statebuilding in Afghanistan: A Contradictory Engagement,” Central Asian
Survey 32, no. 3 (October 22, 2013): 275-276.
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These contradictions also extend into other principles. How does one
reconcile the need for peace with the need for justice and reconciliation?
Reaching a political settlement may require cooperation with individuals
and groups that have been, or are perceived to have been, complicit in
serious human rights violations. In Cambodia, for example, reaching a
peace settlement required negotiating with the Khmer Rouge, a group
responsible for millions of deaths. Is peace reached through such deals
likely to be viewed as just by those who suffered at the hands of such
perpetrators? Can one have reconciliation without the sense of justice?36
Equally, can the need to promote physical security be reconciled with
the need to sustain the legitimacy of an operation? Here, the argument
is that a focus on security leads inevitably to militarized approaches to
peacebuilding in which military responses then crowd out non-military
peacebuilding strategies.37 Liberal peacebuilding then segues into a
counterinsurgency strategy augmented by reconstruction tools, diluting and confusing its purpose. The needs of security may, for example,
result in the arming of militias (as was the case in Afghanistan) but
these militias may undermine the host state’s monopoly on the means
of coercion and strengthen non-state actors.38 There is no clear-cut way
of getting around these problems. The complex methods and objectives
associated with liberal peacebuilding operations cannot help but impede
one another.
The critical approach argues liberal peacebuilding is pointless—
either it cannot work or the context has to be a very particular one for it
to succeed. For some hyper-critics of liberal peacebuilding, it is designed
not to work. As an exercise in “imperial nation-building” or “EmpireLite,” doctrines of liberal peacebuilding are simply mechanisms to
legitimize the creation of neo-imperial zones of political and economic
influence.39 On that basis, alternative strategies may be required: allowing
conflicts to continue until they reach a natural conclusion (sometimes
euphemistically called “indigenous state reconstruction efforts”); or
varieties of non-liberal intervention, such as permanent trusteeship or
direct international government; or empowering strong local leaders;
or reliance on traditional or indigenous practices of peacemaking and
governance, such as tribal assemblies.40

Building Democratic States: Are We Doing It the Right Way?

If there was a consensus surrounding the critical approach to liberal
peacebuilding, the conclusions would be negative, but at least clear: do
not do it. This would make it clear doctrines for such activities would
largely be irrelevant; however, this consensus does not exist. An alternative approach, the “problem-solving” approach, takes a different view.
It argues peacebuilding can be done if a radically different approach is
36     For a discussion of the problems of jus post bellum, see Larry May and Elizabeth Edenberg,
eds., Jus Post Bellum and Transitional Justice (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
37     See Astri Suhrke, “Waging War and Building Peace in Afghanistan,” International Peacekeeping
10, no. 4 (September 20, 2012): 478-491.
38     Suhrke, “Statebuilding in Afghanistan,” 279-281.
39     Michael Ignatieff, Empire Lite: Nation-Building in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan (London:
Penguin, 2003).
40     Perhaps the most famous expression of this view is Edward N. Luttwak, “Give War a Chance,”
Foreign Affairs 78, no. 4 (July/August 1999), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1999-07-01/
give-war-chance; and Stephen D. Krasner, “Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and
Failing States,” International Security 29, no.2 (Fall 2004): 85-120.
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taken. Looking at the problems experienced in Iraq and Afghanistan,
this perspective would argue the difficulties experienced there are not
because of intervention, but because intervention was conducted in the
wrong manner. This approach also argues critical perspectives undervalue the successes of liberal peacebuilding and present alternatives that
do not work.
Recognizing liberal peacebuilding interventions have rarely been
complete successes, proponents still argue, on balance, they have caused
more good than harm. Acknowledging the difficulties in counter-factual
assessment, Roland Paris still argues, for example, that where peacebuilding has taken place, the evidence suggests “these countries are probably
better off than they would have been without such missions.”41 Bosnia
provides a good example. While the results there have been more problematic than hoped for, external intervention has still achieved many
worthwhile objectives, not least the fact that Bosnians are no longer
killing one another.
Most countries that have hosted liberal peacebuilding interventions
are no longer at war. Ending armed conflict matters. In Africa, countries that are not peaceful experience five years less life expectancy, 50
percent more infant deaths, and have 15 percent more of the population
undernourished.42 Liberal interventions have also achieved many other
worthwhile goals—in Bosnia, external intervention helped in a progressive reversal of ethnic cleansing.43 Supporters of peacebuilding argue
ceasing to engage in such interventions would condemn many millions
of people to substantially worse conditions.
At the same time, advocates of intervention argue the alternatives
to liberal peacebuilding interventions often are not really alternatives.
There is a reason why such interventions have evolved over time, and
it is more than casually related to the limitations of other options. For
example, the idea we need to “give war a chance” assumes it is politically
acceptable to do this, but this may not always be the case. The British
government, which was very lukewarm on intervening in Bosnia, did so
because of domestic public pressure. At the same time, as the conflicts
in Syria, Iraq, and Libya today demonstrate, conflicts have all kinds of
destabilizing ripple effects, and they do not necessarily end swiftly.
Alternatives to liberal interventions also have their own difficulties.
Non-liberal interventions may be difficult to sell domestically. Direct
international government looks very much like neo-colonialism, with all
the problems of legitimacy that entails (and is often a version of liberal
peacebuilding). Supporting local authoritarian leaders because they can
enforce stability was a staple of the Cold-War period that, as the evidence of President Mobutu in Zaire and President Siad Barre in Somalia
demonstrates, often produced negative outcomes in the long term. As
for relying on traditional or indigenous practices of peacemaking and
governance, the recurrent difficulty here is, if these were strong enough

41     Roland Paris, “Saving Liberal Peacebuilding,” Review of International Studies 36, no. 2 (April
2010): 352.
42     Ibid., 352.
43     Marcus Cox, “Bosnia and Herzogovina: The Limits of Liberal Imperialism,” in Call, Building
States, 256-257.
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to be effective, there would not be serious armed conflict in the state in
the first place.44
The problem for military doctrine is the lack of agreement concerning whether liberal state-building interventions are, or are not, a viable
tool of policy. If they are, then having a doctrine for conducting them is
important; if it is the latter, then no amount of tactical- or operationallevel military excellence will deliver the desired results. But the situation
is even more complex. Even writers who argue liberal peacebuilding is
a viable option if it is conducted in the right way cannot agree on how
these operations should be conducted.
One constructive critique of current approaches argues ambitious
peacebuilding can work if democratization needs are downgraded in
importance in peacebuilding efforts. Instead, first priority should be
placed on developing the institutional capacity of the host nation government. This “institutionalization-before-liberalization” perspective
notes democracy and free markets are adversarial and conflictual phenomena. Processes of political and economic liberalization, therefore,
can exacerbate social tensions and undermine stability in the short and
medium terms.
Weak democracies find it difficult to manage the cut-and-thrust
of market liberalism. For example, in Iraq democratization reinforced
sectarian identities. In order to overcome this problem in the future,
this perspective argues liberal interventions should ensure elections
take second place to strengthening the host government institutions:
the judiciary, police, legislative, and executive frameworks. Only when
a state has the ability to manage, through peaceful means, the conflicts
caused by democracy should political liberalization be pursued.45
The difficulty with this approach is, without elections, peacebuilding may quickly lose its legitimacy; it risks establishing authoritarian
regimes, not representative ones. In particular, it is argued the “institutionalization-before-democratization” approach will not end the
destabilizing power struggle within a host nation. It will simply relocate
it to the institutions of government, as each faction seeks to exert control
over the new regime.46
An alternative perspective argues the real problem with liberal
peacebuilding efforts is they are too centralized and too top down.
They have focused too much on centrally coordinated activities directed
towards local elites, crushing true local participation from the wider
population and emasculating locally driven reforms.47 For example, in
Kosovo from 1999, some have argued international efforts undermined
the emergence of Kosovar civil society and created conditions of dependency. In doing so they built obstacles to democracy, self-government,
44     Roland Paris, “Alternatives to Liberal Peace?” in A Liberal Peace? The Problems and Practices of
Peacebuilding, ed. Susanna Campbell, David Chandler, and Meera Sabaratnam (London, UK: Zed
Books, 2011), 162-166.
45     Roland Paris, At War’s End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 2004).
46     Chandra Leckam Sriram, “Transitional Justice and the Liberal Peace,” in New Perspectives on
Liberal Peacebuilding, ed. Edward Newman, Roland Paris, and Oliver P. Richmond (New York, NY:
United Nations University Press, 2009), 120-121.
47     John Paul Lederach, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies (Washington, DC:
United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999), 44-55.
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and reconciliation. Success requires we adopt emancipatory approaches
to intervention in which the interveners play the roles of counsellors or
therapists, facilitating self-knowledge and supporting reconciliation and
healing at the grass-roots level.48
But here, too, there are difficulties. It may be politically impossible
to engage with certain constituencies in this way. In 2001, for example,
the US government could not have sanctioned bringing the Taliban
into this type of transformatory peacebuilding process. Moreover, this
approach assumes there are grass-roots organizations to work through.
One problem with this assumption is armed conflicts often undermine
the structures of local society so there is no guarantee there are coherent
grass-roots actors to work with. In addition, these local actors are likely
to be politically and/or morally compromised—militias, warlords, or
other partial participants to the conflict. Do we work with them, thus
legitimizing them? Or, do we exclude them, creating potential spoilers
to any agreements? Finally, do these emancipatory approaches provide
answers to difficult issues such as economic development, humanitarian
crises, or security sector reform?49
For others, liberal interventions of the future should take the form
of “hybrid solutions” or “cosmopolitan interventionism.” Here the idea
is that liberal approaches should be blended with local institutions,
making for a more nuanced and context-sensitive approach to intervention. This might involve working through tribal organizations or using
local conflict-resolution methods, where appropriate.50 As reasonable as
this approach sounds, there is no consensus it works.
In many respects, this was the strategy adopted in Afghanistan. The
problems there demonstrated two key weaknesses. First, the strategy
assumed the intervening party in a country understood how local politics works. Often, however, this understanding is faulty and based on
stereotyped, overly romantic images of traditional societies.51 Second,
local players have their own agendas, and they use the resources and
opportunities provided by intervention for personal gain. No matter
the means used to engage with local players, many players will always
manipulate the processes to benefit themselves. For example, the establishment of an interim government and constitution in Afghanistan in
2001 followed the broad processes and mechanisms of the Loya Jirga,
which is rooted in Afghan traditions. But, warlords used their participation in the process to reconstitute a ruling order based on tribal
elements and strongmen that legitimized the positions of existing local
and regional powerholders. Another example was the establishment of
the Afghan Local Police, a militia force raised to fight the Taliban. It was

48     Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse, and Hugh Miall, Contemporary Conflict Resolution
(Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2008), 227-229.
49     Ibid., 224.
50     William Maley, “Statebuilding in Afghanistan: Challenges and Pathologies,” Central Asian
Survey 32, no. 3 (2013): 255-270.
51     Jaïr van der Lijn, “Imagi-Nation Building in Illusionstan: Afghanistan, Where Dilemmas
Become Dogmas, and Models are Perceived to be Reality,” International Peacekeeping 20, no. 2 (June
19, 2013): 180-181.
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intended to be controlled by local Shura’s and tribal leaders. In fact, the
militia was subverted by local warlords.52

Conclusion

Military doctrine for stabilization operations is dominated by the
planning-school approach. General Sir David Richards, Britain’s then
Chief of the Defense Staff, commented in 2009 about Afghanistan, “It
is doable if we get the formula right, and it is properly managed.”53 As
this article has identified, there is no guarantee of success. The problems
of stabilization are not just those of process. They reflect deep-rooted
philosophical differences surrounding the viability of such operations
and the approaches that might be used. Militaries, as problem-solving
organizations, have focused necessarily on the tactical and operational
techniques, processes, and structures to perform liberal intervention
tasks. This focus in no way guarantees future operations will be more
successful than those in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The practical evidence for the best way to rebuild shattered nations
remains ambiguous. Examination of the debate within the critical and
problem-solving schools indicates it might be impossible to conduct
complex peacebuilding effectively—except through luck or very specific
conditions; or that it might be possible to do so only if a different general
approach is adopted, though there is no consensus on what that might
be. When it comes to state-building, military doctrine lacks a basis in
an uncontested “theory of victory:” a clear sense of how one goes about
successfully constituting a liberal state through external intervention.
Because of this lack of an objectively verifiable strategy for successful
nation-building, we cannot assume the problems that bedevilled the
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan will not be repeated again. Improved
tactical and operational stabilization techniques for the future, in the
context of these difficulties, may simply mean it will take longer to lose.

52     Amin Saikal, “The UN and Afghanistan: Contentions in Democratization and Statebuilding,”
International Peacekeeping 19, no. 2 (April 20, 2012): 223-224; and Aziz A. Hakimi, “Getting Savages
to Fight Barbarians: Counterinsurgency and the Remaking of Afghanistan,” Central Asian Survey 32,
no. 3 (October 23, 2013): 388-405.
53     Sean Rayment, “General Sir David Richards: ‘We Can’t Afford to Lose the War in
Afghanistan’,” The Telegraph, October 4, 2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/
afghanistan/6258025/General-Sir-David-Richards-We-cant-afford-to-lose-the-war-in-Afghanistan.
html.
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Capturing the Character of Future War
Paul R. Norwood, Benjamin M. Jensen, and Justin Barnes
Abstract: This essay proposes a conceptual framework combining
elements of Clausewitz’s On War with trend-forecasting techniques
to describe future operational environments. This framework captures how the interaction of megatrends—the rate of technological change, the composition of the international system, and the
strength of state governance—shapes the character of competition,
confrontation, and conflict in each period. We argue this framework
can help military officers build the future force.

H

ow should military officers describe the future operational
environment? In February 25, 2016, testifying before the
House Armed Services Committee, US Air Force General
and EUCOM Commander, General Philip M. Breedlove referred to a
resurgent Russia as an existential threat.1 Moscow continues to challenge
multiple NATO members while investing in a military-modernization
program that includes significant increases in autonomous systems.
Despite those facts, Russia has a gross domestic product the size of Italy,
and it spent less on defense in 2015 than Saudi Arabia.2
The Islamic State continues to hold terrain in multiple countries,
and it has been a magnet for foreign fighters. The group is pressing a
21st-century terror campaign by attacking European cities and waging
complex operations in the cyber domain, including the use of social
media and hacking the names and addresses of adversaries in an effort to
encourage lone-wolf attacks.3 Yet, the group has lost, by some estimates,
as much as 40 percent of its territory in Iraq and Syria, multiple leaders,
and as many as 10,000 fighters since 2014.4
From the Islamic States’ use of cyber and traditional guerilla and
terror tactics to Russian experiments of combining massive fires with
drones and broad-spectrum information warfare in Ukraine, there are
signs the future of warfare may already be here. Just as the Spanish Civil
War (1936-1939) and the 1973 Arab-Israeli Conflict were harbingers of
future conflict, we may be at the juncture where events from Eastern
1      Lisa Ferdinando, “Breedlove: Russia, Instability Threaten US, European Security Interests,” DoD
News, Defense Media Activity, February 25, 2016, http://www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/
Article/673338/breedlove-russia-instability-threaten-us-european-security-interests.
2      Russian GDP (USD, market prices) in 2014 was $1.8 trillion while Italy was $2.1 trillion
based on World Bank data, April 30, 2016, http://data.worldbank.org/; and Russian defense spending according to SIPRI was $66 billion. SIPRI, April 20, 2016, http://www.sipri.org/research/
armaments/milex/milex_database.
3      On recent Islamic State hacking, see Jack Detsch and Sara Sorcher, “Thousands of New
Yorkers Named as Apparent Islamic State Targets,” Christian Science Monitor Passcode, April 27, 2016,
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Passcode/2016/0427/Thousands-of-New-Yorkers-named-asapparent-Islamic-State-targets; and Evan Perez, Catherine E. Shoichet, and Wes Bruer, “Hacker
Who Allegedly Passed US Military Data to ISIS Arrested in Malaysia,” CNN, October 19, 2015,
http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/15/politics/malaysian-hacker-isis-military-data/.
4      Liz Sly, “In Syria and Iraq, the Islamic State is in Retreat on Multiple Fronts,” The Washington
Post, March 24, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/in-syria-and-iraqthe-islamic-state-is-in-retreat-on-multiple-fronts/2016/03/24/a0e33774-f101-11e5-a2a3d4e9697917d1_story.html.
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Ukraine to Syria and Iraq signal how warfare is likely to evolve and
shape the world of 2030 to 2050.
Describing the future character of war should be a central task for
the military profession.5 As bureaucracies, resourcing strategies, and
programming processes increase in complexity, often unnecessarily,
senior leaders need to make long-term bets on whether to innovate by
combining legacy forces with new concepts and incremental improvements or to invent breakthrough capabilities for future contingencies.
The future force is built now to be used later. Failing to meet that task
abdicates a central responsibility of the military profession.
This article introduces an analytical framework for describing
the future operational environment based on integrating Clausewitz’s
concept of the character of war unique to each period with trend analysis
techniques common in scenario-planning.6 We contend macro-trends—
specifically, the rate of technological change and through it the available
means of coercion, the composition of the international system, and the
degree to which political units in that system can secure their internal
domains—interact in a trinity-like manner. As these trends interact,
they produce an emergent character of war. To describe the future
operational environment, military professionals should first define the
likely future character of war and use the resulting forecasts to develop
new concepts and modernization priorities.
The article proceeds by establishing what the character of war is and
uses the construct to situate a new approach to describing the future
operational environment. From this vantage point, we look at major
findings in future studies by the Army and the broader US national
security community since the 1970s, highlighting how the interaction of
technology, the international system, and governance tends to produce
evolutionary as opposed to revolutionary change.7 Of the three legs of
this triad, two are composed of institutions, and institutions exist, in
part, because they resist change. This resistance to change—whether
derived from cultural, legal, moral, etc., reasons—means even significant technological breakthroughs are incorporated into the character
of war incrementally resulting in a gradual evolution of that character.
The effect is that, to borrow from Shakespeare, the past remains the
prologue. The article concludes with a discussion of the importance of
expanding Army efforts to describe the future operational environment.

The Character of War

The idea that while war has an enduring nature, it also has a changing character unique to each historical period comes from On War. In
Book One, Clausewitz stated that “from the enemy’s character, from
his institutions, the state of his affairs and his general situation, each
side, using the laws of probability, forms an estimate of the opponent’s
5      For an overview of the military as a profession and how it influences innovation, see Benjamin
Jensen, Forging the Sword: Doctrinal Change in the US Army (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press,
2016).
6      The seminal work in this space remains Peter Schwartz, The Art of the Long View: Planning for
the Future in an Uncertain World (New York, NY: Bantam Doubleday, 1991).
7      For an overview of the difference between evolutionary and revolutionary change in military
theory and practice, see MacGregor Know and Williamson Murray, eds., The Dynamics of Military
Revolution, 1300-2050 (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
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likely course of action.”8 In Book Three, Clausewitz linked the idea of
an identifiable character of war to planning, asserting that “all planning, particularly strategic planning, must pay attention to the character
of contemporary warfare.”9 In Book Eight, Clausewitz argued that
“the aims a belligerent adapts and the resources he employs, must be
governed by the particular characteristic of his own position; but they
will also conform to the spirit of the age and to its general character.”10
In numerous places, Clausewitz highlighted how failing to understand
the character of war leads to disaster. In discussing the Prussian defeat
in 1806, he chastised Prussian generals for misapplying the tactics of
Frederick the Great, the oblique order, against a Napoleonic enemy
waging a new type of warfare.11
The character of war, the co-mingling of the motives and circumstances governing uses of force to compel an adversary to do one’s will,
is an emergent phenomenon. 12 In Book Six, Clausewitz stated “in war,
more than anywhere else, it is the whole that governs all the parts, stamps
them with its character and alters them radically.”13 In other words,
when forecasting the future operational environment, analysts should
start by charting how broad trends condition the choices available to
actors engaged in strategic competition, confrontation, and conflict.
The idea of a unique character of war features prominently in
military studies historically. Helmuth von Moltke the Elder (1800-1890)
hypothesized new material conditions, such as railroads and telegraphs,
changed the speed of mobilization and the character of war. Despite their
differences, Russian military theorists Marshal Aleksander A. Svechin
(1878-1938) and Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky (1893-1937) believed
the material conditions of the industrial age called for a departure with
the Jominian conceptualization of ground maneuver prevalent since
Napoleon.14 Major General J.F.C. Fuller, architect of Plan 1919, sought a
science of war based on technology and mysticism.15 For Stephen Biddle,
victory on the 20th-century battlefield was a function of the modern
system of force employment (combined arms maneuver).16
After the Cold War, numerous scholars and practitioners sought
to define the character of what former Army Chief of Staff General
Gordon Sullivan called “post-industrial warfare.”17 John Arquilla and
8      Carl von Clausewitz, On War, eds. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1989), 80.
9      Ibid., 220.
10      Ibid., 594.
11      Ibid., 154-155.
12      Emergence is a concept from complex systems. For the relationship between modern research into complexity science and Clausewitz’s treatment of war, see Alan Beyerchen, “Clausewitz,
Nonlinearity and the Unpredictability of War,” International Security 17 no. 3 (Winter, 1992): 59-90.
For the implications of complex systems for international relations, see Robert Jervis, System Effects:
Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999); and Randall
Schweller, Maxwell’s Demon and the Golden AppleGlobal Discord in the New Millennium (Baltimore, MD:
John Hopkins University Press, 2014).
13      Clausewitz, On War, 484.
14      Jacob W. Kipp, “The Origins of Soviet Operational Art, 1917-1936,” in Michael D. Krause
and R. Cody Phillips, Historical Perspectives of the Operational Art (Washington, DC: Center of Military
History, 2007).
15      J.F.C. Fuller, The Foundations of the Science of War (London: Hutchinson and Company, 1926).
16      Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern War (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2010).
17      General Gordon Sullivan first used the term in a 1992 speech at the Land Warfare Forum.
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David Ronfeldt hypothesized the emergence of netwar as non-state
actors structured as networks engaged in transnational competition.18
Observing the complexity of conflicts in West Africa and the Balkans
in the early 1990s, Robert Kaplan argued there was a breakdown in the
old state order leading to a new era of struggles defined by resource
competition, pandemics, urbanization, demographic shifts, and state
failure.19 Martin van Creveld argued that a shift away from wars between
states to a new era of religious and ethnic conflict challenged many of
the philosophical assumptions inherent in western military thought.20
Former British Army General, Sir Rupert Anthony Smith, proposed that
modern war reflects a shift from the paradigm of industrial war to war
amongst the people.
The question becomes what forces coalesce to produce a paradigmatic shift in warfare. Borrowing from the Marxist concept of a mode of
production, Mary Kaldor hypothesized a new mode of warfare defined
by internationalized intrastate identity conflicts, illicit economic networks, and guerilla tactics.21 As seen in Russian actions in Crimea in
2014, these conflicts can be a hybrid, mixing conventional capabilities
and irregular warfare.22 Similar to Kaldor’s modes of warfare, William
Lind and Thomas Hammes suggested distinct, identifiable generations
of warfare paralleling larger technological change. Modern war was in the
fourth generation, involving the use of all available networks (e.g., social,
economic, political) to compel an adversary and avoid costly conflict.23
Antoine J. Bousquet proposed that the character of war tends to reflect
the dominant scientific paradigm of the period.24 War evolved from a
Newtonian mechanistic struggle of Napoleonic armies to the current
network-based struggle between complex, self-organizing groups like
terrorist movements.
The idea of an emergent, interactive character to war can be contrasted with work on enduring national ways of war. A way of war is a
transhistorical approach to the conflict by a political community. Three
18      John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, The Advent of Netwar (Santa Monica, CA: RAND
Corporation, 1996) and Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy (Santa Monica,
CA: RAND Corporation, 2001).
19      Robert D. Kaplan “The Coming Anarchy: How Scarcity, Crime, Overpopulation, Tribalism,
and Disease are Rapidly Destroying the Social Fabric of Our Planet,” The Atlantic, February 1, 1994
and The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post-Cold War (New York, NY: Vintage Press,
2001).
20      Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War: The Most Radical Reinterpretation of Armed
Conflict Since Clausewitz (New York, NY: Free Press, 1991).
21      Mary Kaldor, Old and New Wars: Organized Violence in a Global World (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford
University Press, 1999). For an overview of the “new wars” literature, see Martin Shaw, “The
Contemporary Mode of Warfare? Mary Kaldor’s Theory of New Wars,” Review of International
Political Economy 7, no. 1 (Spring 2000): 171-180; and Mary Kaldor, “In Defence of New Wars,”
Stability: International Journal of Security and Development 2 no. 1 (2013): 4.
22      The leading authority on hybrid warfare is Frank Hoffman. See Frank Hoffman and James
N. Mattis, “Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars,” Proceedings (November 2005), http://www.
usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2005-11/future-warfare-rise-hybrid-wars (accessed February 15,
2015). For an overview of the broader literature Hoffman spawned, see Timothy McCulloh and
Richard Johnson, Hybrid Warfare (Tampa, FL: Joint Special Operations University Press, 2013). For
a historical overview of the concept of hybrid warfare, see Williamson Murray and Peter Mansoor,
eds., Hybrid Warfare (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
23      T.X. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century (New York, NY: Zenith Press,
2006), i.
24      Antoine J. Bousquet, The Scientific Way of Warfare: Order and Chaos on the Battlefields of Modernity
(New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2009) and “Chaoplexic Warfare or the Future of
Military Organization,” International Affairs 84, no. 5 (September 2008): 915-929.
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examples highlight this point. In Russell Weigley’s original treatment,
the American way of war referred to the preferred strategy of attrition
and overwhelming force, as seen in Ulysses S. Grant’s emphasis on
destroying the Army of Northern Virginia and the application of US
airpower in the strategic bombing of Axis cities in World War II.25 This
changed over time, as Max Boot claimed the industrial way of warfare
shifted after the introduction of widespread precision targeting.26 With
respect to Germany, Robert Citino argued for a distinctly German way
of war organized around offensive solutions to defensive vulnerabilities
between the Thirty Years War and the fall of the Third Reich.27 Liddell
Hart claimed there is a distinct British way of war based on economic
pressure exercised through sea control, mobility, and surprise.28

Assessing the Character of Future War

We propose a trinity-like framework for describing how major trends
interact to shape the future operational environment. The combination
of the rate of technological change, the composition of the international
system, and the strength of state governance shape the emergent character of war and by proxy the motives and circumstances governing how
political actors will use force to compel their adversaries.29
Our approach assumes even cooperative systems have competition
under conditions of information asymmetry and ambiguity (i.e., fog and
friction prevail). Therefore, political actors employ strategies to achieve
positions of relative advantage to one another that can include acts of
force to compel their opponent (war both in the overt act and indirect
signaling that occurs through generating forces and posturing). The
interaction of the rate of technological change, the structure of the international system, and the governance capacity of the state shapes how
actors compete with one another. For instance, the rate of technological
innovation—for example, how fast artificial intelligence (AI), quantum
computing, or autonomous systems emerge—will likely determine the
coercive tools available to state and non-state actors seeking to challenge
US interests.
Seen in this light, the character of war tends to define the circumstances in which conflict, as well as preparations for conflict,
occur. These circumstances are informed by trends. Trends describe

25      Russell Weigley, The American Way of War (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1977).
For a description of an earlier, pre-industrial American way of war, see John Grenier, The First Way
of War: American War Making on the Frontier, 1607–1814 (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press,
2005). For an analysis of a new American way of war brought on by the proliferation of precision
targeting, see Max Boot, War Made New: Weapons, Warriors, and the Making of the Modern World (New
York, NY: Gotham Press, 2007). For an interesting contrast to both Max Boot and Russell Weigley,
see Antulio J. Echevarria II, Reconsidering the American Way of War (Washington, DC: Georgetown
University Press, 2014). In the work, Echevarria also challenges the idea of enduring national ways
of war.
26      Max Boot, “The New American Way of War,” Foreign Affairs 82 no. 4 (July/August 2003).
27      Robert Citino, The German Way of War: From the Thirty Years’ War to the Third Reich (Lawrence,
KS: University of Kansas Press, 2005).
28      Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart, The British Way of Warfare (London: Faber and Faber, 1932).
29      The idea that war is an act of force to compel an adversary comes from Clausewitz, On
War, 75.
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macro-tendencies likely to shape the future.30 According to the Oxford
English Dictionary, a trend describes a direction of change. Analysts
use frameworks to categorize trends such as social, technology, environmental, economic, and political (STEEP).31 To speak of trends is
to make a bet about the types of driving forces likely to influence the
future. Contemporary US Army doctrine uses trends to describe future
conflict. Unified Land Operations (ULO) argue that the operational
environment, which is “a composite of the conditions, circumstances,
and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on
the decisions of the commander” is influenced by the following trends:
globalization, urbanization, failed/failing states, and the diffusion of
information technology. 32

Imagining the Future: 1970-2020

The trinity-like framework we propose synthesizes individual
observations made in future studies since the 1970s into a larger analytical framework. After the Vietnam War, most such studies saw a future
of fragmentation globally, beginning first with the international system
and moving later to the “atom” of that system, the state itself. The 1974
Astarita Report commissioned by Chief of Staff of the Army General
Creighton Abrams concluded that although the United States would
“retain its relative standing as the dominate world power,” its “preeminence” would be inhibited by the rise of Western Europe, Japan, and
China.33 Alongside the United States and the Soviet Union, the report
argued these states would be the “primary actors on the world stage.”34
The document emphasized the power of states in a competitive system,
focusing less on technological change than on relative military and
economic power as the primary drivers of strategy. In this, the authors
foresaw the world moving from a bipolar configuration to one in which
those main actors had to share the stage with others. Other than noting
a “shrinking world economy” and the growth of multi-national corporations—a particular type of non-state actor—this was not a world in
which the state itself was challenged.35
In the 1982 Airland Battle 2000 commissioned by US Army Training
and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Commanding General Donn
Starry, the authors noted trends tend to interact and produce the environment in which militaries apply, design, and generate forces.36 In
the document, the authors list a variety of factors, including increased
foreign investment in technology, the proliferation of arms, rising
populations in the developing world, growing worldwide urbanization,
30      Tessa Cramer, Patrick van der Duin, Christiannne Heselmans, “Trend Analysis,” in Foresight in
Organizations: Methods and Tools, ed. Patrick van der Duin (New York, NY: Routledge, 2016), 135. For
other definitions of trends, see Spyros Makridakis and Steven Wheelwright, Handbook of Forecasting
(New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons, 1982); Raymond Martin, Trend Forecasters Handbook (London:
Laurence King Publishing, 2010); and Henrik Vejlgaard, Anatomy of a Trend (Copenhagen: Confetti
Publishing, 2008).
31      Schwartz, The Art of the Long View.
32      Department of the Army, ADRP 3-0: Unified Land Operations (Washington, DC: Department
of the Army, May 2012), 1-1.
33      Harry G. Summers Jr., The Astarita Report: A Military Strategy for the Multipolar World (Carlisle,
PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1974), 10.
34      Ibid., 12.
35      Ibid., 8.
36     TRADOC, Airland Battle 2000 (Fort Monroe, VA: TRADOC, 1982), 3.
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political and economic interdependence, and the US transition to an
information-based society as trends defining the character of war. The
document predicted these trends would interact with the “scarcity of
energy and other critical resources and the attendant rise of other potential world powers” and signaled a “shift to a multipolar situation.”37 In
this view of the future, the composition of the international system
interacts with technological trends such as the proliferation of arms,
technology investments, a transition to an information-based society,
and with conditions the authors believed would likely result in challenges to state authority, such as urbanization and rising populations.
Written 12 years later at the behest of Army Chief of Staff Gordon
Sullivan, TRADOC’s Force XXI Operations, cited similar trends, as elements of instability defining the strategic environment. The document
argued, “The world’s geopolitical framework will continue to undergo
dramatic restructuring, accompanied by a wide array of economic, technical, societal, religious, cultural, and physical alterations. History shows
that change of this scope, scale, and pace increases global tension and
disorder.”38 The document listed, among other things, shifting power
balances at the regional and subnational level, nationalism, rejection of
the West, demographics, technological acceleration, information technology, and environmental risks as trends shaping the character of war.
Specifically, this futures document addressed how technology
changed the character of war and the stability of the state. Force XXI
noted information technology was “expected to make a thousand fold
advance over the next 20 years.”39 This would, the publication argued,
“revolutionize—and indeed have begun to revolutionize—how nations,
organizations, and people interact” by challenging “the relevance of
traditional organizational and management principles.”40 Thus it saw
a future that would be characterized, in part, by growing “rivalries
between states and non-state groups for power,” while the “ability of
a government to govern effectively is being eroded,” and indeed, the
power of information technology itself was “challeng[ing] the authority of long-standing institutions and the meanings of terms such as
sovereignty.”41
Similar to future studies commissioned by the Army, larger national
security foresight initiatives also highlighted the interaction of technology, the international system, and governance. In 1997, the first of the
National Intelligence Council’s Global Trends reports saw a continuation
of these two trends: growing fragmentation in the international system
and a weakening state. Noting that in 1997, “most conflicts are internal,
not between states,” the Global Trends 2010 forecasted that an international
system “based primarily on relations between states, not developments
within them” was “drawing to an end.”42 Arguing that even stable states
“will still find that they are losing control of significant parts of their
national agenda due to,” among other things,” the continuing revolution
37      Ibid., 4.
38      TRADOC, Force XXI Operations (Fort Monroe, VA, TRADOC, 1994), 2-1.
39      Force XXI, 1-5.
40      Ibid.
41      Ibid., 2-1 and 2-2 (emphasis original).
42     National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2010, https://www.dni.gov/index.php/about/
organization/national-intelligence-council-global-trends/global-trends-2010.
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in information technology,” the report asserted non-state actors “will
not supplant the power of governments,” but “they will weaken them.”43
At the dawn of the 21st century, then, the international system was
to have moved from its unipolar “moment” to a more multipolar system,
and the state itself was to have weakened, but not have been displaced
from its place of primacy in that system. After the turn of the century,
later futures studies saw the continuation of these two trends.44 But in
those studies, technology—and the accelerating pace of innovation—
began to play a more key role in the shaping the future.
To be clear, technology was a consideration—at least an implicit
consideration—in each of the studies discussed above, in particular,
information technology.45 Indeed, it would be hard to conclude anything
other than that the state of technology—and the rate of invention— play
key roles in shaping the future. As a tool or technology, Archimedes’
lever does “move the world.” It is arguable that from that simplistic, albeit metaphorical, lever through the wonders of the Industrial
Revolution—all one, two, three, or four of them, depending on who
you ask—technology played a significant role in shaping the future.
That said, beginning in the early 2000s, it appears technology began
to become a more prominent player in futures studies. For instance,
after acknowledging “few predicted the profound influence of information technology”—a cautionary statement about the perils in attempting
to predict breakthroughs, if there ever was one—the NIC’s Global Trends
2015 concluded science and technology would be one of the key drivers
shaping the future.46 The report noted “[m]ost experts agree[d] that the
[information technology] revolution represents the most significant
global transformation since the Industrial Revolution.”47 In this report,
joining information technology, which was mentioned in earlier studies,
were biotechnology—forecasted to “drive medical breakthroughs”—
and advanced materials.48
Many of today’s futures studies mirror these three larger trends.
First, regarding the fragmentation of the international system and governance, the NIC’s Global Trends 2030 sees the “diffusion of power among
countries and from countries to informal networks will have a dramatic
impact by 2030.”49 This diffusion of “economic and political power” was
catalyzed, according to AT Kearney, a global management consulting
firm, by the fact that since the 2008 financial crisis, the United States
has “receded from the global stage,” while “rising regional powers...

43      Ibid. Interestingly, the report also cited globalization and economic expansion as the two
other causes of this loss “of control.” Although both globalization and economic expansion are
interrelated, technology plays a key role in both.
44      For instance, Global Trends 2015 predicted that states “will continue to be the dominate
players on the world stage,” but that “governments will have less and less control” over transactions
across their borders and that “although the United States will continue to be a major force in the
world community,” there will also be an “increasing number[] of important actors on the world
stage.” Global Trends 2015, 9-10, 13.
45      Force XXI, 2-2. Interesting The Astarita Report refers to information technology in passing to
explain, in part, the Army’s difficulty in articulating the “security argument.” The Astarita Report, 9.
46      Global Trends 2015, 9.
47      Ibid.
48      Ibid.
49      Global Trends 2030, 15.
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have increased their political influence in line with growing economic
strength.”50
Similarly, like earlier studies, these see an important—and
growing—role for non-state actors. The Global Trends 2030 goes so far
as to present a scenario for 2030 it labels the “non-state world.”51 As the
number and influence of non-state actors grow, they will “create pervasive challenges to nation-state power and influence,”and will “complicate
decision making.”52 These complications, in turn, make governing more
difficult, which weakens the state.
Despite the prominent appearance of the other two trends, technology continues to play a key—if not the most important—role in
these studies. Thus, in many of these studies, the potential of emerging
technologies is fully realized, and the consequence of that realization
is societies are fundamentally disrupted. For example, “mass production” is seen as “increasingly...replaced with on-demand, custom
manufacturing.”53 “[R]obotics could eliminate the need for human labor
entirely in some manufacturing environments,” raising the specter of
increased unemployment and unrest. And nanotechnology allows “an
ability to create composite or new materials.”54
Going forward, the most disruptive of these possible technologies
is the potential for artificial intelligence (AI), empowered by quantum
computers.55 It is interesting to note that although information technology has been referred to repeatedly in earlier futures studies, today’s
studies show the important and growing role of artificial intelligence.
As one study argued, “the first company or country to create and deploy
advanced artificial intelligence might acquire a decisive advantage”
over its competitors.56 Since the 1970s, future studies have seen a global
environment with more actors who matter, empowered by technology
the development of which is increasing at a faster rate. In some ways,
these trends are not surprising. No hegemon has ever stayed hegemonic
forever. The state itself is not the only principle along which a community could organize itself. Before the Peace of Westphalia, it was not
the West’s organizing principle.
These studies demonstrate the importance of considering what has
not changed. Despite repeated prognostications of the failed state in
these studies, the state remains the most important player on the international stage. More importantly, there is no clear indication of what would
replace the state as the government for a geographic area. Similarly, the
relative diminishment of the United States is generally caveated with the
notation that it is likely to remain the world’s most important state into
the foreseeable future.
The forces of continuity are as strong, if not stronger, than the forces
of change. Large trends take time to emerge, often eclipsing increasingly
short attention spans prone to a historical perspectives. Too often, staffs
50      Global Trends 2015 to 2025, 4.
51      Global Trends 2030, 128.
52      For the Next 40, 3; and Global Trends, vii.
53      For for the Next 40, 5.
54      Global Trends 2030, 87; and Miller, 31.
55      Ibid., 23.
56      Global Trends 2015 to 2025, 23.
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begin the task of describing the future operational environment assuming change as opposed to appreciating continuity. Furthermore, they do
not grade their homework by implementing systematic processes that
assess whether or not their earlier forecasts came to fruition.

Conclusion: Integrating Foresight Initiatives into the Army

The military profession requires an analytical process for describing
the future operational environment. If the first act of judgment is to
understand the war you are fighting, the second act is to anticipate the
next war, knowing full well the inherent uncertainty and contingency
involved in the task. To that end, we propose a trinity-like framework
based on Clausewitz’s concept of the character of war, arguing that the
emergent interaction of technology, the composition of the international
system, and governance trends shape the circumstances in which actors
engage in strategic competition. Of note, many of these trends appear in
earlier future studies. What this article offers is a means of conceptualizing how the interaction of these trends produces an emergent character
of war.
Given the importance of futures research to the military, the question becomes how to integrate foresight initiatives designed to describe
the future character of war into the institutional Army. While the Army
has institutional processes like Exercise Unified Quest nested within
larger government exercises like the National Intelligence Council Global
Trends and Joint Staff/OSD studies like the Joint Operational Environment,
Quadrennial Defense Review, and National Military Strateg y, the profession
of arms needs a more vibrant and competitive marketplace of ideas
that invests uniformed personnel with the responsibility to describe the
changing character of war. Many times, existing bureaucratic processes
for describing the future—even when guided by thought leaders—
suffer from the pitfalls of all routinized staff work. They tend to become
non-controversial, consensus documents often bent by existing equities,
which reflect the views of a small group of experts true to the original Delphi Method pioneered at RAND in the 1950s.57 The thinkers
become trapped in bureaucracy’s iron cage.
To offset this effect, the Army could create a more competitive
marketplace of ideas for describing future operational environments.
Rather than rely solely on large institutional processes, senior leaders
could use small, diverse groups of officers, senior leaders hand selected
for their professional competency, analytical attributes, and imagination.
This cohort could be placed in an incubator. Incubators are “informal
subunits established outside of the hierarchy” where military leaders
engage in problem-directed searches for new ideas.58 If you look at many
of the Army’s major futures exercises and significant doctrinal developments since the 1970s like The Astarita Report, they relied on these small
groups separated from the bureaucracy.
The emergence of incubators reflects the fact that the profession of
arms, by necessity, has developed coping mechanisms for the size and
rigidity of modern military bureaucracy. Rather than cut non-standard
57      Olaf Helmer-Hirschberg, Analysis of the Future: The Delphi Method (Santa Monica, CA: RAND,
1967).
58      Jensen, Forging the Sword, 1.
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assignments in incubator-like entities in periods of declining budgets
and force structure, the leadership should preserve and incentivize
them. Any mechanism that helps a military organization describe the
future character of war and through it a range of potential warfighting
concepts is, as Barry Watts and Williamson Murray highlight in their
study of the interwar period, the “sine qua non of successful peacetime
military innovation.”59
In addition, competing incubators should produce future forecasts
that are rigorous, replicable, and testable. The problem with most futures
work is forecasts are rarely subject to testing or updating based on the
unfolding operational environment as it actually occurs and unforeseen
events. Just as the Intelligence Preparation of the Environment (IPOE)
process produces named areas of interests (NAIs) to determine whether
or not the predicted enemy course of action is coming to pass, futures
work should produce clear indications and warnings that allow analysts
to determine whether or not the character of warfare is evolving as
forecast.
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O

ver 100 years ago, the philosopher-strategist Carl von Clausewitz
wrote that a trinity of passion, chance, and political purpose
drives the vicissitudes of war. In Carnage & Connectivity, David
Betz supports this view. He offers a concise, witty, insightful argument
for the proposition “war itself has not changed,” though changes in technology have complicated its dynamics. He states his case up front and
through his review of literature and evolving military doctrines marshals
compelling evidence to support his proposition.
As Betz sees it, “quixotically, the major military powers in the West
have serially tried and failed to use technology to disconnect from
war’s enduring nature.” They chase solutions using high-tech weaponry that increase the speed at which combat is conducted, but do not
affect the forces in Clausewitz’s trinity that continue to govern warfare.
The consequences can prove costly. They espouse a form of war that
largely replaces forces on the ground with force delivered by long-range
weapons. “Each time,” he observes, “all they have managed to grasp is
a slow, bitter, indecisive war.”
One cannot achieve victory, Betz argues, by replacing chance in
war with information systems, including weaponized malware (cyber
weapons), and passion with long-range weapons and spin and compensating for failures of policy and strategic vision with tactics that avoid
contact with the enemy—and, one might add, casualties. Indeed a criticism skeptics level against current US policy is it too often seeks to wage
a “bloodless” war through the use of drone and air strikes, rather than
with boots on the ground. How bloodless such a war may be depends
greatly on whether you sit on the sending or receiving end.
Betz skillfully examines how emerging new technologies and a globally connected world have altered warfare. He recognizes the benefits of
empowering individuals, but cautions about the darker side. Connectivity
provides revolutionary new tools for persuasion. These tools can help
articulate a strategic narrative that shapes perceptions, beliefs, and ideals
of target audiences, changes behavior, and effects a desired end-state.
New technology has altered the capacity of parties to forge and execute
strategies, operations, and tactics. What it does not do is change the
core truths Clausewitz’s trinity embodies. The West may have bigger,
more high-tech weapons, but as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have
demonstrated, Betz says, these cannot compensate for the “deficit of
passion” that motivates enemies comprised of moderately organized and
loosely affiliated non-state groups. For them, while chance may always
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play a role, intensely motivated, purposeful
enemies using low-tech methods can still
defeat high-tech opponents.
Betz cites several examples to show
how new technology in prior eras misled
commanders into believing the nature
of war had changed. Cyber tactics can
employ social engineering or “phishing” to
mislead enemies. The technology is new;
the concept is old. During the American
Civil War, Confederate cavalry seized Union
telegraph communications—then new technology—to send false orders and reshape
the information environment. During the
Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71, clever
David Betz, Carnage & Connectivity:
Germans trained falcons, turning them into
Landmarks in the Decline of Conventional
weaponized predators to intercept French
Military Power (New York, NY: Oxford
University Press, 2015), 261 pages, $45.00 carrier pigeons delivering messages. In
World War II, radar helped destroy German
U-boats. None of these examples altered the importance of passion,
chance, and purpose in war, although new technology broadened the
capacity and ability of actors to wage war.
Connectivity has increased the number and types of actors who
can influence outcomes, empowering non-state as well as state actors.
It has enabled violent movements to operate in networked, distributive
forms that counter conventional military tactics. It increases the capacity
for intellignece, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)—but also makes
operations more transparent, complicating efforts to execute tactics
through stealth. For liberal democracies, articulating coherent, credible
narratives that support military operations is more challenging. Indeed,
Betz points out, connectivity renders disrupters more flexible, adaptable,
and dangerous. In a prior era, logistics presented problems more easily
avoided today. Disrupters can now focus on ideas and move them in
digital form rather than allow for logistics.
Technology has rendered modern armies more lethal. Yet that can
produce illusionary victories. Betz cites the 1991 and 2003 Iraq Wars as
examples. Our technology and the remarkable skill of our forces were
so exceptional they overwhelmed enemies who were never really in the
fight. Here, Betz returns to Clausewitz for a pivotal insight. Clausewitz
observed war consists of “acts of force to compel our enemy to do our
will.” Defeating the enemy kinetically in a battlespace does not necessarily equal winning. Winning requires the enemy to recognize it has been
defeated and to subject itself to the victor’s will. Saddam’s resurgence
after Desert Storm and the long war waged by al-Qaeda and other insurgents after the fall of Baghdad in 2003 attest to the pitfalls that occur
when an enemy denies it is defeated.
Betz challenges the view that the Revolution in Military Affairs
(RMA) has altered the character and conduct of conflict. RMA advocates
believe advanced technology and the developing “system of systems”
give commanders a clearer, more-rapid grasp of complex situations.
This technological edge enables forces to operate within an opponent’s
decision and action cycles, make the right decisions, and outthink and
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outmaneuver an opponent. Betz believes
RMA symbolizes a “blind faith in technology” that could prove self-defeating in
fighting today’s less-encumbered opponents.
As Betz sees it, today’s conflicts demonstrate
“the near impossibility of operating within
the decision-cycle of any opponents without
a high degree of political clarity about the
purpose [and] the issue of force in the first
place,” something he argues is increasingly
difficult to identify. Betz offers a compelling
case for his key point, that evolving technology does not replace the Clausewitz trinity
in understanding the dynamics determining
outcomes in war.
De Graaf, George Dimitriu,
Betz’s points invite competing views. Beatrice
and Jens Ringsmose, Editors, Strategic
Public Opinion, and War:
He agrees with C. E. Callwell who argued Narratives,
Winning Domestic Support for the Afghan
a winning outcome requires contact with War (New York, NY: Routledge, 2015),
the enemy and defeating it in battle. Still, 379 pages, $155.00
Betz acknowledges insurgent dominance of
the narrative, aided by Al Jazeera’s biased reporting, determined the
outcome of the April 2004 battle for Fallujah. But the pivotal role information warfare played there merits stronger recognition. Information
is one of many elements that comprise combined arms warfare, and
too few people seem to grasp this truth. In November 2004, information warfare was a crucial element that was well integrated into kinetic
strategies and operations responsible for winning the second battle for
the city. Still, adroit propaganda by insurgents effectively exploited the
after-effects of the battle across Iraq in 2005, arguably the most chaotic
year of the war.
Betz is skeptical about Army Col. (Ret.) Thomas X. Hammes’ notion
of Fourth Generation Warfare. But I think Hammes is astute, especially
in showing how the Palestinians leveraged strategic communications
rather than weapons to win the political battle—the one that in that
context mattered most—during the First Intifada.
None of these questions detracts from Betz’s central argument. He
has written an outstanding analysis as to how connectivity has affected
warfare, pointing out its potential, as well as its key traps, for warriors,
political leaders, and commanders to avoid. I was pleased to see him
quote Phillip Bobbitt, who warned non-state actors might produce a cataclysm using a nuclear device, dirty bomb, pathogen, or pandemic in an
American city.1 Neither the United States nor any other Western nation
would be the same after that, with one potential consequence being the
eclipse of civil liberties in the name of security. Betz empathizes with
Bobbitt, who believed evolving technology mandates strategies that
focus on the sensitive issues raised in protecting against vulnerabilities,
not just mounting threat deterrence.
A second contribution to this topic—Strategic Narratives, Public
Opinion, and War: Winning Domestic Support for the Afghan War—offers a
1      Philip Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace, and the Course of History War (New York, NY:
Alfred A. Knopf, 2002), 819.
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collection of penetrating essays on how NATO governments employed
strategic narratives well (or badly) to mobilize support for their participation in the war in Afghanistan. The first part of the book offers
theoretical debates on “narrative” and “strategic narrative.” Case studies
on NATO and other partners follow.
Strategy has proven notoriously difficult to define. Lawrence
Freedman’s Strateg y offers superb insights; but most campaign professionals would find novel his definition of strategy as the “art of creating
power.” They would puzzle over Fabrizio Coticchia and Carolina De
Simone’s concept of framing as “bricks for building” a broader storyline presented in “The Winter of our Consent? Framing Italy’s ‘Peace
Mission’ in Afghanistan.” None of the writers in the volume adequately
places strategic narrative in the context of a story from which narrative emanates, or the themes and messages that flow from narratives.
They tend to conflate story and narrative and omit theme and message.
Distinguishing each of these elements is vital in developing strategies.
Still, it is interesting to see how others think about these notions and
apply them to concrete studies.
The authors also neglect a critical dimension in measuring the
impact of narratives: resonance. Reason persuades, but emotion motivates. Narratives shape behavior when they strike a responsive chord
rooted in emotion. Allied messaging in World War I and World War II
respected that precept, personalizing the enemy and selling the idea the
Germans were monsters we had to vanquish. While true for the second
war, it was not for the first. Even when fighting the Nazis, stirring up
public support to beat Hitler proved challenging.
In his fascinating study of American attitudes and opinions
towards entering the war, historian Steven Casey makes the point many
Americans, even after Pearl Harbor, were reluctant to fight to exact
revenge against Japan.2 Americans showed surprisingly little interest
in fighting the entire German nation. Most Americans had difficulty
believing the Germans were collectively guilty of mass atrocities. Too
many viewed the Nazis as an aberration whom the “good” German
generals would soon topple. Franklin Roosevelt, who towers as both a
political leader and a military strategist, understood the existential threat
Hitler posed. He had a good message in the “Four Freedoms” about the
values America stood for.
But in that era all but devoid of mass communications, how could
Roosevelt motivate Americans to oppose Hitler? He realized they might
not give credence to claims the Nazis were committing mass murder;
however, they might believe reports about smaller-scale barbarities.
Hitler provided Roosevelt the opportunity after British commandos
mortally wounded Hitler’s trusted confederate, Reinhard Heydrich, in
May 1942. The Gestapo thought the assassins came from Lidice and
Lezaky so it executed, or sent to concentration camps, about 400 people
from these towns—a sufficiently small number Americans could get
their minds around. Roosevelt spotlighted this atrocity and mobilized
celebrities like Albert Einstein to denounce the Nazis and expose them
for what they were. The strategy defined the Nazis in emotional and
2      Steven Casey, Cautious Crusade (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2001).
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personal terms. It worked. It is a good example of how framing a story,
narrative, theme, and message in a way that evokes an emotional response
is crucial to influencing attitudes and opinions and shaping behavior.
Arguably, the true reason the United States went to war against
Saddam Hussein in 1991 was oil. Andrew Bacevich well summarized
what many political insiders felt was the primary reason for American
military intervention in the Middle East: “to preserve the American way
of life, rooted in a specific understanding of freedom and requiring a
cheap abundance of oil.”3
President George H. W. Bush and his team of closest advisers—James Baker, Brent Scowcroft, and Dick Cheney—understood
mobilizing support for countering Saddam’s seizure of Kuwait and the
threat to Saudi Arabia required sparking emotions. Talking about oil or
geostrategy was not going to gin that up. They believed American voters
liked to put angel’s wings or forked tails on political players. Hence, they
conceived and executed a strategy that demonized Saddam while portraying intervention as a bold stroke to preserve democracy for Kuwait.
Bush mobilized overwhelming support for the war.
The US presidential elections in 2016 offer a good example of
how emotion can evoke an extraordinary response in target audiences.
Consider Donald Trump. Skeptics argue Trump’s narratives lack substance, a problem that may prove fatal in the November general election.
But, Trump defeated 16 candidates, many considered political powerhouses, to win the Republican nomination. He did so, almost entirely,
by tapping into the deeply held emotional hostility to a sense the US
government had left its constituencies behind in favor of wealthy insider
elites whose agendas ignored their hopes and dreams.
None of these questions detracts from the book’s high merit, especially in the specific analyses of the dynamics governing each nation’s
strategic narrative. Each writer is incisive and illuminating, presenting
convincing cases for the conclusions argued. A powerful question raised
is how one can forge a viable war-fighting coalition among actors with
different political systems, agendas, interests, resources, and scope of
flexibility to participate in foreign conflicts. The case studies of country
perspectives highlighted next impressively dissect how each nation
employed strategic narratives to mobilize public support.
Quoting Johns Hopkins scholar Michael Vlahos, the editors note it
is critical to root policies in a foundation of “truths” people can easily
accept because they appear to be “self-evident and undeniable.” Or, put
in campaign terms, the rationale for expeditionary interventions needs
to be credible, defining the stakes and explaining persuasively why and
what action is taken, how it will unfold and for what purpose, and how
it benefits both foreign and domestic actors.
Netherlands, Italy, and Canada failed to produce coherent, persuasive, consistent narratives, costing their governments vital public support,
but not necessarily with the same result. The Dutch government, which
operates through consensual politics, collapsed. Italy’s executive traditionally has wide power in security matters, but poor messaging drained
3      Andrew J. Bacevich, America's War for the Greater Middle East (New York, NY: Random House,
2016).
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public support. Both governments drew down their International
Security Assistance Forces (ISAF). In Canada, elite consensus based on
a pro-NATO strategic culture enabled it to sustain ISAF’s fourth largest
combat presence in Afghanistan. A similar scenario enabled Australia’s
government to hold firm in providing its forces.
Adroit leadership in Germany, notably by defense minister Zu
Guttenberg, produced security-driven arguments and sustainable elite
consensus. These overcame lack of public support. In a system attuned to
consensus politics, the Danes articulated a narrative “attuned to shared
national values and ideals—such as the promotion of human rights—
while still preserving the argument of protecting Danish security…”
Germany’s and Denmark’s ability to present “consistent, compelling,
and clear” narratives that contained elements of purpose, legitimacy,
and success underpinned their engagements.
One striking finding was most governments changed their narratives. Rather than building public support, those actions diminished
it, partly because the new narratives embodied new rhetoric not new
strategies. This political gamesmanship inspired counter-narratives and
undercut scope of action.
Consider France. Traditionally, France accords its executive wide
authority on security matters and debates there have tended—as its many
interventions in Africa illustrate—to occur among elites. Even during
the Algerian civil war, the explosive issue of the use of torture by the
armed forces, which threated to subvert republican values, transpired
among elites, not the general public. Elites still matter, but in this era,
public opinion that translates into votes at the ballot box counts, too.
This lesson proved costly as President Nicolas Sarkozy saddled
himself with an incoherent narrative manifested in a four-page leaflet
expressing elusive objectives for French intervention. Sarkozy regularly
leveraged his frenetic leadership style to muscle his way through such
problems. What the French read in newspapers conflicted with on-theground realities. Confronting election defeat, mounting casualties and
strong counter-narratives forced Sarkozy to pull back. His party lost the
next election. Sarkozy’s rhetorical approach in talking about problems
rather than solving them contributed to the loss.
Hungarian voters are less interested in foreign policy although they
pay attention to casualties. The Hungarian government managed by sticking to its basic narratives of helping Afghans and allies in Afghanistan
without being directly at war, and, crucially, showing support for the
NATO alliance. “This is about NATO, not Afghanistan,” Minister of
Defense Ferenc Juhász declared. Important was his insistence against
taking offensive action or even detaining anti-Afghan government
forces. That dismayed ISAF allies. With uncertain public support for
sending troops, Hungary never altered the rules of engagement or aimed
to win hearts and minds for the provincial reconstruction teams (PRT)
it deployed. It consistently characterized its mission as peacekeeping,
and its refusal to adopt a more belligerent stance enabled it actually to
increase its forces.
Poland stressed the need to be counted as part of an alliance,
knowing the same alliance might one day be called upon to defend it
against Russia. Combined with a narrative about strengthening Polish
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military capabilities, the posture enabled the government to achieve
important goals despite vocal opposition.
Sweden—which is not a member of NATO—provided troops. It
justified its actions through a catch-all narrative that ranged from fighting terrorism to enhancing Afghan democracy. It consciously declined
to specify clear policy goals. This approach reflected domestic imperatives to balance interests among competing target audiences in order to
forge consensus. The Swedes questioned whether Afghanistan posed
a terrorist threat at home, and the military felt uncertain about the
purpose of its mission. The government narrative stressed the need for
Afghan and Swedish security. It argued the use of force, but not war, was
necessary to attain democracy, political stability, governance, and gender
equality. The strategy worked, giving legitimacy to the use of force by
appealing to humanitarian needs, Swedish self-interest, and an argument for strengthening collective security organizations like NATO by
participating in NATO actions.
The British approach reflected a strategic culture that stresses the
US-UK alliance. Like Americans, the British public takes pains to show
support for its military—even when it may disagree with government
policies. All three UK political parties supported intervention, and a
clear narrative emerged that balanced protecting UK security and
joining international partners in the fight against terrorism. A global
outlook and elite consensus bolstered support for participation in the
ISAF. Critically, the campaign reflected a strong belief that protecting
security at home required international engagement.
Britain’s steady hand in the face of mounting casualties after troops
were deployed to Helmand Province in 2006 suggests fatalities do not
necessarily erase popular support in some societies. Curiously, after 2009
the government muddled its narrative by adding humanitarian concerns
to national security goals. Was Britain engaged in peacekeeping or warfighting? Foreign Secretary Jack Straw moved to finesse the issue by
stressing the “astonishing success” British forces were achieving. When
British forces withdrew, it pegged the withdrawal to progress made on
the ground. The Brits declared victory and went home. How that might
affect future actions should the current stalemate in Afghanistan continue or should the Taliban seize power poses interesting questions.
The final chapter addresses the United States. It is an interesting
analysis centered on New York Times stories and how they shaped elite
discourse on Afghanistan. Yet, it is somewhat irrelevant to decisionmaking by Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama. Priding
himself as pragmatic and down-to-earth, Bush did not read the Times
or many newspapers. He relied on his instincts as the “decider” and, at
least until 2006, surrounded himself with circles of neoconservatives
who pushed their ideological agendas.
An intense intellectual, Obama reads voraciously, but is a self-contained leader who trusts his judgment above all others. Both presidents
produced incoherent narratives for Afghanistan. Neither laid out a
story, narrative, or themes and messages tied to clear policy goals or
that effectively shape an audience’s behavior to achieve a desired endstate. Not surprisingly, most objective observers severely question what
US actions have achieved or what price propping up the Ashraf Ghani
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administration is worth paying. In a recent Atlantic interview, Obama
expressed deep skepticism over whether the United States could solve
the problems in the Middle East. One infers he feels the same about
Afghanistan, whose challenges one can reasonably suggest he understated before taking office. Both of these presidents were strong-willed
individuals for whom media reporting has relatively little effect on
national security decisions.
Strategic Narratives, Public Opinion, and War ends with a commendable
chapter that summarizes conclusions and raises questions for the future.
The current political environment in the United States and Europe has
elicited a healthy debate about the future of NATO. In the 2016 presidential elections, major differences on the issue have emerged between
Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump. This book admirably contributes to
that discourse. With clarity it lays out the political dynamics that challenged NATO countries who grappled with joining an American-led
coalition in Afghanistan. Have NATO nations done their fair share in
shouldering the burden of European security? With varying success and
the employment of distinct strategies, NATO political leaders tried to
support the US intervention in Afghanistan. Domestic considerations
affected the extent and terms of each nation’s engagement there. But as a
group, these leaders recognized a strong NATO represents vital hope to
deter or defeat potential Russian aggression. Maintaining alliance with
the United States mattered to all of them.

Commentary and Reply
On ”State-Building: America’s Foreign Policy
Challenge”
Robert J. Bunker

This commentary responds to Charles J. Sullivan’s article “State-Building: America’s
Foreign Policy Challenge” published in the Spring 2016 issue of Parameters (vol. 46,
no. 1).

D

r. Sullivan’s essay, while well-articulated, urges a specific strategic approach should be undertaken which this commentator
argues is not in our nation’s best interests.
Sullivan’s essay focuses on the rise of a new menace—the emergence of radical Sunni-inspired terror states in Iraq, Syria, and Libya
linked to ISIL—as well as a reconstitution of Taliban sovereignty over
Afghanistan. It paints a very accurate overview of issues stemming
from state failure in these four countries as well as themes related to
internal sectarian politics, tribalism, external power interference, poorly
crafted policies and their unexpected second-order effects, and a host of
other political maladies. The author rightfully acknowledges the dismal
performance of the United States and its coalition partners in the promotion of state-building—specifically that founded on liberal democratic
governance—in these four countries in the recent past as well as the US
government’s present recalcitrance to get more deeply involved in civil
wars that are seeing raging insurgencies taking place within them.
The author determines the most strategically prudent course of
action for the United States is that of “…adhering to a militaristic foreign
policy agenda…” to “…combat the rise of new radical-inspired states.”
A centerpiece of this agenda would, by necessity, be one focused once
again on ‘state-building.’
Sullivan recognizes such a strategic policy is not without its major
detractions, including the fact the US government does not currently
possess a “workable blueprint” to reconstruct failed states successfully.
In addition, as in our successful campaigns, a small US military or coalition garrison would be required indefinitely for stabilization purposes.
Still, given the mounting security concerns that now exist, state-building
is viewed by the author as our best option when countering ISIL’s
terror state in Iraq, Syria, and Libya, and the Taliban’s re-emergence in
Afghanistan.
A number of faulty assumptions underpin the author’s strategic
policy guidance. One is to suggest the transnational threat represented
by an ISIL caliphate spanning Iraq, Syria, and Libya simply does not represent an existential threat to the Westphalian-state form itself. Viewing
ISIL as the next generational evolution of the al-Qaeda organization,
however, does indeed highlight the fact that this threat now readily
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exists outside of the modern state-centric paradigm. If we are willing to
accept we are indeed operating “out of paradigm,” then all past international security assumptions we held as valid—including those related to
state-building—need to be questioned.
One such presupposition is we can “orchestrate economic recoveries” in these countries in question. Put differently, we can create viable
formal—hence legitimate—economies that will supersede the informal
and criminal economies that presently exist, such as the poppy-opiumheroin production centered in Afghanistan. What if we were to instead
assume the illicit economy is now actually the dominant economy in
certain regions of the world, such as in Afghanistan? If this is indeed
the new reality, then we may quickly come to the conclusion an integral
component to liberal democratic governance simply cannot be accomplished there and, quite possibly, in some of the other countries.
Another presupposition mentioned is that a professionally trained
local military force would be required in areas taken back from ISIL, in
Syria, for instance. Even if we forget the immediate $500 million Free
Syrian Army debacle, the United States and its allies would be required
to stand up a new force of Syrian fighters who are not polarized along
the ends of the spectrum of Islamic radicals and Assad regime loyalists. Such a recruiting pool no longer exists—the Syrian men who have
migrated to Europe in search of a better life for themselves and their
families have no intentions of going back, and those men who live in
refugee camps in neighboring states with their families realize their
cause for democratic freedoms is lost.
Additionally, nothing negates a militaristic foreign policy like that
advocated in the article for the United States like a nuclear-armed
foreign power. Russian forces are now based in Syria, actively engaged
in supporting their allied Assad regime against all opposing factions on
the ground in the country. While the United States can operate covertly
on the margins in Syria, we simply would not risk—nor should we—the
escalation potential vis-à-vis Russia resulting from any overt boots-onthe-ground campaign in the country.
Critiques such as these can also be applied to the situation in Iraq,
a country fragmented into Kurdish, Sunni, and Shia zones. The chance
to engage in state-building for the benefit of a greater Iraq is long past.
Given ongoing American tensions with Iran, and its intimate relations
with the Shia population in Iraq, the southern region of the country can
only be expected to see waning liberal democratic influence over time.
Under such conditions, further US investment in Shia infrastructure
and development makes little sense. The middle section of the country
is partially controlled by ISIL. Additional Sunni territories have some
affinity for ISIL, which is viewed as a partial counterbalance to the
threat the Shia militias pose in the area. Only in the Kurdish zone do
any type of real US state-building futures exist and then, if implemented,
the negative impacts on our alliance with Turkey would certainly have to
be considered, which may likely preclude such a course of action.
Brevity prevents a critique of state-building and the requirement for
deployed American troops on the ground in Libya. Suffice to say, this
does not represent a rational course of action on the part of the United
States towards the ISIL threat. Competing governments now exist there,
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along with roughly 8,000 ISIL fighters attempting to expand their selfproclaimed caliphate. This new quagmire is of immense geo-political
significance to Europe and by all rights should fall within its sphere of
regional security interest. Hence, Libya should come under European
Union mandate, and as part of our Atlantic alliance, its domestic security needs should fall under a European burden-sharing agreement with
the United States.
While the emergence of ISIL is a component of a changing world
that is exiting the modern state-centric paradigm into something else—
and may even represent an existential threat to the Westphalian-state
model—the United States cannot become mired in multiple countries
with deployed ground forces in support of prohibitively expensive
social-engineering projects as a futile exercise in liberal democratic
expansion. This is even more the case given our past failures in this
regard, and the realization we have no viable strategic state-building
plan. We, unfortunately, tend to incrementally “wing-it” once in country
by literally throwing money at the problem to the benefit of corrupt local
officials and businesses.
With US national debt now over $19 trillion, the exhaustion of our
armed services—especially our army—from more than a decade of
constant deployments, the rise of an expansionist China and a bellicose
Russian state, and the ongoing gang and cartel problems in the Americas,
strategic prudence suggests we should not go “all in” to Afghanistan,
Iraq, Syria, and Libya. Rather, we should target, degrade, and undermine
ISIL and the Taliban when and where we can in a measured and costeffective manner. We must also recognize the Assad regime, supported
by Iranian and Russian forces, has stabilized its position and does not
appear to be in danger of imploding.
If we are entering a new and more dangerous global security era,
logic suggests we marshal our strength as the last remaining superpower. Sullivan’s state-building policy guidance, in an absolute best-case
scenario, would yield us nothing more than pyrrhic victories. Instead,
we should reposition ourselves for continuing global influence and
dominance rather than myopically becoming mired in a handful of lost
causes for the long-term.

The Author Replies
Charles J. Sullivan
I wish to extend my sincere thanks to Parameters for publishing
my article “State-Building: America’s Foreign Policy Challenge” in its
Spring 2016 issue. I would also like to thank Dr. Robert J. Bunker for
his thoughtful critique of my work. One of the reasons I wrote this
article was the hope of initiating (or perhaps reigniting) a discussion on
US strategy in the Global War on Terror. In reading Bunker’s critique,
I admittedly agree with many of his observations. Indeed, the United
States faces a most daunting situation across the Middle East today.
Furthermore, as I have already noted, there are many risks involved in
the United States adhering to a state-building-oriented strategy. That
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said, it is on strategy where Bunker and I differ. He sees state-building
as too risky, and he argues America should “reposition” itself so as to
maintain “global influence and dominance” in the international system.
I appreciate this viewpoint, but I also believe it to be mistaken.
In endorsing a state-building-oriented strategy, I am not thinking
in terms of preventing the fall of dominoes across the entirety of the
Middle East. Instead, I believe a degradation-oriented approach is an
acceptable strategy for the United States to pursue in certain countries
where states are either failing or collapsed such as Nigeria, Somalia,
and Yemen. I also agree other challenges, particularly those involving
Russia and China’s hegemonic aspirations have the potential to undermine the United States’ superiority in the international system. Pivoting
away from the armed conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria, in
particular, may not be a wise decision. Metaphorically speaking, these
four countries, in my opinion, represent the dominoes in the Global War
on Terror, and what I am suggesting is America should try to stand them
back up, if possible.
Syria and Libya have fallen apart, and Afghanistan and Iraq are
wobbling. My preference is for America to focus its efforts primarily on
Afghanistan and Iraq, but I do not think the United States can disassociate itself from Libya and Syria altogether. I believe state-building is a
very bloody and costly foreign policy agenda to pursue, and Washington
does not know how to go about rebuilding failed states. Adhering to a
state-building-oriented strategy would involve experiencing future setbacks. Yet, I do not foresee acts of political violence within these four
countries and elsewhere (as evidenced by the recent occurrence of deadly
attacks in the West) letting up if the United States decides to scale down,
abandon, or hand-off its state-building efforts. Europe needs America’s
help in Libya, and I do not view Russia’s strategy for Syria, Iran’s strategy
for Iraq, or Pakistan’s strategy for Afghanistan as sustainable.
I hope my article, along with Bunker’s critique, prove helpful to
America’s future military leaders, in terms of laying out the dangers
facing the United States today and the strategic options available to
them. In all honesty, I very hesitantly argue on behalf of a state-buildingoriented strategy. Nevertheless, I see it as America’s best option.Nonstate actors like ISIL seek to transform into states. Their respective
interests run counter to America’s interests across the Middle East. They
have also shown themselves to be lethal adversaries. I thus believe it is
in America’s interest to stifle their rise and gradually eliminate them.
“Degrading” is what we are (hopefully) trying to do in Afghanistan,
Iraq, Libya, and Syria now.
“Destroying” though entails America assisting in the rebuilding of
fractured states or building of new states within these countries. Rest
assured, such entities need not evolve into consolidated liberal democracies, but they should aspire to govern in an accountable and inclusive
manner. Otherwise, this menace facing us will continue to snipe at our
interests. In my article, I have laid out a blueprint for how to rebuild
these four war-torn countries. In truth, I do not see a light at the end
of this tunnel just yet, but I do feel it is best if America keeps pressing
forward.
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Despite its efforts, the United States does not know how to effectively rebuild failed states. America’s military has demonstrated they can
“clear” a territory of enemy forces and “hold” it, but what the United
States has sought to “build” in countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq is
apparently not built to last. One of the major limitations of US counterinsurgency policy as it applies to the Global War on Terror lies with the
seeming inability of Washington to convince local elites of certain host
governments to govern in a more accountable fashion.1
That said, the rise of ISIL and the resurgence of the Taliban may have
initiated a change in the decision-making calculations of some Afghan,
Iraqi, Libyan, and Syrian elites. Watershed events do not happen very
often so the United States has to exercise prudent judgment in determining the extent to which America should involve itself in the domestic
politics of these four countries. As I stated in my article, dealing with
failed states is extremely difficult, for they require a lot of time and effort
be devoted to them. Moreover, devoting resources to their betterment
may not pay off for the United States in the long run. Still, in spite of
these drawbacks, I conclude state-building holds the greatest promise
in terms of resolving the intractable conflicts, and of lessening acts of
political violence, within these four countries.

1     For an analysis of the origins, adoption, implementation, and limitations of the United States
military’s counterinsurgency policy, see Fred Kaplan, The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change
the American Way of War, Reprint Edition (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2014).
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On “Rethinking America’s Grand Strategy:
Insights from the Cold War”
William J. Gole
This commentary is in response to Hal Brand’s article “Rethinking America’s Grand
Strategy: Insights from the Cold War” published in the Winter 2015-16 issue of
Parameters (vol. 45, no. 4).
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approached the article, “Rethinking America’s Grand Strategy:
Insights from the Cold War,” by Hal Brands in the Winter issue of
Parameters with great interest. However, after having read it, I found
the case for the value of such a retrospective search for lessons learned
unconvincing.
The author’s account of lessons learned rests primarily on the
propositions that the Cold War period and the early 21st century are
similar enough in their basic characteristics as to suggest a similar
“Grand Strategy”; and, that there is such a Grand Strategy that finds
broad support within the foreign policy establishment. It is worth noting
that “every analogy begins with a lie,” that the underlying facts can
never be the same, so analogies are fundamentally flawed and should be
viewed with some degree of skepticism. That is not to say analogies are
without merit. Rather, it is meant to make the point that the less alike
the two scenarios being compared, the heavier the dose of skepticism
recommended.
One cannot help but cite some significant differences in the bipolar
nature of the Cold War environment and that which exists today. The
uncapping of many of the pressures the Cold War contained is among
the major forces that have led to a new world order. The new order is
characterized by the diffusion of power among multiple regional or, as
Samuel Huntington has described, civilizational centers. This shift has
had a profound effect on the strategic configuration of the planet. As
a result, a basis for comparison of the field where geopolitics is played
is questionable at best. This suggests an analogy of its own, and one
that better captures the realities involved: the comparison of the two
environments as being as different as a boxing match and a game of
dodgeball.
In fairness to the author, there are certainly lessons to be gleaned
from the Cold War period. However, does the unchallenged continuation of past practice constitute a Grand Strategy? And, does the grafting
on of new tactics, also largely unchallenged, represent an affirmation
of the Grand Strategy or evidence of ‘drift’ in the absence of a strategic
rudder?
A fundamental shortcoming of the use of the Cold War experience as a standard to evaluate existing geopolitical strategy is that it
places strategic analysis in the context of ‘what was’, not ‘what is’. Any
adjustment to strategy must assess the country’s current strengths and
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weaknesses and the nature of the threats the new world order presents.
This includes challenging assumptions that have been embedded in the
policies inherited from the past.
In short, continuation of past policy, regardless of its historical
success, is a poor substitute for the crafting of a Grand Strategy that
reflects the realities of the present.

The Author Replies
Hal Brands

I

n his letter to the editor, William Gole offers a critique of my article,
“Rethinking America’s Grand Strategy: Insights from the Cold War.”
In response to his critique, I would simply like to make three brief
points.
First, the core of Gole’s critique—that my argument is flawed
because it assumes a fundamental continuity between the Cold War and
the post-Cold War era—actually misconstrues the point of my article.
Nowhere did I argue there was perfect continuity between the two eras;
in fact, I acknowledged the differences between them. What I argued,
rather, was the perceived lessons of the Cold War unavoidably loom
large for policymakers, many of whom came of age during that conflict.
Accordingly, it is important to really scrutinize the history and lessons of
the Cold War, to ensure that whenever history is used in policy debates
today—as it inevitably will be—is it used well rather than poorly.
Second, although I acknowledge there are crucial differences
between past and present (as there always are), I reject the idea that the
post-Cold War era is too dissimilar from the Cold War era—in terms
of American statecraft—to learn useful lessons from that earlier period.
As I pointed out, the United States today is having a fundamental debate
about whether to remain globally engaged in the future. The Cold War
represents the only period prior to the post-Cold War era in which the
United States has pursued a globalist grand strategy, and so it seems
quite plausible that interrogating this history can reveal useful insights
about the nature, the impact, and the value of that global engagement.
Third, Gole apparently feels I draw the wrong historical lessons
from the Cold War. But he never specifies the lessons or insights with
which he disagrees. Does he disagree with the idea that the history of
the Cold War shows that the military balance shapes risk-taking and
decision-making? Does he disagree with the idea that the history of
the Cold War indicates that stability is not an organic condition of the
international system, but must be provided by powerful and principled
actors? Does he disagree that the history of the Cold War shows that
selective and strategic democracy-promotion can benefit American
statecraft? He never actually says which, if any, of these insights he
deems incorrect. And that is too bad. I would welcome a debate about
whether one should interpret the history of the Cold War differently
than I do, but that would require drawing the lines of agreement and
disagreement more distinctly than Gole’s letter does.
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On “Making Sense of the ‘Long Wars’ –
Advice to the US Army”
G. T. Burke, COL (USA Ret.)
This commentary is in response to Tami Davis Biddle’s special commentary “Making
Sense of the ‘Long Wars’ – Advice to the US Army” published in the Spring 2016
issue of Parameters (vol. 46, no. 1).
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r. Biddle is correct to recommend Army senior leaders should
better educate themselves regarding communication with
civilian decision-makers so as to improve results in future operations. While her special commentary inspired many positive thoughts, I
also have several critical comments to pass along.
In paragraph 4, when Dr. Biddle recommends asking probing questions can we be so sure Army senior leaders did not ask—or at least
considered asking? In such cases, it is useful for subordinates to consider
the most likely, and the best-case or worst-case results when questioning
political leadership. Responses could range widely—from approval to
censure.
As noted by Dr. Biddle, General Petraeus’ communication skills
yielded temporary, finite “means” versus “ways.” Army leadership
should work more ways-means balances in its dealings with political
leadership.
In the final few paragraphs, Dr. Biddle recommends a “more-isbetter” strategy in leader development. While it is nearly impossible to
win against a “more-is-better” argument, I will try:
•• She is correct: there are areas in which we need a greater understanding of strategic leadership, and one’s education at the US Army
War College is not the only time to focus on these areas. I suggest
concurrent learning must become the norm and recommend more
distance-education programs.
•• The push for advanced degrees is fine, but I do not believe they are
seen generally as a serious diversion from the “warrior path.” I suggest
an examination of general-officer biographies will show all have at
least a master’s degree and a significant, and acceptable, amount have
had useful “unconventional” assignments.
•• Mimicking an Air Force program to rotate captains into the Pentagon
is a good idea, except we already have internship and broadening
opportunity programs.
•• Also, general-officer ranks should seek out mentoring to improve civilmilitary communication skills—again via modern online methods.
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on Dr. Biddle’s important and timely recommendations.
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The Author Replies
Tami Davis Biddle

I

am pleased to have an opportunity to respond to COL Burke’s comments and recommendations regarding “Making Sense of the ‘Long
Wars’ – Advice to the US Army.” I appreciate both his kind words and
his thoughtful reading of the essay.
With respect to COL Burke’s first question, pertaining to the Bush
administration’s decision for regime change in Iraq in 2003, it is clear
from the history of events there were serious gaps in planning for the
post-combat phase of the endeavor. This was a result of several different types of problems. In some instances, important questions were not
raised by Army senior leaders. (To consider asking such questions, but
then to refrain from doing so is not an option when the stakes are high
and lives are at risk.) In other instances, important questions were posed,
but perhaps not with sufficient tenaciousness. And sometimes, efforts
to raise important questions were simply batted away by administration
officials who did not welcome them or wish to engage them. All of these
problems reflected a troubled civil-military relationship—one that hampered strategic planning and undermined the effective use of military
instruments to achieve political ends. When civil-military relations are
sound (and I believe they must be sound for strategy to be successful),
both sides will feel free to engage in an open and robust conversation
about how to use appropriate ways and means to achieve desired ends.
When senior Army officers encounter pathologies in this all-important
relationship, they must re-double their efforts to communicate effectively
while staying within the norms of appropriate civil-military discourse.
Sometimes this requires raising hard questions repeatedly and through
as many appropriate channels as possible. If the questions officers want
to ask are central to the successful implementation of what the civilians
desire, and if those questions are central to a stable resolution of the
problem at hand, then officers have an obligation not to self-censor;
however, they must work through channels that are within bounds,
and that will not further exacerbate an already troubled interaction. If
tenacious and good faith efforts on the military side will not resolve
the problem, then officers must be prepared to do the best they can in
the circumstances they face—for this is the nature of a representative
system that is (and must be) under civilian control. If civilians refuse to
heed the professional military advice being offered to them and if things
go awry as a result, then the serving administration will face sanctions
at the ballot box.
Clearly the civil-military relationship is a two-way street, and civilians
hold half of the responsibility for its health and soundness. Fortunately,
it has been rare for civilian leaders to turn a blind eye or a deaf ear
to their military partners. In the great majority of circumstances, the
historical record indicates civilians will readily seek professional military
advice and place a high priority on sound civil-military relations. We are
fortunate in the United States that this is usually the case.
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The civil-military relationship is a challenging and nuanced one that
must receive careful thought and ongoing attention from both sides if
it is to work as it should. If it is not healthy, then national strategy will
not be either. Military officers who are approaching the highest levels
of their profession must understand this relationship thoroughly and
study it in detail. Happily, there is excellent literature to aid them in
this process. As I said in my original essay, senior officers must pay
particular attention to the skill set required to “craft clear-headed and
sophisticated military advice,” and to “pose options that convey what is
feasible with the resources available, and what is not.”
In his comments, COL Burke suggests the augmentation and broadening of officer education can take place principally through distance
education. I would agree only up to a point. When distance learning is
done well, it can be both effective and efficient—and quite rigorous as
well. There is much important content that can be delivered to students
in this format, including the study of detailed and well-structured case
studies. Students working in this realm can surely hone their written
communication skills if they are overseen by qualified and skilled instructors. I would contend many of the skills needed by those who are going
to negotiate the upper reaches of the civil-military relationship are those
that require development via face-to-face interaction with civilians—in
academic settings, in non-DOD government agencies, and in programs
with partner nations or international agencies. In these settings, officers
can learn to understand and communicate with those who come from
non-military backgrounds and cultures.
I contend being able to reach across this divide is more important
now than it ever was. Very few civilian leaders in the United States have
military experience; indeed, many have had no contact whatever with
the military or its culture. They lack a detailed understanding of the
challenges that are wholly unique to war and warfighting. These include
not only physics, geography, weather, and the limits of the human
body—but also the daunting challenges of logistics and communications. In addition, civilians often fail to comprehend the psychological
challenges of operating in environments that are uniquely stressful and
predisposed to every kind of friction. The only way officers will equip
themselves to articulate these issues and convey these challenges (prior
to finding themselves in a high-level inter-agency meeting or across
from a row of senators) is if they practice these skills in settings where
civilians are present.
While many senior officers do have master’s degrees, and while
some have had unconventional assignments, I have encountered many
officers who have paid a career price for taking opportunities to broaden
their horizons and/or for following slightly atypical career paths. In my
original essay I explained the reasons for the Army’s high emphasis on
tactical and operational skill so I will not revisit it here. I will argue
that the modern, 21st-century Army needs people with diverse, wideranging skills and bodies of knowledge. Promotion practices must adjust
to this pressing reality. And, I would make a special plea for sending
more officers into PhD programs—and doing so early in their careers.
Such programs allow students to gain true mastery of knowledge that
must be fully available to those serving in the military if they are to serve
as genuine partners with civilian leaders. This high-level knowledge is
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needed not only in technical/mathematical realms like computing and
operations research, but also in realms like political science where scholars have, in recent years, done profoundly important work that is helping
us to understand not only insurgency movements and terrorists, but also
the internal dynamics that operate within civil wars. If the Army does
not avail itself of this knowledge by sending its most capable young
people out into the academy to acquire it, then it will not be serving the
nation as well as it might.

Book Reviews
Drugs and War
Shooting Up: A Short History of Drugs and War
By Łukasz Kamieński
Reviewed by Dr. Robert J. Bunker, Adjunct Research Professor at the Strategic
Studies Institute, US Army War College

I

t is rather rare to do a Parameters book review of a military-related work
initially written in Polish—in this instance, the new work Shooting Up. In
regard to this review, it has turned out to be an extremely fortuitous experience. The original manuscript published in 2014 by Łukasz Kamieński,
a Polish academic, has been painstakingly translated into English by the
author and two associates for publication by Oxford University Press, a
prestigious publishing house.
At more than 400 pages in length, this in-depth chronological
study of the subject of “psychopharmacology in warfare” is a unique
document. Indeed, very few works so far have attempted to explore the
historical impact of drug use in warfare and the co-evolution of the two
over time. The book, influenced by an “interpretivist” epistemology,
social constructivism, and the concept of war as “an essentially social
and cultural phenomenon’” (xxv-xxvi) is composed of a preface, an
acknowledgments listing, 14 chapters, a conclusion, an epilogue, a notes
section, a bibliography, and an index. The chapters are organized into
three themes grouped into the premodern through the Second World
War, the Cold War, and the contemporary periods. Chapter foci include
the Napoleonic era, the Opium Wars, the American Civil War, the
Colonial Wars, the First and Second World Wars, the Korean War, the
Vietnam War, the Red Army in Afghanistan, our present conflicts with
irregular combatants (including intoxicated child soldiers), and contemporary American armed forces. The work is extremely well researched
and well referenced with the inclusion of an extensive bibliography.
Given US societal—and military (as a federal agency of that
society)—perspectives on illicit (recreational) and licit (medically prescribed) narcotics use, this significant book—exploring the “taboo
subject” of psychoactive compounds (xxiv)—can be analyzed on two
levels. The first is the detrimental level of addictive substance abuse,
including alcohol and harder illicit commodities such as heroin and
cocaine, upon military organizations and the societies they represent.
Second, is the beneficial level of licit (and at times illicit) alcohol and narcotics use—such as enhanced performance, as a psychological coping
mechanism, and as a reward for troops—upon military organizations.
Of course, a vast gray area exists between these levels of use, along
with the fact a psychoactive compound may have both simultaneous
positive and negative effects upon soldiers at the same time. There is
an interplay between what may be beneficial for military operations and
what would later be detrimental with regard to societal costs, stemming
from high addiction levels of veterans returning home—and this is also
an underlying theme of the work.

New York, NY: Oxford
University Press, 2016
416 pages
$29.95
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Personally, I found the Second World War section entitled “The
Finns: A Special Case” (132-140)—drawing from the seminal work of
Mikko Ylikangas—one of the most fascinating elements. It has helped
to explain partially the much-higher performance of the greatly outnumbered Finnish commando units in their engagements with invading
Soviet forces during the Second World War. As it turns out, Finnish
troops had personal medical kits containing heroin, opium, and Pervitin
(an early type of crystal meth) that chemically enhanced their stamina
and other human performance factors over extended combat mission
periods.
For contemporary military officers and strategists, Kamieński’s
book provides a very informative historical overview of the use of narcotics in warfare from classical Greece into the early 21st century. Given
the United States’ decades-long conflicts with irregular armies, often
partially composed of child soldiers, the two chapters on them (12 and
13) should almost be considered mandatory reading—though much of
the irregular armies information has been drawn directly from US Army
War College professor Paul Rexton Kan’s scholarship. The work also
provides a rare glimpse into how and when US military personnel may
possibly utilize prescribed narcotics such as “go-pills” and “no-go pills”
(263-282) for mission performance requirements. The book does not,
however, yield any insights into potential near-peer (e.g. Russian) or peer
(e.g. Chinese) competitor military use of such performance-enhancing
narcotics and thus must be considered one of its few limitations.
In summation, this exceedingly informative work, especially when
combined with Paul Rexton Kan’s seminal Drugs and Contemporary Warfare
(Potomac, 2009), would provide an excellent textbook foundation
from which to teach a military university course focusing on this still
esoteric—yet increasingly important—component of modern military
activities. It is easy-to-read, affordable, and a gem of a work produced
by a little-known, yet brilliant, academic hailing from the esteemed
Jagiellonian University in Kraków, Poland.

Drones
The Drone Debate – A Primer on the US Use of Unmanned
Aircraft Outside Conventional Battlefields
By Avery Plaw, Matthew S. Fricker, and Carlos R. Colon
Reviewed by Ulrike Esther Franke, Doctoral Candidate at the University of
Oxford, Supervised by Sir Hew Strachan

T
Lanham, MD: Rowman &
Littlefield, 2016
343 pages
$34.00

he Drone Debate by Avery Plaw, Matthew S. Fricker, and Carlos R.
Colon is a comprehensive book on the debate around the United
States’ use of unmanned aircraft outside conventional battlefields. It is
particularly suited for teaching as it provides the reader with a broad
understanding of the issues surrounding the US drone campaigns.
The three authors work together at the University of Massachusetts
Dartmouth; Fricker and Colon are co-founders of the University’s Center
for the Study of Targeted Killing. In six chapters, plus an introduction
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and conclusion, the authors address the major issues and questions
with regard to US drone use outside official battlefields: legality, ethical
questions, strategy, and politics, as well as emerging issues such as the
proliferation of drones.
The Drone Debate is a very comprehensive book. It raises the right
issues and quotes the right people—Sarah Kreps, Micah Zenko, Bradley
Strawser, Peter W. Singer, and Audrey Cronin among others—and also
includes lesser-known but important voices in the debate such as Farha
Taj. The book presents and balances opposed views without taking
sides; however, at a time when new drone books are flooding the market,
a new book must be measured by whether it fills a gap in the literature.
While The Drone Debate fills a gap in available teaching material, contentwise it does not.
As I have argued, the current debate on drones suffers from a disproportionate focus on a very specific, albeit by no means typical, use of
drones: their use by the US armed forces and intelligence agencies for
targeted killings outside official battlefields. As is correctly noted in The
Drone Debate, of the nearly 11,000 drones in US possession, “only a small
number (fewer than 450) are physically capable of carrying armaments
in known configurations and among that group a much smaller number
actually carry weapons and are operational at any given time. The vast
majority of UAVs fielded by the United States are mini (or micro) drones
such as the Raven and Wasp which make up 89 percent of the military’s
drone inventory (9,765 drones in total)” (282, numbers from Samuel J.
Brennan, Ethan Griffin, and Rhys McCormick, Sustaining the US Lead in
Unmanned Systems, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2014). On the
global scale, the numbers are even more skewed towards small, unarmed
systems.
Hence, the debate on drones would greatly benefit from more work
on non-US drone use, on military drone use for other purposes than
targeted killings, on drone use in conventional wars rather than asymmetric ones, and on drone use in official war zones rather than outside
of them. The authors of The Drone Debate focus on US drone use outside
of official warzones. This does not make it a bad book, but somewhat
less groundbreaking and original.
The Drone Debate is a good tool for teaching as it allows students to
get a very comprehensive overview of the current state of the debate.
I would recommend assigning this book to students taking a class on
drone warfare for the first time, as well as to interested members of the
general public. After all, the authors point out, “people cannot be said
to consent to a policy of which they are ignorant.” (2) I also recommend combining the reading assignment with other publications that
further highlight elements of drone usage such as the Center for a New
American Security’s Global Perspectives, A Drone Saturated Future (2016);
David Hambling’s Swarm Troopers (2015); and several papers out of Peter
Bergen and Daniel Rothenberg’s Drone Wars (2015). This list is by no
means comprehensive.
One of the book’s strengths is the discussion of different approaches
to measure (civilian) casualties of drone strikes (28ff), which nicely
depicts the difficulties researchers face when trying to gather data
and to analyze them correctly. On this subject, the authors’ expertise
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is particularly strong—Avery Plaw had previously published a highly
recommendable paper on this question in Bradley Strawser’s Killing by
Remote Control (2013). I particularly enjoyed the end of the book where
the authors start engaging with the issues raised throughout the book
and explain how drones have become “the poster child” for targeted
killing (333).
All in all, while I would not consider The Drone Debate essential
reading for those already familiar with the debate, it is useful teaching
material and a good primer for the general public—as it was intended
by the authors.

Mercenaries and Private Contractors
The Modern Mercenary: Private Armies and What They Mean
for World Order
By Sean McFate
Reviewed by COL Scott L. Efflandt, XO to Commanding General, FORSCOM

G
New York, NY: Oxford
University Press, 2015
272 pages
$30.00

lobal economic recession, failing states, and a rise in transnational
organizations provide ample material for consumers and scholars
to synthesize when considering the many changes to the character of
war. For most, the ongoing wars in the Middle East have become a constant environmental condition, typically getting little more than a running
banner update at the bottom of the news broadcast. With so much
ongoing, it is easy to lose sight of the potential second-order effects that
may indicate a tectonic shift in civilian-military relations.
Sean McFate breaks this pattern in The Modern Mercenary by expertly
looking at recent/ongoing wars to explain the increased use of private
military companies (PMCs, also referenced in literature as private
security companies—PSCs). By outlining the influence of the above
factors, he argues this trend will likely affect future wars and indicates
an ongoing evolution of the world system. He explains the phenomenon
of the contemporary mercenary in three areas. The first part of the book
explains why “soldiers for hire” are used. Second, a detailed examination
of recent wars scopes the breadth and depth of the current phenomenon.
Lastly, the book theorizes as to how this recent and sharp increase in the
use of mercenaries will affect who wages war in the future.
Chapters one through five explain the mechanics of modern mercenary activities in contrast to historical norms. By definition, a mercenary
is a person who performs coercive military duties for pay without allegiance to a state or sovereign. McFate illustrates such a simple definition,
while adequate for understanding the phenomenon from Machiavelli
through Forsyth’s novel in 1974, is not sufficient to capture the multibillion dollar industry that has emerged since 9-11. By building on the
contemporary works of Singer and Avant, the author provides a more
nuanced and complete understanding using the PMC as the central unit
of analysis. These are further divided into two categories—mercenary
companies (capable of independent campaigns) and military enterprises
(train, advise, and equip armies for command by others). The distinction
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proves useful in the author’s application of economic theory in a market
economy to explain three factors: a) the conditions that have caused
the industry to grow, b) why the industry is dominated by a US military
paradigm, and c) why the need for PMCs will continue to grow.
Beyond validating the utility of the above construct, the middle
two chapters provide a tour-de-force of the mercenary industry today—
with a level of insight and detail unrivaled in any other research in this
field. This material is clearly informed by McFate’s previous mercenary
experience with DynCorp, which he acknowledges in the foreword. The
purists among social scientists might cry foul at the unavoidable bias this
induces. Alternately, one could counter this is the price of admission to
get such clarity and detail, especially when dealing with such a guarded
topic as this. The author’s experience aside, the robust use of references
adds depth and credibility to the book. In keeping with the author’s
quality of scholarship, even more detailed information on mercenary
contracts and operations in Liberia is available in the three annexes.
In the closing five chapters, the aforementioned framework and
contemporary operations are used to support the argument that the
private military industry will perpetuate and, in turn, induce larger
societal change because the world is entering the “neomedievalism”
period. As such, states will continue to exist but they will play a less
significant role in the global system as they increasingly compete with
other global actors for political dominance. This fragmentation of global
society will lead to the use of mercenaries for war by any actor who can
afford it. The author concludes in the future the institutional military
will more closely resemble the condottieri of pre-Westphalia (a return
to the natural condition) than the national armies dominating modern
times. The rationale for the conclusion relied on a European centric
analysis of warfare over the last 800 years, without acknowledging the
inherent distinct histories of other cultures over longer time frames. Put
differently, could one analyze the Peloponnesian War and draw the same
conclusion? While the conclusion falls short of being compelling, this is
exactly how a good book—such as this one—should end. It leaves the
reader with new questions.
In summary, for those who wish to understand the current state-ofplay of commercial soldiers or contemporary civilian-military relations
The Modern Mercenary is a must-read foundational text. The book is clearly
written, well documented, and insightful and stands as a pillar in this
field. Through the use of thought-provoking applications of contemporary theory the author lays the foundation for future research in
important areas.
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Military History
Jacob L. Devers: A General’s Life
By James Scott Wheeler
Reviewed by Dr. Conrad C. Crane, Chief of Historical Services, US Army
Heritage and Education Center, US Army War College

J

Lexington, KY: University
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ames Scott Wheeler’s fine new book is the latest in the Association
of the US Army American Warriors series. The need for it is made
clear by the first sentence of renowned author Rick Atkinson’s introduction, “No senior American general from World War II has been
forgotten more quickly or with less justice than Jacob Loucks Devers.”
While Dwight Eisenhower and his subordinate Army Group commanders Omar Bradley and Bernard Montgomery still receive voluminous
coverage in history books, Devers and the Sixth Army Group are often
ignored.
That is surprising, considering his significant list of accomplishments. After a lively childhood in York, Pennsylvania, Devers graduated
from the United States Military Academy in 1909, ranking 39 out of
103. A field artilleryman, he filled a number of assignments at frontier
posts until being assigned to help establish a field artillery school at Fort
Sill to train the American army going to France for World War I. He
was selected to command a field artillery regiment there, but the war
ended too soon. After the war, he served a second tour of duty teaching
mathematics at West Point, attended staff college at Fort Leavenworth,
and then went back to teach at Fort Sill. He served with the office of the
Chief of Artillery before going to the Army War College, and then commanded an artillery battalion before becoming the graduate manager of
athletics at West Point in 1936.
Through connections with one of his former battalion commanders,
Leslie J. McNair, during this time at West Point, Devers came to the
attention of George Marshall, and his career skyrocketed. First, Devers
was sent to Panama to help rejuvenate defenses there. Then he was
brought back to Washington to serve as Marshall’s “fireman,” and soon
Devers found himself in charge of Fort Bragg and the Ninth Infantry
Division. Looking for a balanced officer not tainted by cavalry or
infantry prejudices, Marshall and McNair picked Devers as leader of
the new Armored Force in spring 1941. He made such an impression
there when Lieutenant General (LTG) Frank Andrews, commander of
the US Army European Theater of Operations, died in a plane crash in
May 1943, Devers was quickly chosen as his replacement. I found the
most revealing part of this book the coverage of Devers work building
up to Overlord, especially his support of LTG Ira Eaker, who was trying
to vindicate precision bombing doctrine while scrambling to build up
the Eighth Air Force. Eaker seems another general who deserves better
from history.
Devers and Eaker soon headed for the Mediterranean, where
Devers became deputy theater commander and was deeply involved in
operations there until he brought elements of his Sixth Army Group
ashore in France in August for the Anvil-Dragoon assault. He led a
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combined force of 12 American and 11 French divisions that drove
north, cleared Alsace, eventually cleared the Colmar pocket, crossed the
Rhine, and participated in the final campaigns that defeated Germany.
Few American officers would have been able to handle the stubborn
French as well as he did. He actually reached the Rhine in November
1944, and some historians view Ike’s refusal to allow the Sixth Army
Group to jump the river then as one of the great lost opportunities of
the war. After the surrender, he commanded the Army Ground Forces
until heading off for an uneventful retirement out of the limelight.
It is worth contemplating why someone with such a list of accomplishments has been so quickly relegated to the dustbin of history. Devers did
not participate in the invasion of Normandy nor the Battle of the Bulge,
the two most iconic American battles in northwest Europe. He was not a
self-promoter, and later was accused of having “foot-in-mouth” disease
with the press, though he was never involved in any scandals. He did not
write a memoir. His relationships with his peers were respectful, but not
close, and he never became part of Eisenhower’s inner circle. Wheeler
believes the source of Ike’s reticence towards Devers started in North
Africa, when George Marshall sent his chief of the Armored Force to
check on early operations. Assaulted by many problems, Ike probably
saw the senior Devers as a possible replacement, and from then on he
viewed Devers more as a rival than a subordinate, though Devers never
perceived that.
I once participated in a generalship panel at West Point with noted
historians Stephen Ambrose, Martin Blumenson, and Brooks Kleber,
and they argued the press usually creates great generals, while historians
spend eternity trying to adjust those images. Scott Wheeler has done an
admirable job countering a veritable press vacuum with a rich account
worthy of being read by anyone interested in World War II. Devers
might not have gotten much attention in his day, but he deserves it now.

An American Soldier in the Great War: The World War I Diary
and Letters of Elmer O. Smith
Edited by John DellaGiustina
Reviewed by COL Douglas V. Mastriano, PhD, Department of Military
Strategy, Plans and Operations, US Army War College

O

ne hundred years ago, Europe was ablaze with fire and death. In
February 1916, the German army launched a devastating attack
towards the French city of Verdun. As the casualties mounted, and the
Battle of Verdun dragged on, the French appealed to their British Allies
to launch an attack along the northern portion of the Western Front to
relieve the pressure. The British obliged and began the Somme Offensive
on July 1, 1916. The attack had the desired effect, and reduced the pressure on the French at Verdun, though at a terrible price in lives and
treasure for the United Kingdom. It would be another year before the
United States entered the war. Yet, when it did, tens of thousands of
young Americans rallied to the flag and volunteered to serve. Among
these patriotic volunteers was Elmer O. Smith.
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Retired US Army Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) John DellaGiustina
edited the book, An American Soldier in the Great War: The World War I
Diary and Letters of Elmer O. Smith, which tells the story of his grandfather,
Elmer O. Smith. Using Elmer’s wartime diary and letters to his family,
supplemented by reputable World War I sources, DellaGiustina does a
masterful job weaving together the saga of a soldier serving in the Great
War.
The story begins with Elmer’s early days in the Army. Sadly, the
United States did little to prepare for the war, and rapidly expanded its
prewar force of 220,000 to more than four million troops in only eighteen months. Although an impressive feat, the ability of these soldiers to
fight “modern” war, was in doubt. This was not helped by General John
Pershing’s intent to reject the wartime lessons learned by the French
and British. Pershing instead believed American soldiers armed with
rifles and bayonets would win the day. Such a view triggered the French
Prime Minister, Georges Clemenceau, to retort, “If the Americans do
not permit the French to teach them, then the Germans will do so.”
Soldiers like Elmer Smith would pay the price for America’s lack of
preparedness and for Pershing’s ill-advised ideas on how to fight in 1918.
Yet, like other soldiers in the American Expeditionary Forces,
Elmer Smith trained hard and looked forward to fighting. Serving in
the 32nd Division’s 119th Field Artillery Regiment, Smith participated
in four major campaigns, and had more than 60 days in combat. He was
wounded by German artillery, endured gas attacks, and, more importantly, provided support to four American divisions (the 79th, 3rd, 89th,
and 32th) during the heaviest fighting Americans encountered in the
war.
Of Smith’s combat experience, his 37 days in the Meuse Argonne were
perhaps the most significant. The Meuse Argonne Campaign remains
America’s largest offensive ever, with more than 1.2 million soldiers
serving in the line. It was part of four major attacks across the Western
Front planned by the first Allied Supreme Commander (Generalissimo),
Marshal Ferdinand Foch. This brilliant broad front attack contributed
to bringing the war to an end on November 11, 1918. Smith served in all
but the last week of this important campaign. His role was important in
that he participated in the reduction of the “Kriemhilde Stellung,” the last
German defensive line in the region. Once his division penetrated the
Kriemhilde, the ability of the German army to blunt the American attack
all but came to an end.
An American Soldier in the Great War is a timely book about one soldier
who did his duty in the face of daunting odds. John DellaGiustina tells
a story worth reading, especially during the centennial commemoration
of World War I. Through it all, the enduring lessons of having a trained
and ready army echo across the generations to us today. Indeed, men like
Smith and countless others found themselves in a war their nation was
not prepared for. Many paid the ultimate price for the lack of American
preparedness. Hopefully, books like this one, will remind the nation of
the need for eternal vigilance to maintain the peace and to secure final
victory.
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Connecticut Unscathed: Victory in the Great
Narragansett War
By Jason W. Warren
Reviewed by Dr. Matthew S. Muehlbauer, author of Ways of War: American
Military History from the Colonial Era to the Twenty-First Century and Adjunct
Professor of Military History, Austin Peay State University

T

he conflict generally known as King Philip’s War ravaged southern
New England in 1675-76, generating thousands of casualties and
refugees. Death, flight, and the subsequent sale of Indian captives into
slavery roughly halved the region’s native population. Among the victorious colonies, about a dozen towns in Massachusetts Bay, Plymouth, and
Rhode Island were completely destroyed, with more partially damaged.
But, as author Jason W. Warren observes, Connecticut remained relatively “unscathed” during the war. Focusing on this colony, he offers a
new perspective on the conflict, as prior treatments emphasized those
areas where intense hostilities occurred. In doing so, Warren challenges
accepted notions about combat during the war, as well as its very name.
Warren first notes how Connecticut and local indigenous peoples
had maintained amicable mutual relations since the Pequot War of 163738. When King Philip’s War began, Massachusetts Bay and Plymouth
were surprised by the initial Indian attacks and reacted by incarcerating
peaceful native groups within their jurisdictions. In contrast, Mohegans,
Pequots, and other local peoples provided crucial intelligence to
Connecticut authorities and helped protect the colony throughout the
war. Moreover, cross-cultural cooperation fostered a unique tactical
approach among its field forces.
Standard narratives of King Philip’s War describe militia forces
as hapless in the face of native ambushes and raids. Late in the war,
colonists began to work with Indian allies. Some commanders created
mixed units of both settlers and Indian warriors who used native tactics:
relying upon terrain and stealthy movement, and forgoing closed-order
formations typical of European combat. One of these, led by Benjamin
Church, hunted down and killed Philip himself, the Wampanoag leader
traditionally blamed for launching the war. Warren challenges this interpretation, asserting it relies heavily on Benjamin Church’s memoirs and
similar accounts. Among Connecticut’s forces, Warren claims a military
“division of labor” existed between the soldiers and native warriors on
campaign (13). Whereas the latter functioned as scouts and flankers,
troopers provided firepower once targets had been located and fixed
by the warriors. (In contrast to other colonies’ infantry, Warren notes
most of Connecticut’s were mounted.) Similarly, colonists assaulted fortifications, whereas Indians would form an outer perimeter to prevent
enemies from escaping.
A significant research challenge for the colonial period is Indian
peoples left no records. English settlers occasionally noted native
perspectives, though scholars then need to account for biases in their
transcriptions. Warren shares some intriguing documents that speak
to Indian views, such as the accounts of hostile warriors Menowalett
and Cohas (74-77). These demonstrate the complex nature of Indian
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identity: the tribal labels settlers used to designate various native groups
(“Niantics,” etc.) did not necessarily reflect native affiliations, which
were complicated by kinship networks. Warren notes this challenge
made the colonists’ reliance upon trustworthy native allies all the more
important, for they could better determine allegiances among New
England’s disparate indigenous groups and colonists. He also employs
archeological research and terrain analysis to bolster his argument.
The relative lack of Indian perspectives is significant for aspects
of Warren’s argument. In particular, he asserts native allies helped to
deflect enemy incursions into Connecticut and minimize the damage
from those that occurred. Warren also devotes a chapter to fortifications, noting they also helped deter attacks upon the colony. But, without
access to Indian points of view and deliberations, we cannot know the
relative impact of these factors upon the native leaders who directed
attacks against English settlements. Though not a means to solve the
problem, more discussion of developments beyond Connecticut might
have helped mitigate this issue, or at least provided more context for
understanding available alternatives.
As for Warren’s claim the conflict should be known as the Great
Narragansett War, other scholarship indicates Philip’s influence over
events was limited, and the Narragansetts deserve more attention in the
broader history of the region. The fact that the war was half over before
the Narragansetts became active belligerents—and only did so after
the New England colonies launched a pre-emptive attack against their
homeland—should give one pause. Moreover, such a change would
deflect attention from the experiences of the other indigenous peoples
who fought and suffered during the conflict (similar to the current
problem of calling it King Philip’s War)—including those who initiated
hostilities.
These concerns, however, should not obscure the value of Warren’s
work. Whereas many scholars highlight examples of cultural adaptability, and particularly how colonists adopted native combat techniques,
Warren asserts—at least in 1675-76—Connecticut colonists still relied
primarily on tactics predominant in Europe, with Mohegan and Pequot
allies fulfilling functions for which they were better suited in New
England’s wooded terrain. His book is an important contribution to the
literature.

War and Ethics
The Ethics of Armed Conflict: A Cosmopolitan Just War Theory
By John W. Lango
Reviewed by Dr. Pauline M. Shanks Kaurin, author of The Warrior, Military
Ethics and Contemporary Warfare: Achilles Goes Asymmetric, and Associate
Professor and Chair, Department of Philosophy, Pacific Lutheran University
Edinburgh, Scotland:
Edinburgh University Press,
2014
246 pages
$120.00

I

n The Ethics of Armed Conflict: A Cosmopolitan Just War Theory, John
Lango brings a cosmopolitan, universal human rights orientation to
the discussion of Just War Theory that is accessible to non-specialists.
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His thesis is that Just War Theory should be understood deontologically
and oriented around the following points: 1) a revisionist approach to just
war, including all kinds of responsible agents; 2) a focus on the Security
Council; 3) a preventative approach, including non-violent tools; 4) a
temporalizing approach to present and future conflicts; 5) a coherentist
approach, including just war and general moral principles and real-world
cases; and 6) a universal human rights approach, including a variety of
forms of armed conflict. (ix) There are multiple themes and moving parts
in this ambitious book; it covers a great deal of philosophical ground
with significant discussion of real-world conflicts, past and present.
As a scholar and teacher of the Just War Tradition and military
ethics, I found several points worth highlighting. First, Lango raises the
issue of which acts count as military actions as opposed to non-military
actions—notably the question of whether threats of military force are
types of military actions and count as war. The second is his focus on
the Security Council and the locus for cosmopolitan arguments; Lango
admits it is flawed, but it is the best we have at present. Third, he wants
to expand the class of persons considered under Just War Theory to “all
responsible persons,” not just the usual combatant/non-combatant distinctions. Finally, he considers the question of whether one can justify
using military threats to prevent mass atrocities; this is a question of
keen interest to those considering humanitarian interventions or peacekeeping operations.
While there is much that merits consideration in this book, and I
commend the complexity of the issues and theoretical considerations
Lango is wrestling with, this volume is still heavy on theory and would
be challenging for non-specialists to find accessible and useful. I think
that is the nature of these kinds of discussions, and it is a difficult needle
to thread. Case studies certainly help in this regard, but there are too
many theoretical balls in the air to hold onto the flow of the argument
from beginning to end, much less to then reflect upon the implications
of the arguments Lango is making for the practice and conduct of war.
In terms of specific arguments and claims, Lango’s use of philosophical action theory is really interesting and potentially useful; however, he
needed to develop it in a more accessible and streamlined way so readers
could see how it was integrated into the overall argument. Given the
preventative arguments and the focus on the status of military threats
in the overall discussion, the theory of action section was weak in laying
the necessary foundation for those arguments.
I also found myself wondering how Lango thinks about individual responsibility, especially in the context of the conduct of war for
responsible agents and for citizens in a cosmopolitan world. He seems
more comfortable with arguments that address a more collective view
of action and responsibility, presumably out of his concern to expand
these arguments to “all responsible agents.” Are there different levels or
kinds of accountability for some responsible agents (say those involved
in military action) as opposed to others (like citizens, victims of atrocities)? How does the answer to these questions change the way we think
about responsibility in war? He indicates he holds some “revisionist”
views, and authors in that vein, like Jeff McMahan, are moving towards
an individualist account and rejecting collectivist accounts of responsibility in war for combatants.
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In short, this book will be most useful to those well versed in
Anglo-American moral philosophy and contemporary Just War Theory,
especially those interested in thinking about war in a more cosmopolitan way. Those who consider themselves in the realist camp, and/or are
interested in strategy, will find much to be challenged by in terms of
arguments and perspectives. The book does raise some important questions, and it will spark discussions in those areas amongst scholars who
can advance the debate and then make the ideas more generally accessible than they are here.

Counterinsurgency
The Soul of Armies: Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Military
Culture in the US and UK
By Austin Long
Reviewed by Colonel Ian C. Rice, Military Faculty, Defense Analysis
Department, Naval Postgraduate School

H
Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 2016
288 pages
$24.95

ow did it come to this? Austin Long asked, reflecting on the endless
briefings in the over-staffed headquarters where he worked as a
policy analyst in both Afghanistan and Iraq. In The Soul of Armies, Dr.
Long, now a Columbia University political science professor, explores
the question: how does an army’s organizational culture impact how it
conducts counter-insurgency?
Long argues an army’s ability to execute a counter-insurgency
campaign is rooted in formative experiences during the 19th century.
These early experiences shaped organizational cultures that persist to
this day, and some organizational cultures are better suited for counterinsurgency than others. Combining social science methods and archival
evidence, Long develops two organizational archetypes—the continental army model where formative experiences and professionalization
focus on fighting and winning major wars for national survival against
strong state enemies and the maritime army model centered on frequent
wars of choice designed to support imperial maintenance with smaller
numbers of distributed forces.
The author looks at four cases: Vietnam and Kenya, and his first-hand
experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq. Long compares the performances
of the US Army representing the continental army model, with both
the US Marine Corps and the British Army as examples of the maritime
army model. His evidence demonstrates continental armies perform differently than their maritime counterparts with the former focused on
large-scale operations and an overwhelming use of firepower to achieve
results, while maritime armies (typically operating in small numbers)
depend on their ability to find, select, and then work effectively with
local partners, partners who will do much of the fighting.
Long’s investigation into organizational archetypes is in good
company. In a 1964 study, French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to
Algeria: The Analysis of Political and Military Doctrine, Peter Paret also noted
these differences. He contrasted “pure soldiers” who were only useful in
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Europe with French colonial troops who were expected to be self-reliant
and manage their sectors with a special emphasis on “local conditions.”
In a style accessible to both scholarly and professional military readerships, Long’s historical analysis is also a worthy companion to more
recent works focused on the doctrinal origins of counter-insurgency,
namely Douglas Porch’s Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New
Way of War, David French’s The British Way of Counter-Insurgency, 1945-1967
and Brian McAllister Linn’s Echo of Battle: The Army’s Way of War. Notably,
John Nagl’s Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons From
Malaya and Vietnam compares the American and British armies’ ability
to learn from experiences, whereas Long stresses the longevity of the
founding culture.
Currently, a tiny task force of predominately special operations
“counter-insurgents” is training and advising indigenous forces to dislodge the Islamic State from Iraq and Syria. The results of the operation
may produce more evidence to bolster Long’s argument. Will the multilayered headquarters atop the small advise-and-assist force limit itself
to supporting Iraq’s military, or will the strong organizational pull of
Long’s continental archetype lead to an increase in ground forces and
greater US and coalition involvement?
It is unlikely the importance of organizational culture will diminish
anytime soon. Policymakers, military professionals, and scholars will
all gain insights from this book. Long provides cause for introspection
by those who variously formulate policy, conduct operations, and study
this “new way of war.” However, there must be something missing in
how the United States wages counter-insurgency campaigns. Although
Long presents convincing evidence that organizational culture impacts
the conduct of counter-insurgency operations, as he points out, the key
for successful campaigns must rest beyond organizational culture alone.
Perhaps the larger question is not just which, but whether these two
land-force archetypes have ever successfully countered ongoing insurgencies in the first place.

ISIS
Black Flags: The Rise of ISIS
By Joby Warrick
Reviewed by Dr. W. Andrew Terrill, a recently retired research professor from
the US Army War College

W

ashington Post reporter Joby Warrick’s study of the Islamic State of
Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is primarily a history of the emergence and
expansion of the organization well before it began using the name ISIS.
Approximately, the first two-thirds of the book deal with the activities
of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the Jordanian street criminal turned terrorist,
who became the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), a predecessor of ISIS.
As a violent street thug, Zarqawi was convinced by his mother to study
Islam at a local mosque in the hope he could be straightened out. While
he did respond to some Islamic ideas, he filtered these ideas through his
own violent outlook and later became further radicalized in Afghanistan.

New York, NY: Doubleday,
2015
344 pages
$28.95

126

Parameters 46(2) Summer 2016

After returning to Jordan, the incipient jihadist leader was imprisoned by authorities in 1992 for terrorism-related activities. Then, in the
harsh conditions of al-Jafr Prison, Zarqawi formed a partnership with
a radical Islamist propagandist and spiritual leader, Abu Mohammed
al-Maqdisi, eventually becoming the unquestioned leader of the radical
Islamist prisoners. Later, Zarqawi was released from prison in 1999
through what Warrick characterizes as a Jordanian bureaucratic mistake
concerning who was eligible for a sweeping royal pardon following King
Abdullah’s assumption of the throne. Eventually the ex-inmate ended
up back in Afghanistan as the leader of a small band of terrorists. While
there, Zarqawi hoped to coordinate with Osama bin Laden, but the
al-Qaeda leader did not have the time or interest to meet with him and
assigned this duty to subordinates.
Zarqawi’s rise, from a small-time radical bin Laden could not be
bothered with to an internationally known terrorist leader, occurred
because of the Iraq war. In late 2001 or early 2002, Zarqawi saw a
potential Iraq war as an opportunity to lead his small band of terrorists
against the American troops he felt were certain to invade the country.
He and his followers correspondingly infiltrated into an area of Kurdish
Iraq outside of the control of Iraqi dictator, Saddam Hussein. There
he attached himself to Ansar al-Islam, a group of al-Qaeda-affiliated
Kurdish insurgents, who were waging war against the regime.
Warrick maintains this move led the Bush administration to give
Zarqawi an inadvertent reputational boost by singling him out as a
premier al-Qaeda operative during Secretary of State Colin Powell’s
February 2003 United Nations speech, made to justify a possible US-led
invasion of Iraq. In that speech, Powell strongly implied Zarqawi could
not have been in Iraq unless Saddam was providing him with sanctuary.
The administration made these assertions despite regular skirmishes
between Zarqawi’s forces and the Iraqi army, as well as the terrorist
leader’s decision to align with radical Kurds, who viewed Saddam’s policies towards their ethnic group as genocidal. Warrick further describes
the CIA’s chief “Zarqawi expert” as mortified by the mistakes in
Powell’s presentation. Unfortunately, the speech did have an important,
if unforeseen, political impact by helping to make Zarqawi a terrorist
celebrity, and thereby increasing his ability to raise money and attract
recruits. Warrick also maintains President Bush considered striking the
Zarqawi and Ansar al-Islam terrorist base, but stopped short of doing
so because destroying Zarqawi’s headquarters and killing a number of
terrorists would undermine a key rationale about the need for war.
After the invasion of Iraq, Zarqawi rapidly expanded his suddenly
thriving organization, benefiting from Sunni anger over the disbanding
of the Iraqi army and the US-sponsored program of de-Ba’athification.
Surprisingly, for a semi-educated criminal turned jihadist, Zarqawi
emerged as a remarkably insightful and agile strategist. By contrast,
the US administration characterized the Iraqi resistance as Ba’athist
“dead-enders” who were simply striking out blindly. Armed with such
a narrative, many US officials failed to recognize patterns in Zarqawi’s
attacks which indicated his strategy for undermining the occupation.
Warrick maintains Zarqawi bombed the Jordanian embassy in
Baghdad not simply for revenge against the monarchy, but also to discourage other nations from establishing diplomatic relations with Iraq.
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Likewise, the murder of the head of the UN Mission to Iraq, Sergio
Vieira de Mello, and a number of other UN personnel in a truck bombing
was meant to convey the message NGOs might want to find work elsewhere. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Zarqawi attacked Iraq’s
Shi’ites in an effort to poison sectarian relations, incite civil war, and
make Iraq ungovernable. Warrick maintains back in the United States,
Vice President Cheney and his aides were putting pressure on the CIA
to link Zarqawi to Saddam, rather than unraveling the terrorist leader’s
strategy for undermining the occupation. Conversely, bin Laden was
taking notice of the former nobody from the Jordanian slums and the
two eventually negotiated an agreement, whereby Zarqawi became alQaeda’s emir (prince and leader) in Iraq.
Warrick characterizes Zarqawi’s orders for the bombing of three
Western hotels in Amman, Jordan as a major mistake that unified most
of the country against him, despite some previous public sympathy for
any organizations resisting US forces in Iraq. While the terrorist leader
claimed he was striking at Israeli and American intelligence operatives,
the deaths of large numbers of Jordanian civilians, including children,
rapidly undermined these claims. The strike also enabled Jordan’s King
Abdullah to intensify his struggle against al-Qaeda in Iraq and to improve
his already good intelligence cooperation with the United States.
These bonds, which extended to intelligence operations in Iraq,
were to be of tremendous help in hunting down the renegade Jordanian.
Eventually, in response to a great deal of effort by a number of intelligence officials, Zarqawi was found and then killed in a US airstrike in
June 2006. This loss caused his organization to enter a rapid downward
spiral due to the lack of any equally charismatic leader. Warrick also
maintains “fusion cells” composed of US Special Forces and intelligence units played a major role in defeating the organization, as did
the formation of anti-al-Qaeda Sunni militias as a central part of the
US-sponsored anti-jihadi Awakening Councils.
The Syrian revolution helped revive AQI after the post-Zarqawi
leadership sponsored a jihadi force known as the al-Nusra Front to
oppose the brutal and unpopular Bashar Assad government. AQI, which
had undergone a number of name changes during its years of operation,
became ISIS during this time frame and eventually sent a number of
its own directly affiliated fighters into Syria where they sought to seize
territory and re-absorb al-Nusra. The al-Nusra leaders had maintained
only limited ties to ISIS during the Syrian fighting and did not wish to
be integrated directly into that organization. The disagreement between
the two groups then expanded to include al-Qaeda’s formal leaders in
Pakistan. When al-Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri attempted to force
ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi to allow al-Nusra to exist independently, he was simply ignored, and ISIS seized considerable territory
from al-Nusra with significant numbers of casualties on both sides.
This conflict led to ISIS being expelled from al-Qaeda, an event
which had no impact on the organization’s soaring fortunes, as it came
to dominate the Syrian opposition. The ISIS leadership also cleverly
moved to establish improved relations with many of Iraq’s Sunni tribes
which Zarqawi had previously alienated. Seething with resentment of
the Shi’ite-led government in Baghdad, many tribal leaders were convinced ISIS would not repeat AQI’s brutal mistakes in alienating the
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Sunni tribes. This judgment proved to be mistaken tragically when ISIS
imposed an administration of harsh, and often arbitrary, brutality on
northern Iraq following its successful military offensive in June 2014.
In evaluating ISIS occupation of Syrian and Iraqi territory, Warrick
quotes a young Syrian man who describes “a culture of backwardness
and terror, [which emerges] after extinguishing the light of the mind.”
Warrick also quotes a teenage gunman who views his role as an ISIS
fighter as “quite fun” and compares his experience to a 3D video game.
Warrick continuously notes Islam under ISIS is anything its leadership
says it is, and ISIS ideology and the religion of Islam are two radically
different things. While such observations are useful, the ISIS ideology
remains a long way from the oblivion it richly deserves, and the group
itself continues to show resilience and flexibility, as well as an ability to
absorb tough military punishment and still strike hard at the civilized
world. One suspects many more high-quality books on ISIS, such as this
one, will need to be written in the future as this ugly chapter in human
history continues to play out.

Human Terrain System
Social Science Goes to War: The Human Terrain System
in Iraq and Afghanistan
By Montgomery McFate and Janice H. Laurence, Eds.
Reviewed by Ryan D. Wadle, Professor of Comparative Military Studies at the
Air Command and Staff College

W
New York, NY: Oxford
University Press, 2015
320 pages
$39.95

hen the Human Terrain System (HTS) appeared at the height
of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom in 2007, it
represented an admission on the part of the defense establishment—it
lacked enough knowledge of local conditions to wage a population-centric
counterinsurgency campaign effectively. The HTS sought to embed
individual Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) at the brigade level in order to
provide an operationally useful understanding of local culture and conditions and to bridge knowledge gaps as military units rotated in and out of
theater. The HTS attracted media attention because it presented a novel
solution to a difficult problem and also through issues surrounding the
proper execution of its ambitious vision. It continues to spark discussion
in defense and academic circles, even as the American contingents in Iraq
and Afghanistan are but a fraction of their former size and as the public
shows reluctance to support any further long-term counterinsurgency
campaigns. As one of the first academic studies of the HTS, the edited
volume Social Science Goes to War succeeds at its stated goal of illuminating
how the HTTs performed in theater and meaningfully contributed to the
war effort.
Social Science Goes to War includes 11 chapters: three describe the
conduct of research by the HTTs, another three detail how the HTTs
sought to integrate their research into the military decision-making
process in a meaningful way, and two discuss the historical and contemporary ethics issues raised by the employment of the HTS. The
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remaining chapters overview the HTS’ establishment, explore the gulf
between the military and academic communities, and frankly assess the
HTS’ past and future utility to the Department of Defense. Unlike some
edited volumes where the quality of the individual chapters varies widely,
the contributions to Social Science Goes to War are uniformly strong and
valuable in providing unique insights into various aspects of the HTS.
A few common themes emerge across the volume. Most notably,
there is a defensive tone to nearly every chapter, likely because the
contributors—nearly all of whom worked with the HTS in some capacity—felt compelled to counteract negative, and often unfair, perceptions
of the program. These views of the HTS stemmed from the outsized
negative media coverage of its failings, including disciplinary issues
of personnel and the deaths of four HTT members. The HTS also
received widespead vitriolic condemnation by members of the American
Anthropological Association (AAA) against any cooperation between
members of its profession and the military. Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban and
George R. Lucas Jr. link the latter’s criticism to anthropology’s historical
association with colonialism and unsavory projects such as the Vietnam
War’s infamous Operation Phoenix.
Yet, for all of the concerns raised by the AAA, the researchers sought
to follow the ethical guidelines issued by the AAA, the American Political
Science Association, and other peer bodies. The researchers protected
the anonymity of their interview subjects in accordance with the principle of “do no harm,” and out of fear of generating lists of suspected
insurgents for host units to act upon. The military units they operated
with concurred in this decision because, as James Dorough-Lewis Jr.
highlights, identifying key individuals remained the responsibility of
military intelligence. In fact, the most notable shortcomings from an
academic perspective were more procedural than ethical as security
concerns and time constraints often prevented HTTs from conducting
the follow-up research necessary to meet academic standards. Rather,
the researchers recognized they needed to provide timely “snapshots”
of local conditions to be of use to their host units.
While highlighting the contributions social science research made
in the field, the authors all concede the HTS had several shortcomings and limitations. The HTS never fully accomplished its stated
goal of easing the transition between old units rotating home and new
units taking their places—largely because new units often sought to
gain their own perspective on the battlespace rather than rely on their
predecessors perspectives. As an experimental program, the HTS was
administered through a contract that limited direct oversight by military
officials and led to numerous poor personnel decisions in both hiring
and management, creating unnecessary friction. Despite these and other
problems, however, Janice H. Laurence points out numerous independent evaluations of the HTS concluded it had ultimately proven effective
at providing the desired knowledge to host units and reducing their reliance on lethal operations to succeed.
Social Science Goes to War is an excellent volume about an oftenmisunderstood element of the American experience in Iraq and
Afghanistan. One hopes this thoughtfulness will lead to more reasoned debates on the relationship between the military and academic
communities and a search for possible common ground between them.
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